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ABSTRACT 
 
Electronic communication is used everyday for a number of different applications.  
Some of the information transferred during these communications can be private 
requiring encryption and authentication protocols to keep this information secure.  
Although there are protocols today which provide some security, they are not 
necessarily unconditionally secure.  Quantum based protocols on the other hand, can 
provide unconditionally secure protocols for encryption and authentication.   
Prior to this Thesis, only one experimental realisation of quantum digital signatures had 
been demonstrated.  This used a lossy photonic device along with a quantum memory 
allowing two parties to test whether they were sent the same signature by a single 
sender, and also store the quantum states for measurement later.  This restricted the 
demonstration to distances of only a few metres, and was tested with a primitive 
approximation of a quantum memory rather than an actual one.  This Thesis presents an 
experimental realisation of a quantum digital signature protocol which removes the 
reliance on quantum memory at the receivers, making a major step towards practicality.  
By removing the quantum memory, it was also possible to perform the swap and 
comparison mechanism in a more efficient manner resulting in an experimental 
realisation of quantum digital signatures over 2 kilometres of optical fibre.  
Quantum communication protocols can be unconditionally secure, however the 
transmission distance is limited by loss in quantum channels.  To overcome this loss in 
conventional channels an optical amplifier is used, however the added noise from these 
would swamp the quantum signal if directly used in quantum communications. 
This Thesis looked into probabilistic quantum amplification, with an experimental 
realisation of the state comparison amplifier, based on linear optical components and 
single-photon detectors.  The state comparison amplifier operated by using the well-
established techniques of optical coherent state comparison and weak subtraction to 
post-select the output and provide non-deterministic amplification with increased 
fidelity at a high repetition rate.  The success rates of this amplifier were found to be 
orders of magnitude greater than other state of the art quantum amplifiers, due to its lack 
of requirement for complex quantum resources, such as single or entangled photon 
sources, and photon number resolving detectors.  
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
The privacy and authenticity of electronic communications (e.g. e-commerce, online 
voting, stocks and share, emails) has become an extremely important topic given the 
current trend of moving to electronic communications for ease of use.   
For instance, one party (Alice) may wish to send a private message to a receiver (Bob). 
Before sending the message they must share some encryption key, which allows them send 
the message over an insecure communication channel.  Sharing of the key can be 
accomplished by several different methods, however an eavesdropper could intercept the 
key sharing and be able to almost effortlessly eavesdrop into the private messages.   
One method to overcome the eavesdropper was to perform key sharing where partial 
information is given to a party to encrypt a private message.  The remaining information 
kept by the other party allows them to decrypt the encrypted information, however this 
information isn’t released meaning an eavesdropper would still require a large amount of 
effort to decrypting the message.  This method is known as public-key cryptography, 
where in commonly used protocols Alice generates some parameters and sends some out 
into a public channel where Bob can receive them.  Alice can decrypt the message 
encrypted by Bob based on the parameters she has kept.   
Although the public key cryptography schemes allow efficient sharing of encryption keys, 
and can be used to provide authentication protocols as well, an eavesdropper can still 
intercept the encrypted message and try to break the encryption.  These protocols are not 
unconditionally secure, meaning there is possibility they can be broken faster than a brute 
force attack which is simply guessing until they get the right answer.  
The one-time pad is an encryption protocol which is unconditionally secure, however an 
eavesdropper could intercept the key during the sharing process.  In order to provide 
unconditional secure encryption, the sending of the key must be made unconditionally 
secure.  Quantum based protocols, where the security is based on the well-known laws of 
2 
 
quantum mechanics, can provide unconditionally secure encryption key, and digital 
signature sharing, which allows eavesdroppers to be revealed during the sharing.  This 
solves two key issues with today’s conventional protocols. 
This Thesis focuses on two topics, quantum digital signatures (QDS) [1], and quantum 
amplification [2], more specifically experimentally realising those protocols.  While 
quantum key distribution (QKD) [3], a more mature quantum technology, focuses on 
secure key distribution, QDS looks at the problem of message authentication and message 
transferability.  Quantum amplification is also a less mature technology, focusing on 
amplifying quantum states, which could lead to applications in extending the transmission 
distance of QKD and QDS.   
Chapter 2 will describe technology which was used to perform experiments carried out in 
this Thesis.  It also includes overviews of other technologies which could be implemented 
and highlights the reasons why they are not chosen for the experimental realisations in this 
Thesis. 
With the enabling technologies reviewed, Chapter 3 will focus on cryptography and digital 
signatures, with both conventional and quantum protocols described.  Firstly, conventional 
protocols are introduced to give the reader an idea of how cryptography and digital 
signatures work.  Hacking and breaking of conventional communications is a hot topic, so 
current and possible future methods are described [4].  With that covered the reasons why 
quantum methods of communications are being sought are highlighted.   
Chapter 4 is the first experimental research Chapter, covering work on an experimental 
realisation of QDS which did not require any quantum memories [5].  Chapter 2 gives an 
overview of quantum memory technologies, after that it will be clear to see why quantum 
memory is not, at the moment, a good technology to rely on for quantum communication 
protocols [6].  This complete removal of quantum memory from the experimental 
implementation allowed a quantum digital signature protocol which was actually 
experimentally possible to build with today’s technology.  
Chapter 5 follows on from work carried out in Chapter 4, and describes an experimental 
realisation of a QDS protocol which could be carried out over kilometre ranges, also 
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without the requirement for quantum memory [7]. This experiment shows another major 
step forward for QDS becoming a commercially viable technology. 
Chapter 6 moves onto the other topic of this Thesis, quantum amplification.  Firstly, an 
overview of how amplification is carried out in conventional optical telecommunications is 
given.  This is followed by methods for carrying out quantum optical amplification using 
non-deterministic post-processing. 
Chapter 7 will describe the state comparison amplifier (SCAMP), a quantum optical 
amplifier based on photon addition and subtraction [8].  This amplifier does not require 
any complex quantum resources such as single-photon sources, or photon number 
resolving detectors, making its experimental implementation much simpler.  As well as 
examining basic characteristics, the device is also tested for robustness against added 
optical noise from a wide, and a narrow band wavelength source. 
Chapter 8 will describe some experiments which further investigated properties of state 
comparison amplifier.  The first experiment was to increase the nominal gain to overcome 
experimental losses experienced in the Chapter 7 implementation.  Noise robustness for 
this higher gain device was also investigated, but only with the narrow band wavelength 
source.  Finally the device characteristics with an extra subtraction stage are described. 
Chapter 9 will serve as a general conclusion to the Thesis.  This will summarise each 
Chapter highlighting key results and discoveries.  This chapter will also describe future 
work which could be undertaken, based on the conclusions.   
1.2 Bibliography 
[1] D. Gottesman and I. Chuang, “Quantum Digital Signatures,” arXiv.org, no. 
0105032v2, 2001. 
[2] V. Scarani, S. Iblisdir, N. Gisin, and A. Acín, “Quantum cloning,” Rev. Mod. Phys., 
vol. 77, no. 4, pp. 1225–1256, Nov. 2005. 
[3] W. Tittel, H. Zbinden, and N. Gisin, “Quantum cryptography,” Rev. Mod. Phys., 
vol. 74, no. 1, pp. 145–195, 2002. 
[4] M. Campagna, L. Chen, Ö. Dagdelen, J. Ding, J. K. Fernick, N. Gisin, D. Hayford, 
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Jeffers, and G. S. Buller, “Realization of Quantum Digital Signatures without the 
Requirement of Quantum Memory,” Phys. Rev. Lett., vol. 113, no. 4, p. 040502, 
2014. 
[6] A. I. Lvovsky, B. C. Sanders, and W. Tittel, “Optical quantum memory,” Nat. 
Photonics, vol. 3, no. 12, pp. 706–714, Dec. 2009. 
[7] R. J. Donaldson, R. J. Collins, K. Kleczkowska, R. Amiri, P. Wallden, V. Dunjko, J. 
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range quantum digital signatures,” Phys. Rev. A, vol. 93, no. 1, p. 012329, Jan. 2016. 
[8] R. J. Donaldson, R. J. Collins, E. Eleftheriadou, S. M. Barnett, J. Jeffers, and G. S. 
Buller, “Experimental Implementation of a Quantum Optical State Comparison 
Amplifier,” Phys. Rev. Lett., vol. 114, no. 12, p. 120505, 2015. 
 
5 
Chapter 2 
Review of Enabling Technologies 
2.1 Introduction 
The topic of this Thesis falls under the area of quantum communications, a relatively new 
(and exciting) area in the subject of communications.  As well as being new, the 
technologies and methods required for implementing quantum cryptographic protocols are 
vastly different to those used to carry out conventional protocols, which we use every day.  
This Chapter will deal with the technologies required to experimentally implement 
quantum communications protocols while the following Chapter will introduce some of 
those protocols with examples using the technologies highlighted here. 
Understanding the technology which can be used for implementing quantum cryptographic 
protocols is vital, as this enables us to understand the practical limitations of quantum 
communications, and therefore make a better estimate of applications.  For this reason, 
enabling technologies is covered before the communications Chapter, as some of the 
subtleties in quantum communications protocol workings may not appreciated without 
understanding the technology behind it.  
The first section of this Chapter gives an overview of single-photon and attenuated laser 
sources, which provide the photons for quantum communications protocols which require 
the use of single or low photon number pulses of light.  The second section describes 
photon detection technologies which are sensitive enough to detect the weak intensity light 
that is received in quantum communications protocols.  The third section will give an 
overview of quantum memories, an important quantum technology for many quantum 
information experiments, and also quantum computers.  The fourth section covers 
transmission media for quantum communications.  Different transmission media have 
different characteristics, in terms of loss, and effect on photon properties, therefore the 
choice of transmission medium should be considered depending on the communications 
protocol. 
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2.2 Single-photon and attenuated laser sources 
As will be discussed in greater detail in the following chapter, quantum key distribution 
(QKD) protocols require single-photon level pulses in order to provide protection from a 
range of eavesdropping attacks.  In the original quantum key distribution proposal, [1], 
Alice sends a pulse train of single-photons, each with a corresponding information 
encoding.  Later protocols have expanded this to coherent states [2] but perfect single-
photon sources still offer significant advantages, such as improved transmission distance, 
bit rate [3], and therefore remain important.  Additionally, single-photons have uses in 
optical quantum amplifiers [4], [5] and some applications of quantum computing [6].   
Single-photon sources are desirable for QKD, other quantum communications and 
information experiments, such as quantum digital signatures (QDS) [7] may also find some 
benefit as well, as QDS can be performed using components similar to QKD.  This section 
will deal with how these single-photon level pulses can be generated, and also give an 
overview of single-photon sources.   
2.2.1 Weak coherent sources 
Coherent sources, lasers, are well known for providing light which, when examined within 
the coherence time, is indistinguishable, i.e. the properties of the photons emitted during 
the coherence time are all identical.  Coherent sources have emission which conforms to 
Poissonian photon statistics with random spacing of photons in the optical stream [8].  This 
means that they can be used to generate low mean photon number per pulse (|α|2) at the 
single-photon level, but are not true single-photon sources as there will be a statistical 
spread of photon numbers around the mean value.   
The Poissonian statistics for the probability of finding a certain number of photons in a 
pulse is given in Figure 2.1 for low |α|2 of 0.1, 0.5, and 1.  As |α|2 increases the probability 
of >1 photon being in a given pulse increases.  However this increase in the probability of 
>1 photon per pulse for the pulses that generate the key has serious security implications 
for quantum key distribution as this can allow an eavesdropper to optimise certain attacks 
[9].  However, as will be seen in Chapter 3, the decoy-state QKD protocol implements 
different |α|2 to test the quantum channel for eavesdropper, allowing a greater |α|2 signal.  
However when |α|2 is reduced, the probability of a vacuum pulse, i.e. no photons being 
present increases, this will effectively reduce the maximum transmission distance and 
information transfer [9].   
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Figure 2.1  Probability of a number of photons in a pulse, for a coherent 
source, given the mean photon number (|α|2).   
Semiconductor laser technologies which emit in the visible and infrared regions (more 
specifically in the wavebands around 1310 and 1550 nm) are common devices used as 
attenuated coherent sources in quantum communications applications [10]–[14].  These 
wavelengths have been selected as they offer compatibility with the low loss windows in 
fused silica optical fibres of the type used for many telecommunications links [15] - this 
will be covered in more detail in section 2.5.  These laser devices are inexpensive 
(primarily as they are now manufactured in bulk for the telecommunications industry), 
reliable, easy to operate, and generally operate either at or near room temperature.   
The coherent laser source used to generate the low |α|2 photon streams in all experiments 
presented in this Thesis is the vertical-cavity surface-emitting laser (VCSEL) diode [16].  
More specifically the Honeywell HFE4080-321, an indium-gallium-arsenide (InGaAs) 
quantum well active region with distributed Bragg gratings which emits at ≈850 nm [17].  
The structure can be seen in Figure 2.2.  This device is used with Peltier cooling and 
operates just below room temperature, and requires commonly available electrical injection 
electronics for operation making it a relatively simple device compared to single-photon 
sources.   
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Figure 2.2 - Vertical-cavity surface-emitting laser (VCSEL) diode 
schematic.  The device is constructed of an n and p substrate with an active 
region composed of multiple quantum wells.  The device has distributed 
Bragg reflectors to create a resonance.  Carriers are inserted through metal 
contacts placed either side of the substrates. 
An applied current injects carriers into the semiconductor device, the carriers recombined 
in the active region emitting light, at a certain threshold current the device will produce. 
stimulated emission generated from the resonance will cause an exponential increase in 
light intensity.  The device has the advantage of high bandwidth (several GHz), a 
“circular” output emission, and a narrow linewidth (<0.1nm), which makes it compatible 
with the proposed optical fibre based quantum communications systems used in this thesis. 
Attenuated coherent laser sources are frequently used as the photon sources in quantum 
information experiments because of the relative ease of implementation.  This ease of 
implementation has led to them being used as photon sources in current commercial QKD 
systems [18]–[20].   
2.2.2 Coherent states 
Attenuated coherent sources with low |α|2 give quantum states known as coherent states 
[8].  These are quantized electromagnetic field states based on the quantized harmonic 
oscillator.  Quantum harmonic oscillators are known to have quantized energy levels of the 
form En=(n+
1
2⁄ )ℏω , with a position and momentum which satisfies the Heisenberg 
uncertainty principle [8] 
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Coherent states are denoted |𝛼⟩ in Dirac notation, where α = X1 + X2, α = |α|e
i
.  X1 and 
X2 are quadratures in a phasor diagram shown in Figure 2.3.  The phasor representation 
can be given with the phasor length |α|2= X1
2+X2
2 and an angle . 
 
Figure 2.3- a) phasor diagram for a coherent state showing the quadrature 
uncertainties. b) coherent state quadrature uncertainties referring to the 
mean photon number |α|2 and the uncertainty in phase. 
Coherent states are said to be a minimum uncertainty state, and so the uncertainties in each 
quadrature are equal, ∆X1=∆X2= 
1
2
.  The length of |α|2 is related to the electric field 
amplitude, and for quantised light is made of discrete energy levels Equantum = (?̅?+1/2)ℏω.  
?̅? is the average photon number hence why |α|2 is referred to as the mean photon number.  
The quadratures of uncertainty for the coherent state are taken as the uncertainty in the |α|2 
length, and the uncertainty in the phase Φ.  The photon number representation of a 
coherent state is given by Equation 2.1 where n is the photon number.  Coherent states 
obey Poissonian photon number statistics.   
|α⟩=exp (- |α|2 2⁄ ) ∑
αn
(n!)1 2⁄
|n⟩
∞ 
n=0    Equation 2.1 
2.2.2 Overview of single-photon sources 
Although single-photon sources are not used in the experiments described in this Thesis, 
they are worth covering in an overview because they are important for QKD and other 
quantum information experiments.  Single-photon sources can be classified into two 
categories, deterministic and probabilistic sources.  The nature of a deterministic source is 
to emit a single-photon when it is excited, whereas a probabilistic source may or may not 
10 
emit a single-photon when it is excited (sometimes emitting more).  A table of the key 
properties for type of single-photon source (including the attenuated coherent source) is 
given in Table 2.1.   
As in the case of a coherent laser source, specific photon statistics can be used to 
characterise deterministic and probabilistic sources.  Sub-Poissonian statistics, where the 
spread in photon number around the mean is smaller than the mean value, govern 
deterministic sources.  Super-Poissonian emission, where the spread in photon number 
around the mean is greater than the mean value, governs the emissions for probabilistic 
sources e.g. entanglement sources.  
Another important measure for single-photon sources is the spacing of each single-photon 
in the photon stream, which can be characterised by the second order correlation function 
(g
2
(0)) measured by the Hanbury-Brown Twiss experiment [8], [21].  The emission of 
single-photons should have an approximately periodic separation (that is to say anti-
bunched, i.e. photons are not emitted in clusters) if it is a perfect single photon source, i.e. 
emitting only one photon at a known time of excitation.  A coherent laser source has a 
g
2
(0) = 1 because its emission is randomly distributed, whereas a perfect single-photon 
source will have g
2
(0) ≈ 0, because only one photon or pair will be emitted at a time. 
Deterministic single-photon sources, i.e. quantum dots [22]–[30], colour centres [31], [32], 
and single molecules [33], [34], are said to be true single-photon sources, as the internal 
photon emission processes only allow one photon to be emitted at a time.  In many cases, 
the multiphoton events measured from these sources are due to simultaneous excitation and 
collection of multiple sites.  Deterministic sources are an ideal technology for achieving 
the maximum range in quantum communication protocols.  However, they are 
cumbersome to work with, some requiring cryogenics, but all requiring relatively high loss 
coupling optics which reduces the extraction efficiency of devices, leading to ”useful” 
count rates of <500 kHz at detectors, therefore can technically be seen as non-deterministic 
emitters are the actual emission is random.  The anti-bunching g
(2)
(0) for these sources has 
been shown to be <<0.5 [35] (as low at 0.04 in colour centres [32]), showing that these 
sources exhibit strong single-photon qualities. 
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Source type Probabilistic 
or 
deterministic 
emitter? 
Electrically 
or Optically 
Driven? 
Operating 
Temperature 
General 
wavelength range  
g
(2)
(0) Rate of 
emission 
Coherent source 
[17] 
Deterministic Either Can be cooled or 
heated 
UV, Visible, IR 1 GHz 
Quantum dot  
semiconductor 
[26]–[28], [36], 
[37] 
Deterministic Either Cryogenic and 
room temp 
UV, Visible, IR <0.5  KHz 
Quantum dot  
colour-centre N-V 
[32], [38], [39] 
Deterministic Primarily 
optical 
Room temperature 600-800 nm <0.1 KHz 
Quantum dot  
colour-centre Si-V 
[32], [39] 
Deterministic Primarily 
optical 
Room temperature 739 nm <0.1 KHz 
Single molecule  
of Terrylene 
[33], [36] 
Deterministic Optical Room temperature 532 nm No 
value 
found 
KHz 
Spontaneous 
parametric down-
conversion 
[40]–[43] 
Probabilistic Optical Heated down-
conversion crystal 
(above room 
temperature) 
Telecommunication <0.1 MHz 
Four-wave mixing 
[44]–[46] 
Probabilistic Optical Room temperature Telecommunication <0.1 MHz 
Table 2.1 - Single-photon source summary. [31], [33], [35], [43] 
Spontaneous parametric down-conversion (SPDC) [8], [40], [41], [47], and four-wave 
mixing [31], [43], [44], [46], [48] are two examples of probabilistic sources.  These do not 
emit single-photons, but instead emit pairs of correlated photons, the number of pairs 
emitted at a time is dependent on the excitation power [8].  The emission of more than one 
pair at a time could allow an eavesdropper to use photon number splitting attacks in a 
quantum communication protocol [49].  Therefore the excitation power needs to be 
reduced in order to lower the probability of >1 pair being emitted at one time.  As a result 
the probability of emitting a single-photon pair has to be reduced substantially to <10% of 
the excitation rate [50].  To overcome this, SPDC systems have used high intensity 
excitation at GHz clock rates leading to MHz rate heralding with g
(2)
(0) <0.1 [51]. 
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2.3 Single-photon detectors 
This section will cover some single-photon detector (SPD) technologies [31], [51], [52] 
which have the sensitivity to measure single-photons.  These detectors have applications 
such as light detection and ranging (LIDAR) [53], single-molecule spectroscopy [54], 
bioluminescence detection [55], as well as many others [31], [51], [52].  For this Thesis, 
more relevant applications of these detectors are found in the area of experimental 
quantum information/communications, such as QKD [31], quantum computation [56], 
quantum amplification [57], entanglement measurements [58], and also quantum digital 
signatures (QDS) [7], [59].   
2.3.1 Single-photon detector properties 
Properties of single-photon detectors can play a major role in the performance of quantum 
communications experiments, as will be seen in the next Chapter, improvements to 
detection technology has been one of the main reasons why QKD transmission distances 
have increased over the past 5 years [60], [61].   
A perfect single-photon detector would generate the same measureable electrical output for 
each and every incident single-photon (known as unity detection efficiency) over the entire 
electromagnetic spectrum.  If more than one single-photon is incident the electrical output 
scales linearly (or by a calibrated amount), allowing more than one incident single-photon 
to be distinguished.  Once an incident photon has been registered, a perfect detector would 
immediately be primed and ready to detect any subsequent photons (i.e. it would have zero 
dead-time/rest-time).  This would mean that it would be able to count photons at greater 
than GHz rates.  Furthermore, an incident photon would only generate one output electrical 
pulse (zero afterpulsing probability) which was produced a consistent time after the photon 
was absorbed by the detector (zero timing jitter).  In reality, single-photon detectors 
typically fall short of the ideal in at least one parameter and the choice of detector for a 
particular application is a process of compromise [51]. 
Timing jitter 
As an example, photons are produced by a single-photon source with a precisely defined 
emission time.  A histogram of the arrival times recorded using a perfect single-photon 
detector would give a single bin wide histogram peak, regardless of how small the duration 
of the histogram bins.  However, when a non-perfect detector is used, a spread in the 
recorded arrival times is seen as a broadening of the peak in the histogram.  The full-width-
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at-half-maximum (FWHM) of this peak is one way of defining the timing-jitter (or time-
resolution) of the detector, which is essentially the spread in times between an incident 
photon and the rising edge of the resulting electrical pulse [62].  This timing jitter can vary 
between detection technologies and even between different detectors in the same product 
range from the same manufacturer [63].  There are other ways to define the timing-jitter 
[64], however this Thesis will only consider the FWHM timing-jitter.   
Dark counts 
Dark counts are a phenomenon present in all real single-photon detectors to date, where the 
range of dark counts per second scales from the order of <1 to >1 × 10
6
 depending on the 
device used [31].  They are essentially output electrical events from the detector which do 
not correspond to incident photons.  Among other sources, these false detections can come 
from thermal excitation of carriers across the bandgap in the device, and this can 
counteract by cooling the detector to reduce thermal excitation.  As will be seen later, 
cryogenically cooled detectors such as superconductors, have the lowest dark count rates 
because of the small probability of thermal excitation and optical isolation. 
Afterpulsing 
Afterpulsing is the detector phenomenon where one event triggers further events some time 
after the initial event. [65].  Afterpulsing is caused by the initial avalanche filling mid-gap 
trap states in the device which are later released, initiating further avalanches.  This results 
in increased dark count rate for the device, as the count rate increases.  The trap lifetime 
will increase significantly at lower temperatures, meaning that afterpulsing is more evident 
in cooled SPAD devices, such as InGaAs/InP SPADs.  Often, such devices use a hold-off 
time where the device is not reset immediately after an avalanche, to allow the trapped 
states to empty without causing further avalanches.  However, such an approach will 
reduce the maximum count rate possible. [66]. 
In order to minimise the afterpulse probability, the growth material must be very pure so 
that lattice defects (common trapping sites) are minimised [67].  Also a longer hold-off 
time before the complete reset is finished will allow greater time for the trapped charges to 
be released [68].   
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Maximum count rates & dead-time  
When an incident photon is absorbed by a single-photon detector, it generates an electrical 
signal which is measured by some form of data recorder.  After the detection has been 
made, generally the detector must reset in some way before it is ready to receive another 
photon.  The time taken for the detector to reset and be able to receive another photon for 
measurement is known as detector dead-time because the detector cannot measure any 
incident photons while it is resetting.  Each detector technology has a different method for 
resetting, for example superconductor based detectors typically use cooling [69] while 
semiconductors use an electrical bias [70] and these all have an intrinsic operational time.  
As described above, some SPADs are used with an intentionally long reset time, usually 
called a “hold-off time, to avoid the effects of afterpulsing.  This dead-time, or hold-off 
time, will also limit the maximum number of events that can be recorded per second. 
Single-photon detection efficiency 
The terms single-photon detection efficiency (SPDE) and quantum efficiency are generally 
used interchangeably to describe single-photon detectors but they are two distinct 
parameters [52]. The quantum efficiency often refers to the efficiency with which an 
incident single-photon will release a carrier (or be absorbed by the material).  The single-
photon detection efficiency is the efficiency with which an incident photon will create a 
measurable event.  
In practice, both quantum and detection efficiency are non-unity, meaning that there is not 
100% probability of detecting an incident photon.  Each technology has shown different 
efficiencies for both quantum and detection [43].  
Photon number resolving capabilities 
A detector which is photon number resolving (PNR) can distinguish how many photons 
were contained within an incident photon stream or pulse.  Single-photon detectors can be 
placed into three categories, non-PNR, fully PNR and partially PNR [43], as a single-
photon detector will be able to detect one photon, although many devices do not have 
inherent PNR properties.  However if a PNR detector does not have unity quantum or 
single-photon detection efficiency, the recorded photon number is not the true value. 
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A non-PNR detector is a detector which has no inherent PNR capabilities, working as a 
binary single-photon counter, measuring whether there were no photons or ≥1 photons in 
the measurement [70].  Of course, non-unity quantum and detection efficiencies mean that 
it is not possible to say for certain that a lack of electrical output indicates no-incident 
photons.  Similarly, dark counts and afterpulsing mean that it is not possible to say for 
certain that an electrical output does signify an incident photon.  These devices are 
generally photomultiplier tubes or single-photon avalanche diodes, which typically have 
too much gain noise to distinguish between individual photons in an incident pulse. 
Fully PNR detectors have inherent PNR properties and give an estimate of how many 
photons were contained in the incident photon pulse or stream.  However for this to be a 
true representation of the number of photons present, a detection efficiency of unity is 
needed.  Superconducting [71], quantum-dot [72] and visible-light photon counter [73] 
technologies have shown inherent PNR capabilities with less than unity efficiency.  These 
devices have low inherent gain noise and can therefore distinguish photons by 
discrimination of voltages, however due to losses and inefficiencies this will not be a true 
value, only an estimate. 
Finally, partially PNR detectors can be created from a non-PNR detector array, or by 
increasing the detector discriminator voltage of a superconductive nanowire.  In the case of 
non-PNR arrays, each cell in the array is created from a non-PNR detector, therefore 
photons within an incident pulse must hit different cells in the array to provide an estimate 
the photon number, this has been shown for single-photon avalanche diodes [74], [75].   
2.3.2 Avalanche photodiodes 
A single-photon avalanche diode (SPADs) detector is a device which is biased above 
breakdown voltage and operated in Geiger mode to detect single-photons.  They are a 
relatively well-established technology for quantum communication applications with 
several commercially available devices for the visible and telecommunications regions of 
the electromagnetic spectrum covering a range of different growth methods, device 
geometries and electrical addressing methods [31], [51], [52].   
As an example, a SPAD can be created from a positive-doped–negative-doped (p-n), or 
positive-doped–intrinsic–negative-doped (p-i-n) junction of semiconductor materials.  The 
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process of doping introduces a controlled amount of impurities into a previously pure 
(intrinsic) semiconductor during the growth process such that the resulting material has a 
larger concentration of either holes (p-type) or electrons (n-type) [76].  When grown on top 
of one another the region around the interface between the materials forms a depletion 
region where no free carriers are present.  A reverse bias current (which is greater than the 
breakdown level) is applied to the material, so that when an incident photon (of energy 
greater than the bandgap) is absorbed in the depletion region (releasing an electron-hole 
pair) the free carriers are accelerated.  The acceleration gives kinetic energy to the free 
carriers, and when the energy is sufficient, they can undergo impact ionisation, releasing a 
carrier from the doped region.  The newly created free carrier also undergoes acceleration, 
and can then undergo impact ionisation as well.  At the very high electric fields above 
avalanche breakdown this results in a self-sustaining avalanche.  Such a current can readily 
be measured with external circuitry. Once the avalanche current has been measured, the 
device must then be quenched, so that the avalanche process is stopped and the device can 
be reset for another photon measurement.  This quenching process can be performed by 
passive, gated, or active quenching circuitry [31], [70]. 
Passive quenching involves a high impedance load connector in series with the SPAD 
device, when an avalanche is started the resistance of the SPAD reduces, resulting in an 
increase in the voltage over the load resistor.  Consequently, the bias voltage across the 
SPAD reduces, bringing the device below breakdown, inhibiting the avalanche current.  
However, after this reset the SPAD must then be brought up to above breakdown voltage 
bias which can take up to five times the RC time constant of the circuit, leading to detector 
dead-times of >500 ns [70]. 
Active quenching [77], [78] involves external circuitry actively and rapidly quenching the 
avalanche process after it is detected.  This can be significantly faster than passive 
quenching, allowing short recovery times (dead-times of the order of 10’s of ns), therefore 
giving maximum count rates of >MHz [70], [77], [78].   
Gated quenching is typically used in applications where the expected time of arrival of a 
photon can be known accurately such as QKD, and can reduce the effects of afterpulsing, 
which contributes to the overall dark count rate.  The reverse bias voltage is only above the 
breakdown voltage for a given time, so an avalanche can be created during that time, if no 
avalanches are created the bias is lowered below the breakdown voltage [31], [70], [77].   
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Silicon single-photon avalanche diodes (Si-SPADs) 
Silicon single-photon avalanche diodes (Si-SPADs) are a very well established technology 
for detection of visible and short wavelength infrared (IR) photons (400 – 1000 nm).  The 
detection limit at the short wavelength is due to silicon’s absorption in the UV, therefore 
the photons are generally all absorbed before they reach the depletion region, while the 
limit at the long wavelength is attributable to the bandgap of silicon, the lower energy 
longer wavelength photons cannot release carriers from the depletion region.  The main 
commercially targeted applications for the Si-SPAD are in areas such as bio-imagining, 
where the levels of light emitted during the fluorescence of cells is small [79], but (for 
reasons that will be explained later) they have been selected as suitable detectors for the 
work presented in this Thesis, that is to say quantum information experiments performed in 
the short wavelength IR at around 850 nm.   
 
Figure 2.4 – a) thick and b) thin junction silicon single-photon avalanche 
diodes.  The thickness refers to the size the depletion region.  [80] 
Different detector microstructures, Figure 2.4, can be used to enhance some properties of 
the detectors. For instance a thin-junction design (b) can give a lower timing jitter at the 
expense of detection efficiency [31]. A thick junction design (a) can give higher detection 
efficiency, at the expense of timing jitter [31]. A resonant cavity can be fabricated around a 
device to enhance the detection efficiency, at the expense of timing jitter as well [81].   
An example of a thin junction device from ID Quantique can provide 5% typical detection 
efficiency, 40 ps timing resolution, 3% afterpulse probability, <100 dark count rate, and a 
dead-time of 45 ns [82].  While a thick junction Si-SPAD from Excelitas Technologies 
(previously PerkinElmer, before that, EG&G and initially RCA [83]), used in the 
experiments presented in the experimental Chapters of this Thesis, provides 40% detection 
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efficiency, 350 ps timing resolution, <400 dark count rate, 0.5% afterpulse probability, and 
dead-time of 20 ns [83].  Commercial resonant cavity detectors are not yet available, 
however examination of research-grade laboratory based detectors has shown detection 
efficiencies of 18%, 74 ps timing resolution, <50 dark count rate [62]. 
Indium-phosphide-based single-photon avalanche diodes (InP SPADs) 
Another important wavelength region for single-photon detection is in the infrared (IR), 
around the so called telecommunications regions centred on wavelengths of 1310 nm and 
1550 nm.  These wavelength regions are extremely important because the transmission loss 
for standard silica optical fibre is low compared to other wavelengths (such as 850 nm).  
For this reason the telecommunications industry uses the IR wavelength region for 
communications. Many optical fibre QKD experiments are also implemented at IR 
wavelengths to ensure compatibility with the currently installed optical fibres.   
 
Figure 2.5 – InGaAs/InP single-photon avalanche diode structure.  An 
InGaAs layer is used to absorb a photon generating carriers, while the InP 
is used as a multiplication region.  [68] 
Indium-Phosphide (InP) based APDs or SPADs are frequently used to detect single-
photons at these wavelengths.  InP multiplication devices use an Indium-Gallium-Arsenide 
(InGaAs) absorption layer (which has a high responsivity at 1550 nm), with a InP 
multiplication layer separated by an InGaAsP layer to smooth the valence band 
discontinuity (energy mismatch between the different valance band levels in InGaAs and 
InP) [31].   
Commercial devices based on this later structure are available from (for example) ID 
Quantique [84]–[86], Laser Components [87], Micro-Photon-Devices [88], and Princeton-
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Lightwave [89]. There are many common features of InP based devices, such as detection 
efficiency of up to 20%, timing resolution in the hundreds of picoseconds, kHz range dark 
count rate, and μs dead-times.  Afterpulsing probability for such devices tends to be below 
1%. 
Similar to the case for the Si-SPADs, increasing the operating temperature increases the 
dark count rate but lowers the afterpulse probability [68], [90].  Increasing the excess bias 
voltage increases the detection efficiency [91] but also increases the dark count rate and 
afterpulse probability.  The hold-off time of the device can be increased to counter-act any 
increase in afterpulsing, but doing so will, however, significantly reduce the maximum 
count rate of the detector [91].   
InGaAs/InP SPADs have been shown to work at dark count rates as low as 1 count per 
second, at a quantum efficiency of 10% (at 1550 nm), at an operating temperature of 163 K 
[90].  These detectors were subsequently used to extend the range of QKD to 307 km over 
optical fibre using the coherent one-way protocol which will be explained in the next 
Chapter [61].   
2.3.3 Superconducting single-photon detectors 
Superconductivity is the physical phenomenon where a material no longer has electrical 
resistivity, and cannot be penetrated by magnetic fields.  This can happen as long as the 
temperature, current, and magnetic field are below certain critical values characteristic of 
the material.  This phenomenon can be used to create single-photon sensitive detectors 
with a variety of characteristics, particularly in terms of operation longer wavelengths.   
Superconducting Nanowire Single-Photon Detectors 
Superconducting nanowire single-photon detectors (SNSPDs) have received a lot of 
attention recently, because of the potentially advantageous detection characteristics in the 
infrared region [92]–[95].  In the region around the telecommunications wavelengths 
SNSPDs can provide high detection efficiency, low dark count rates, and significantly 
improved timing resolution which can be in the range of a few 10’s pico-seconds.  At 
present the most common material employed for nanowires is based on niobium nitrate 
(NbN), however research  into other materials, such as niobium titanium nitrate (NbTiN) is 
ongoing [69].  Nanowires tend to operate at temperatures <7 K [52].   
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SNSPDs are fabricated from a very narrow (≈100 nm) stripe of superconducting metal,  
The wire is cryogenically cooled to below the superconducting threshold temperature, a 
current (I) is applied, which is just below the critical current threshold (Ic).  When an 
incident photon is absorbed on the nanowire it creates a localised temperature increase (hot 
spot), which suppresses superconductivity in that immediate region and forces the current 
around the hot spot.  The increase in current density around the edges of the hot spot means 
that the localised current density increases above the critical current density and causes the 
area of the detector to rapidly become a normal Ohmic conductor, producing a voltage 
spike that can be measured [31], [51], [52], [69].  A simplified diagram of the process is 
shown in Figure 2.6.  The bias current on the detector is decreased while the hot spot cools, 
and increased once the nanowire is back to superconducting temperature, the time taken for 
it to do this gives the recovery time (essentially dead-time) of the detector which is 
typically in the nanosecond timescale. 
 
Figure 2.6 – Simplified diagram of photon measurement by a 
superconducting nanowire single-photon detector.   
Single straight nanowires tend to have lower system detection efficiencies because photon 
detection is dependent on a photon striking the narrow cross section of the wire.  As a 
result devices grown with the wire looping in a meander are commonly used to increase 
the fill-factor of the device and hence increase the overall system detection efficiency [52].  
The detection efficiency and dark count rate are dependent on the bias current which is 
applied to the nanowire.  A higher bias current (i.e. closer to the critical current) allows for 
higher detection efficiency, however this will increase the dark count rate [96].  
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Afterpulsing is not an issue for SNSPDs because of the hot spot dissipation process, 
however latching can occur, which is when a detector cannot reset, so the bias current 
needs to be reduced further to allow the detector to reset. 
Nanowire detectors are starting to become more commercially available, with Single 
Quantum [96] and ID Quantique [93] in Europe, Scontel [97] in Russia, and Photon Spot 
[98] and QuantumOpus [99] in the United States already selling devices.  At present, all of 
the commercial systems offer low timing jitter of <100 ps, low dark count rates <100 per 
second, and fast recovery times of <100 ns, and quantum efficiencies of >90% for 
1550 nm, at a particular bias current.  However precise overall system efficiencies can vary 
from device to device and are dependent on the bias current which also affects the dark 
count rate.   
Transition edge sensor (TES) 
Transition edge sensor (TES) single-photon detectors are high quantum efficiency devices 
that operate at milli-kelvin cryogenic temperatures, and also have photon number resolving 
(PNR) capabilities  [31], [51], [52].  The TES is essentially a bolometer [100], measuring 
the absorption of electromagnetic radiation by observing a change in temperature, via the 
change in conductivity of a superconducting material.  TESs have been successfully 
demonstrated using titanium [71], [101], [102], tungsten [103], and hafnium [104] as the 
absorber.  A larger number of incident photons will result in a greater change in 
temperature and so TES devices with high sensitivity are inherently photon number 
resolving.   
This highly sensitive device is created by depositing a thin layer of superconductive 
material on top of an insulator.  In operation the thin layer is cooled to just below the 
critical temperature.  When an incident photon is absorbed, the temperature of the 
superconductor will rise, increasing the resistance of the device, as shown for an example 
device in Figure 2.7 [105].  The amount of incident energy determines how much the 
conductivity will change and provides an estimation of the photon number. 
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Figure 2.7 – Variation in electrical resistance of a transition edge sensor 
resistance in response to temperature.  Taken from [105]. 
Although TESs have quantum efficiencies of > 90% for both 850 nm, and 1550 nm light 
[71], [103], along with PNR capabilities and extremely low dark count rates, the devices 
can be tricky to work with because of the milli-kelvin temperatures required to operate 
them.  The devices also tend to have large recovery times (equivalent to dead-time), which 
are generally in the range of μs, limiting the clock frequency of an experiment that 
employs them.  Research into improving the recovery time is ongoing and a TES with 
190 ns recovery time was demonstrated in 2008 [101]. 
Photon numbers of up to a 100 [106], and up to 1000 [107] per pulse have been fully 
distinguished, which are substantially higher than the photon numbers per pulse typically 
used for quantum communications applications, however these could potentially be useful 
for wider quantum information experiments, quantum imaging or quantum metrology.  
Many TES detectors are only tested for PNR capabilities of up to 5 photons in a pulse [71], 
[102], [103]. 
2.3.4 Summary of representative detector technology characteristics 
A range of single-photon detection technologies have been described in this Section. While 
the Si-SPAD is the only detector used in the experiments presented in this Thesis, other 
detector technologies were reviewed because these are technologies which are also 
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commonly used in quantum communications experimentation.  When choosing a single-
photon detection technology it is worth reviewing the application before purchase.   
A detector deployed for use “in the field” or as a component is some form of commercial 
device would benefit from easy manoeuvrability, so detection technologies which do not 
require cryogenics and vacuum pumps may be beneficial for reasons of cost and 
convenience.  Therefore semiconductor technologies which can be compact and cooled by 
thermo-electric cooling, like a SPAD, may be more desirable. 
Superconducting detectors have low dark count rates, greatly reduced timing jitter, no 
afterpulsing, and high quantum efficiency over a large wavelength range, meaning that 
these are desirable in a lab environment.  With improvements to cryogenic technology 
there is a possibility for systems to become smaller, making it more convenient for these to 
be used in fixed commercial applications but at present they remain impractical. 
2.4 Quantum optical memories 
Quantum optical memories, which shall hereafter just be referred to as quantum memories 
(and abbreviated to QM), allow a photonic quantum state to be stored, preserved with a 
high fidelity for a length of time, and finally recovered.  Unlike classical memories, which 
only need to preserve the bit value of ‘1’ or ‘0’, quantum memories must preserve the 
quantum superposition which is susceptible to decoherence [108], where the state’s 
interaction with the environment will cause the quantum properties to dissipate over time.   
QM are a useful technology for the future of quantum information protocols [109].  They 
have a range of applications which they can be applied to, including quantum digital 
signatures (QDS) [110], quantum networks [111], [112], deterministic single-photon 
sources [109], and quantum repeaters [113].  However, due to the technical challenges 
associated with current quantum memories, the experiments described in the following 
Chapters do not implement quantum memories and in some cases were deliberately 
designed to remove any requirement for such technologies.   
The ideal (QM) would have the following properties [109], [114]: Perfect fidelity, on-
demand retrieval, unlimited storage time, lossless, scalable storage space, retrieval of 
photons can be made in any order, and are able to operate at GHz repetition rates. 
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 Overall 
storage 
efficiency (%) 
Storage time Fidelity (%) Preserves 
Single atom [115] 9.1  Up to 200 μs  93 (2 μs)  
66 (86 μs) 
6 
polarisatio
n states 
Room temperature 
Atomic vapour  
[116] 
5.5 20 μs 71.5 V/H 
polarisatio
n states 
Cold atomic vapour 
[117] 
30 – 2  0.2 – 4 μs - - 
Molecular gas [108] 18 1 ns - - 
Bulk 
diamond/colour 
centre [118] 
10 ps range - V/H 
polarisatio
n states 
Solid state [119] 69 – 45 1.3 – 2.6 μs - - 
Table 2.2 – Review table of what was found to be, to the best of my 
knowledge, the most significant quantum optical memories for each 
category.  A more profound table can be found in [109]. 
Implementations of QM have been shown in single atoms [115], atomic vapours [120], 
cold atoms [121], molecular gases [108], bulk/nitrogen vacancy diamond [118], [122], 
semiconductor vacancy centres [123], and in rare-earth doped crystals [119].  The focus of 
this Thesis is not QMs and in fact steps are made in each of the experimental Chapters to 
avoid using them, so the details of each method will not be discussed, however some 
examples of QM are given in Table 2.2. 
Many QM technologies can only store information for nano-second timescales, and the 
associated experimental complexity means that it is sometimes worth considering an easier 
approach, such as high finesse optical cavities.  High finesse optical cavities have been 
shown to reliably delay an optical path for μs time scales [124], [125], which simply 
implement an optical cavity where the optical path does a number of round trips until it is 
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able to escape the cavity.  Also lengths of optical fibre can provide relatively lossless nano-
second timescale delays, this method was actually used in the first implementation of 
quantum digital signatures which required QM between the swap and comparison 
mechanism, and the receiver measurement [7]. 
2.5 Transmission media 
In quantum communications, wavelength choice and method of encoding the information 
is not only important for choosing detector and source technologies, but also the medium 
which photons are going to be transmitted through [126].  To date, quantum key 
distribution (QKD), the most developed quantum communications technology, has been 
demonstrated in free-space [127], and in silica optical fibre [128], [129].   
Optical fibres can be used for built-up areas were line-of-sight communications are not 
possible.  However, this installed telecommunications infrastructure typically also contains 
conventional optical amplifiers [130]–[132], routers and network nodes which quantum 
signals can affect the properties of the quantum signal[133], [134] (See Chapters 6, 7, and 
8).   
In order to get over this exponential loss from the silica optical fibre, many research groups 
are looking into free-space satellite QKD, where the satellite acts as a quantum node for a 
world-wide network, however there are many technical issues to overcome, such as signal 
disturbance from turbulence, and tracking of the satellite [135]–[137].   
2.5.1 Free space 
In free-space transmission for communications, the general idea is to send photons from 
one position to a receiver in a line-of-sight channel.  Generally free-space communication 
in the past focused on ground-to-ground transmissions, but with the invention of the 
satellite communications, new applications of free-space communication were made 
available allowing the possibility of a worldwide network with satellite nodes. Figure 2.8 
shows the transmittance of the atmosphere from ground to space over a range of 
wavelengths, and it can be seen there are a number of highly transmitting regions in the 
visible and infrared. 
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In 2007 ground-station–to–ground-station QKD was demonstrated at a distance of 144 km 
using a 1016 mm diameter aperture telescope in the Canary Islands as the receiver [138].  
Since then research into free-space quantum communications has been more dedicated 
toward satellite communications [135], and also angular-momentum encoded photons 
[139], [140]. 
 
Figure 2.8 - Transmittance of light from space to the ground through the 
atmosphere versus wavelength. [141] 
The experimental set-up for free-space communications involves a great deal of care 
during initial alignment, and ongoing operation requires continual monitoring of the 
alignment.  At large transmission distances even small vibrations at the source can cause 
the alignment to shift by a significant amount at the receiver, and in turn reduce the overall 
bit rate of the communications [142].  Atmospheric conditions can also affect the 
communication channel, such as scintillation of the laser beam (i.e. the collimated beam 
pattern changes) [143], [144], and changes in transmission [145].  Also the background 
level of light could swamp a quantum signal. Quantum protocols generally use polarisation 
encoding in free-space protocols because the polarisation is largely un-affected by 
atmospheric propagation[146]. 
2.5.2 Optical fibre  
Optical fibre is a popular medium for communication transfer and has largely replaced its 
predecessor the copper cable in the delivery of long-haul telecommunications signals.  
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Copper cables are comparatively bulky and costly while optical fibre was seen as a cheaper 
and higher data-rate alternative.  Although fibre optics is now the dominant transmission 
medium in telecommunications, this was only made possible by improvements in 
technology such as optical amplifiers [130] (to increase the bandwidth), detectors and 
photon sources. 
In optical fibre, losses can come from absorption, scattering, dispersion, bending, 
splicing/connections, mode-coupling, and bad alignment.  Telecommunications generally 
use single-mode (at a wavelength of 1550 nm) 9 μm core diameter silica optical fibre to 
guide the light.  Single-mode fibre helps prevent mode-dispersion for long transmission 
distances, allowing for high-bandwidth [15].   
 
Figure 2.9 – Attenuation of a silica optical fibre showing the three bands of 
interest at 850, 1310, and 1550 nm.  [147] 
Three low-loss bands of interest, which also conveniently have semiconductor technology 
for sources and detection, can be seen in Figure 2.9.  The medium and long wave bands, 
1310 and 1550 nm respectively have low loss, with ≈0.31 and 0.25 dB/km.  InP and 
InGaAs semiconductor technology offers a range of sources and detectors in these 
wavelengths.  The final band, the short wave has higher loss, ≈2.2 dB/km, however at this 
wavelength silicon is an available detection technology, which was shown to have high 
quantum efficiencies (≈40% at 850 nm), low dark count rate (<400 s-1), good timing jitter 
(100’s ps), and does not need to be cryogenically cooled, allowing for a more compact 
device. 
28 
To overcome these losses in conventional telecommunications, optical amplifiers are 
periodically placed into the channel allowing intercontinental distances to be covered.  
These optical amplifiers allow the signal to be boosted in amplitude at the expense of 
added noise.  This is generally not possible with quantum communication protocols as this 
goes against the no-cloning theorem, which are limits in transmission distance due to the 
inherent loss of silica optical fibres.  Figure 2.10 shows the remaining percentage of 
original signal after propagating through silica optical fibre, from Corning Incorporated 
[148], without an optical amplifier.  It is clear to see why many quantum communication 
protocols are implemented at 1550 nm, because this is the lowest loss wavelength in silica 
optical fibre.   
 
Figure 2.10 – Percentage of signal vs distance in silica single mode fibre 
for the three different wavelengths used in telecommunication and quantum 
communications.   
Although silica standard single-mode fibre (at 1550 nm) is used by the telecommunications 
industry as standard, there have been developments in optical fibre manufacturing to create 
speciality low loss optical fibres, such as Corning SMF-28 ULL [149], which provides 
0.16 dB/km loss around the 1550 nm window.  Commercial quantum key distribution 
systems implemented in optical fibre are (or were) available from ID Quantique [150], 
MagiQ Technologies [20], SeQureNet [19], QuintessenceLabs [151]. 
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2.6 Time-correlated-single-photon-counting 
Time-correlated single-photon counting (TCSPC) is a technique of photon counting which 
allows the time of each photon to be recorded [152].  This is useful in a number of 
different research areas including LIDAR [53], imagining of single molecules [55].  More 
importantly for this Thesis, it can be used in quantum information and communication 
experiments to record timing information of the single qubits sent in order to perform post-
processing.   
While single-photon detectors allow photons to be counted, the information of arrival time 
is lost. TCSPC involves additional specialist equipment in order for timing information to 
be recorded.  In TCSPC the output from the detector is fed into a discriminator which 
allows the device to record events which are above a certain threshold, i.e. reducing the 
overall noise.  This discriminator gives a digital output which is then fed into a counter 
module which can record the event times accurately, the photon event time recordings are 
sometimes referred to as time-tags.  [152] 
In the experiments for this Thesis the TCSPC device is the Hydraharp 400 [153].  It is a 
time to digital converter with a 1 ps resolution, maximum data transfer rate of 4 Mb/s for 
the USB 2.0 version, and 12.5 Mb/s for the USB 3.0 version.   
2.7 Bibliography 
[1] C. H. Bennett and G. Brassard, “Quantum cryptography - public key distribution 
and coin tossing,” in International Conference on Computers, systems and signal 
processing, 1984, p. 8. 
[2] H.-K. Lo, et al., “Decoy state quantum key distribution,” Phys. Rev. Lett., vol. 94, 
no. 23, p. 230504, Jun. 2005. 
[3] P. Sibson, et al., “Chip-based quantum key distribution,” pp. 1–5, 2015. 
[4] N. Bruno, et al., “Heralded amplification of photonic qubits,” Opt. Express, vol. 24, 
no. 1, p. 125, Jan. 2016. 
[5] S. Kocsis, et al., “Heralded noiseless amplification of a photon polarization qubit,” 
Nat. Phys., no. 3, pp. 1–6, 2013. 
[6] P. Walther, et al., “Experimental one-way quantum computing.,” Nature, vol. 434, 
no. 7030, pp. 169–176, 2005. 
30 
[7] P. J. Clarke, et al., “Experimental demonstration of quantum digital signatures using 
phase-encoded coherent states of light.,” Nat. Commun., vol. 3, p. 1174, Jan. 2012. 
[8] M. Fox, Quantum Optics: An introduction, 1st ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2006. 
[9] W. Tittel, et al., “Quantum cryptography,” Rev. Mod. Phys., vol. 74, no. 1, pp. 145–
195, 2002. 
[10] S. Bhattacharya, et al., “Decoy-state method for subcarrier-multiplexed frequency-
coded quantum key distribution,” J. Opt. Soc. Am. B, vol. 30, no. 4, p. 782, Mar. 
2013. 
[11] S. Krapick, et al., “Bright integrated photon-pair source for practical passive decoy-
state quantum key distribution,” Phys. Rev. A - At. Mol. Opt. Phys., vol. 89, no. 1, 
pp. 1–5, 2014. 
[12] H.-K. Lo, et al., “Decoy state quantum key distribution.,” Phys. Rev. Lett., vol. 94, 
no. September 2004, p. 230504, 2005. 
[13] Y. Zhao, et al., “Experimental quantum key distribution with decoy states.,” Phys. 
Rev. Lett., vol. 96, no. 1, p. 070502, 2006. 
[14] E. Meyer-Scott, et al., “How to implement decoy-state quantum key distribution for 
a satellite uplink with 50-dB channel loss,” Phys. Rev. A, vol. 84, no. 6, pp. 1–9, 
2011. 
[15] A. Ghatak and K. Thyagarajan, An Introduction to Fiber Optics. 1998. 
[16] L. A. Coldren, et al., “Vertical-Cavity Surface-Emitting Lasers,” in Optical Fiber 
Telecommunications IIIB, Elsevier, 1997, pp. 200–266. 
[17] J. Tatum and J. Guenter, “Modulating VCSELs,” Honeywell Int., pp. 1–19, 1998. 
[18] ID Quantique, “Clavis 2.” [Online]. Available: http://www.idquantique.com/photon-
counting/clavis2-qkd-platform/. [Accessed: 14-Jan-2016]. 
[19] SeQurenet, “Cygnus Distribution Module,” SeQureNet SARL, 2013. [Online]. 
Available: www.sequrenet.com. 
[20] MagiQ Technologies, “MagiQ.” [Online]. Available: http://www.magiqtech.com/. 
[Accessed: 13-Jan-2016]. 
[21] R. Hanbury-Brown and R. Q. Twiss, “Correlation between Photons in two Coherent 
Beams of Light,” Nature, vol. 177, no. 4497, pp. 27–29, Jan. 1956. 
31 
[22] M. a M. Versteegh, et al., “Observation of strongly entangled photon pairs from a 
nanowire quantum dot.,” Nat. Commun., vol. 5, p. 5298, Jan. 2014. 
[23] M. J. Holmes, et al., “Room-temperature triggered single photon emission from a 
III-nitride site-controlled nanowire quantum dot,” Nano Lett., vol. 14, no. 2, pp. 
982–986, 2014. 
[24] M. Zavvari and V. Ahmadi, “Quantum-Dot-Based Mid-IR Single-Photon Detector 
With Self-Quenching and Self-Recovering Operation,” IEEE Electron Device Lett., 
vol. 34, no. 6, pp. 783–785, 2013. 
[25] K. Yamaguchi, et al., “Stranski-Krastanov growth of InAs quantum dots with 
narrow size distribution,” Jpn. J. Appl. Phys., vol. 39, no. 12, pp. 1245–1248, 2000. 
[26] J. Claudon, et al., “A highly efficient single-photon source based on a quantum dot 
in a photonic nanowire,” Nat. Photonics, vol. 4, no. 3, pp. 174–177, Jan. 2010. 
[27] F. Hargart, et al., “Electrically driven quantum dot single-photon source at 2 GHz 
excitation repetition rate with ultra-low emission time jitter,” Appl. Phys. Lett., vol. 
102, no. 1, p. 011126, 2013. 
[28] S. Buckley, et al., “Engineered quantum dot single-photon sources.,” Rep. Prog. 
Phys., vol. 75, p. 126503, 2012. 
[29] K. Watanabe, et al., “Fabrication of GaAs Quantum Dots by Modified Droplet 
Epitaxy,” Jpn. J. Appl. Phys., vol. 39, no. Part 2, No. 2A, pp. L79–L81, Feb. 2000. 
[30] K. Rivoire, et al., “Fast quantum dot single photon source triggered at 
telecommunications wavelength,” Appl. Phys. Lett., vol. 98, no. 8, p. 083105, 2011. 
[31] G. S. Buller and R. J. Collins, “Single-photon generation and detection,” Meas. Sci. 
Technol., vol. 21, no. 1, p. 012002, Jan. 2010. 
[32] F. Jelezko and J. Wrachtrup, “Single defect centres in diamond: A review,” Phys. 
Status Solidi Appl. Mater. Sci., vol. 203, no. 13, pp. 3207–3225, 2006. 
[33] W. E. Moerner, “Single-photon sources based on single molecules in solids,” New J. 
Phys., vol. 6, pp. 88–88, 2004. 
[34] B. Lounis and W. E. Moerner, “Single photons on demand from a single molecule at 
room temperature,” pp. 491–493, 2000. 
[35] T. Heindel, et al., “Quantum key distribution using quantum dot single-photon 
emitting diodes in the red and near infrared spectral range,” New J. Phys., vol. 14, 
32 
no. 8, p. 083001, 2012. 
[36] X.-L. Chu, et al., “Experimental realization of an optical antenna designed for 
collecting 99% of photons from a quantum emitter,” Optica, vol. 1, no. 4, p. 203, 
2014. 
[37] T. Ishikawa, et al., “Site-controlled InAs single quantum-dot structures on GaAs 
surfaces patterned by in situ electron-beam lithography,” Appl. Phys. Lett., vol. 76, 
no. 2, pp. 167–169, 2000. 
[38] T. M. Babinec, et al., “A diamond nanowire single-photon source.,” Nat. 
Nanotechnol., vol. 5, no. 3, pp. 195–9, Mar. 2010. 
[39] M. Leifgen, et al., “Evaluation of nitrogen- and silicon-vacancy defect centres as 
single photon sources in quantum key distribution,” New J. Phys., vol. 16, pp. 0–13, 
2014. 
[40] A. S. Solntsev, et al., “Characterization of aperiodic domain structure in lithium 
niobate by spontaneous parametric down-conversion spectroscopy,” Laser Phys. 
Lett., vol. 12, no. 9, p. 095702, 2015. 
[41] S.-Y. Baek and Y.-H. Kim, “Spectral properties of entangled photon pairs generated 
via frequency-degenerate type-I spontaneous parametric down-conversion,” Phys. 
Rev. A, vol. 77, no. 4, p. 043807, Apr. 2008. 
[42] ID Quantique, “ID350-PPLN periodically poled lithium niobate,” 2014. 
[43] M. D. Eisaman, et al., “Invited Review Article: Single-photon sources and 
detectors,” Rev. Sci. Instrum., vol. 82, no. 7, p. 071101, 2011. 
[44] O. Aso, M. Tadakuma, and S. Namiki, “Four-wave mixing in optical fibers and its 
applications,” dEp, vol. 19, no. 19, pp. 63–68, 1999. 
[45] J. Hansryd, et al., “Fiber-based optical parametric amplifiers and their applications,” 
IEEE J. Sel. Top. Quantum Electron., vol. 8, no. 3, pp. 506–520, 2002. 
[46] R. Wakabayashi, et al., “Time-bin entangled photon pair generation from Si micro-
ring resonator,” Opt. Express, vol. 23, no. 2, p. 1103, 2015. 
[47] H. Di Lorenzo Pires, et al., “Type-I spontaneous parametric down-conversion with a 
strongly focused pump,” Phys. Rev. A, vol. 83, no. 3, p. 033837, 2011. 
[48] B. J. Smith, et al., “Photon pair generation in birefringent optical fibers,” Opt. 
Express, vol. 17, no. 26, p. 23589, 2009. 
33 
[49] N. Lütkenhaus and M. Jahma, “Quantum key distribution with realistic states: 
photon-number statistics in the photon-number splitting attack,” New J. Phys., vol. 
4, pp. 44.1 – 44.9, Jul. 2002. 
[50] N. Bruno, et al., “Simple, pulsed, polarization entangled photon pair source,” Opt. 
Commun., vol. 327, pp. 3–6, 2014. 
[51] M. D. Eisaman, et al., “Invited review article: Single-photon sources and 
detectors.,” Rev. Sci. Instrum., vol. 82, no. 7, p. 071101, Jul. 2011. 
[52] R. H. Hadfield, “Single-photon detectors for optical quantum information 
applications,” Nat. Photonics, vol. 3, no. 12, pp. 696–705, 2009. 
[53] A. M. Wallace, et al., “Design and evaluation of multispectral LiDAR for the 
recovery of arboreal parameters,” IEEE Trans. Geosci. Remote Sens., vol. 52, no. 8, 
pp. 4942–4954, 2014. 
[54] Y. L. A. Rezus, et al., “Single-Photon Spectroscopy of a Single Molecule,” Phys. 
Rev. Lett., vol. 108, no. 9, p. 093601, 2012. 
[55] K. L. Walker, et al., “Un-collimated single-photon imaging system for high-
sensitivity small animal and plant imaging.,” Phys. Med. Biol., vol. 60, no. 1, pp. 
403–420, 2015. 
[56] T. D. Ladd, et al., “Quantum computers.,” Nature, vol. 464, no. 7285, pp. 45–53, 
Mar. 2010. 
[57] R. J. Donaldson, et al., “Experimental Implementation of a Quantum Optical State 
Comparison Amplifier,” Phys. Rev. Lett., vol. 114, no. 12, p. 120505, 2015. 
[58] Z. Zhao, et al., “Experimental realization of entanglement concentration and a 
quantum repeater.,” Phys. Rev. Lett., vol. 90, no. 20, p. 207901, 2003. 
[59] R. J. Collins, et al., “Realization of Quantum Digital Signatures without the 
Requirement of Quantum Memory,” Phys. Rev. Lett., vol. 113, no. 4, p. 040502, 
2014. 
[60] S. Wang, et al., “2 GHz clock quantum key distribution over 260 km of standard 
telecom fiber.,” Opt. Lett., vol. 37, no. 6, pp. 1008–10, Mar. 2012. 
[61] B. Korzh, et al., “Provably secure and practical quantum key distribution over 307 
km of optical fibre,” Nat. Photonics, vol. 9, no. 3, pp. 163–168, Feb. 2015. 
[62] P. J. Clarke, et al., “Analysis of detector performance in a gigahertz clock rate 
34 
quantum key distribution system,” New J. Phys., vol. 13, p. 23, 2011. 
[63] I. Rech, et al., “Modified single photon counting modules for optimal timing 
performance,” Rev. Sci. Instrum., vol. 77, no. 3, pp. 33104–33105, 2006. 
[64] N. J. Pilgrim, et al., “Influence of absorber layer dopants on performance of Ge/Si 
single photon avalanche diodes,” J. Appl. Phys., vol. 113, no. 14, p. 144508, 2013. 
[65] R. E. Warburton, et al., “Ge-on-Si Single-Photon Avalanche Diode Detectors: 
Design, Modeling, Fabrication, and Characterization at Wavelengths 1310 and 1550 
nm,” IEEE Trans. Electron Devices, vol. 60, no. 11, pp. 3807–3813, 2013. 
[66] S. T. Pantelides, “The electronic structure of impurities and other point defects in 
semiconductors,” Rev. Mod. Phys., vol. 50, no. 4, pp. 797–858, 1978. 
[67] K. Iniewski, Ed., Semiconductor Radiation Detection Systems. Taylor & Francis, 
2010. 
[68] S. Pellegrini, et al., “Design and performance of an InGaAs-InP single-photon 
avalanche diode detector,” IEEE J. Quantum Electron., vol. 42, no. 4, pp. 397–403, 
2006. 
[69] M. G. Tanner, et al., “Optimised quantum hacking of superconducting nanowire 
single-photon detectors,” pp. 1–8, 2013. 
[70] A. Gallivanoni, et al., “Progress in quenching circuits for single photon avalanche 
diodes,” IEEE Trans. Nucl. Sci., vol. 57, no. 6, 2010. 
[71] D. Fukuda, et al., “Titanium-based transition-edge photon number resolving 
detector with 98% detection efficiency with index-matched small-gap fiber 
coupling.,” Opt. Express, vol. 19, no. 2, pp. 870–875, 2011. 
[72] B. E. Kardynał, et al., “Photon number resolving detector based on a quantum dot 
field effect transistor,” Appl. Phys. Lett., vol. 90, no. 18, pp. 89–91, 2007. 
[73] K. S. McKay, et al., “Enhanced quantum efficiency of the visible light photon 
counter in the ultraviolet wavelengths.,” Opt. Express, vol. 17, no. 9, pp. 7458–
7464, 2009. 
[74] X. Jiang, et al., “InP-Based Single-Photon Detectors and Geiger-Mode APD Arrays 
for Quantum Communications Applications,” IEEE J. Sel. Top. Quantum Electron., 
vol. 21, no. 3, pp. 1–12, May 2015. 
[75] A. Rochas, et al., “First fully integrated 2-D array of single-photon detectors in 
35 
standard CMOS technology,” Photonics Technol. Lett. IEEE, vol. 15, no. 7, pp. 
963–965, 2003. 
[76] J. R. Woodyard, “Nonlinear circuit device utilizing germanium.” Google Patents, 
1950. 
[77] S. Cova, et al., “Active-quenching and gating circuits for single-photon avalanche 
diodes (SPADS),” IEEE Trans. Nucl. Sci., vol. 29, no. 1, pp. 599–601, 1982. 
[78] S. Cova, et al., “Avalanche photodiodes and quenching circuits for single-photon 
detection,” Appl. Opt., vol. 35, no. 12, p. 1956, Apr. 1996. 
[79] A. Kinkhabwala, et al., “Large single-molecule fluorescence enhancements 
produced by a bowtie nanoantenna,” Nat. Photonics, vol. 3, no. 11, pp. 654–657, 
Nov. 2009. 
[80] F. Zappa, et al., “Single-Photon Avalanche Diode Arrays for Fast Transients and 
Adaptive Optics,” IEEE Trans. Instrum. Meas., vol. 55, no. 1, pp. 365–374, 2006. 
[81] M. Ghioni, et al., “Resonant-cavity-enhanced single-photon avalanche diodes on 
reflecting silicon substrates,” IEEE Photonics Technol. Lett., vol. 20, no. 6, pp. 413–
415, 2008. 
[82] ID Quantique, “Visible single-photon detection module with high timing resolution 
and low dark count rate.,” 2015. 
[83] Excelitas Technology, “Single Photon Counting Modules,” 2015. 
[84] ID Quantique, “Infrared single-photon counter ID220: Cost-effective module for 
asynchronous,” 2015. 
[85] ID Quantique, “ID230 free-running InGaAs/InP photon counter with 50 Hz dark 
count rate at 10% quantum efficiency,” 2015. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.idquantique.com/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/id230-specs.pdf. 
[86] ID Quantique, “Infrared single-photon counting system ID210 advanced system for 
single-photon detection with 100 MHz gated mode and free-running mode.,” 2002. 
[87] Laser Components, “Single Photon Counting Module COUNT Q Series.” 
[88] Micro Photon Devices, “InGaAs SPAD - gated,” 2014. 
[89] Princeton Lightwave, “High Speed Single Photon PGA-600HSU,” no. 1, 2011. 
[90] B. Korzh, et al., “Free-running InGaAs single photon detector with 1 dark count per 
second at 10% efficiency,” Appl. Phys. Lett., vol. 104, no. 8, p. 081108, Feb. 2014. 
36 
[91] A. Restelli, et al., “Single-photon detection efficiency up to 50% at 1310 nm with an 
InGaAs/InP avalanche diode gated at 1.25 GHz,” Appl. Phys. Lett., vol. 102, no. 14, 
p. 141104, 2013. 
[92] D. Rosenberg, et al., “nanowire single photon detector array,” vol. 21, no. 2, pp. 
1440–1447, 2013. 
[93] ID Quantique, “ID280 - Superconducting nanowire single photon detector,” 2014. 
[94] H. Shibata, et al., “Superconducting nanowire single-photon detector with ultralow 
dark count rate using cold optical filters,” arXiv Prepr. arXiv …, pp. 1–5, 2013. 
[95] C. Sijing, et al., “Superconducting nanowire single-photon detection system and 
demonstration in quantum key distribution,” vol. 58, no. 10, pp. 1145–1149, 2013. 
[96]  single Quantum, “Single Quantum Eos X10 CS Closed-Cycle System.” [Online]. 
Available: http://www.singlequantum.com/cs/. [Accessed: 10-Nov-2015]. 
[97] Scontel, “Scontel superconducting nanotechnology.” [Online]. Available: 
http://www.scontel.ru/sspd/. [Accessed: 10-Nov-2015]. 
[98] Photon-spot, “Photon Spot.” [Online]. Available: http://www.photonspot.com/. 
[99] A. J. Miller, “Quantum Opus.” [Online]. Available: http://www.quantumopus.com/. 
[Accessed: 10-Nov-2015]. 
[100] A. T. Lee, et al., “A superconducting bolometer with strong electrothermal 
feedback,” Appl. Phys. Lett., vol. 69, no. 12, pp. 1801–1803, 1996. 
[101] D. Fukuda, et al., “Photon number resolving detection with high speed and high 
quantum efficiency,” Metrologia, vol. 46, no. 4, pp. S288–S292, Aug. 2009. 
[102] D. Rosenberg, et al., “Noise-free high-efficiency photon-number-resolving 
detectors,” Phys. Rev. A, vol. 71, no. 6, p. 061803, 2005. 
[103] A. E. Lita, et al., “Counting near-infrared single-photons with 95% efficiency.,” 
Opt. Express, vol. 16, no. 5, pp. 3032–3040, 2008. 
[104] A. E. Lita, et al., “High-Efficiency Photon-Number-Resolving Detectors based on 
Hafnium Transition-Edge Sensors,” vol. 351, no. 2009, pp. 351–354, 2009. 
[105] F. Group, “Transition edge sensors (TES),” 2014. [Online]. Available: 
http://web.mit.edu/figueroagroup/ucal/ucal_tes/. [Accessed: 09-Nov-2015]. 
[106] G. Brida, et al., “Quantum characterization of superconducting photon counters,” 
New J. Phys., vol. 14, no. 8, p. 085001, 2012. 
37 
[107] NIST, “Adding Up Photons with a TES,” 2010. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.nist.gov/pml/div686/tes.cfm. [Accessed: 09-Nov-2015]. 
[108] P. J. Bustard, et al., “Toward quantum processing in molecules: A THz-bandwidth 
coherent memory for light,” Phys. Rev. Lett., vol. 111, no. 8, pp. 1–5, 2013. 
[109] C. Simon, et al., “Quantum memories,” Eur. Phys. J. D, vol. 58, no. 1, pp. 1–22, 
Apr. 2010. 
[110] D. Gottesman and I. Chuang, “Quantum Digital Signatures,” arXiv.org, no. 
0105032v2, 2001. 
[111] K. Nemoto, et al., “Photonic Quantum Networks formed from NV- Centers,” pp. 1–
11, Dec. 2014. 
[112] B. Fröhlich, et al., “Quantum Secured Gigabit Passive Optical Networks,” pp. 20–
22, 2015. 
[113] S. Bäuml, et al., “Limitations on Quantum Key Repeaters,” no. May 2014, p. 41, 
2014. 
[114] A. I. Lvovsky, et al., “Optical quantum memory,” Nat. Photonics, vol. 3, no. 12, pp. 
706–714, Dec. 2009. 
[115] H. P. Specht, et al., “A single-atom quantum memory.,” Nature, vol. 473, no. 7346, 
pp. 190–3, May 2011. 
[116] C. Kupchak, et al., “Room-Temperature Single-photon level Memory for 
Polarization States.,” Sci. Rep., vol. 5, p. 7658, Jan. 2015. 
[117] K. F. Reim, et al., “Single-Photon-Level Quantum Memory at Room Temperature,” 
Phys. Rev. Lett., vol. 107, no. 5, p. 053603, Jul. 2011. 
[118] D. G. England, et al., “Storage and Retrieval of THz-Bandwidth Single Photons 
Using a Room-Temperature Diamond Quantum Memory,” vol. 053602, no. 
February, pp. 1–5, 2015. 
[119] M. P. Hedges, et al., “Efficient quantum memory for light.,” Nature, vol. 465, no. 
7301, pp. 1052–1056, 2010. 
[120] K. F. Reim, et al., “Towards high-speed optical quantum memories,” Nat. 
Photonics, vol. 4, no. 4, pp. 218–221, 2010. 
[121] K. S. Choi, et al., “Mapping photonic entanglement into and out of a quantum 
memory.,” Nature, vol. 452, no. 7183, pp. 67–71, 2008. 
38 
[122] P. C. Maurer, et al., “Room-Temperature Quantum Bit Memory Exceeding One 
Second,” Science (80-. )., vol. 336, no. 6086, pp. 1283–1286, 2012. 
[123] M. Steger, et al., “Quantum Information Storage for over 180 s Using Donor Spins 
in a 28Si ‘Semiconductor Vacuum,’” Science (80-. )., vol. 336, no. 6086, pp. 1280–
1283, Jun. 2012. 
[124] P. G. Kwiat, et al., “Digital Delay Quantum Memory,” vol. 287, p. 61801, 2015. 
[125] D. R. Herriott and H. J. Schulte, “Folded Optical Delay Lines,” Appl. Opt., vol. 4, 
no. 8, p. 883, 1965. 
[126] M. Campagna, et al., Quantum Safe Cryptography and Security, no. 8. 2015. 
[127] R. Ursin, et al., “Free-Space distribution of entanglement and single photons over 
144 km,” pp. 1–10. 
[128] K. Gordon, et al., “Quantum key distribution system clocked at 2 GHz.,” Opt. 
Express, vol. 13, no. 8, pp. 3015–20, Apr. 2005. 
[129] R. J. Collins, et al., “Quantum key distribution system in standard 
telecommunications fiber using a short wavelength single photon source,” J. Appl. 
Phys., vol. 107, no. 7, p. 073102, 2010. 
[130] B. Utreja and H. Singh, “A review paper on comparison of optical amplifiers in 
optical communication systems,” vol. 2, no. 11, 2011. 
[131] M. J. Connelly, Semiconductor Optical Amplifiers, 1st ed. Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, 2002. 
[132] M. N. Islam, “Raman amplifiers for telecommunications,” IEEE J. Sel. Top. 
Quantum Electron., vol. 8, no. 3, pp. 548–559, 2002. 
[133] V. Scarani, et al., “Quantum cloning,” Rev. Mod. Phys., vol. 77, no. 4, pp. 1225–
1256, Nov. 2005. 
[134] E. Eleftheriadou, et al., “Quantum Optical State Comparison Amplifier,” Phys. Rev. 
Lett., vol. 111, no. 21, p. 213601, Nov. 2013. 
[135] J.-P. Bourgoin, et al., “A comprehensive design and performance analysis of low 
Earth orbit satellite quantum communication,” New J. Phys., vol. 15, no. 2, p. 
023006, Feb. 2013. 
[136] V. D’Ambrosio, et al., “Complete experimental toolbox for alignment-free quantum 
communication.,” Nat. Commun., vol. 3, p. 961, Jan. 2012. 
39 
[137] G. Vallone, et al., “Adaptive real time selection for quantum key distribution in 
lossy and turbulent free-space channels,” Phys. Rev. A, vol. 91, no. 4, p. 042320, 
Apr. 2015. 
[138] T. Schmitt-Manderbach, et al., “Experimental demonstration of free-space decoy-
state quantum key distribution over 144 km,” Phys. Rev. Lett., vol. 98, no. 1, pp. 1–
4, 2007. 
[139] G. Vallone, et al., “Free-Space Quantum Key Distribution by Rotation-Invariant 
Twisted Photons,” Phys. Rev. Lett., vol. 113, no. 6, p. 060503, 2014. 
[140] M. Mirhosseini, et al., “High-dimensional quantum cryptography with twisted 
light,” New J. Phys., vol. 17, no. 3, p. 033033, 2015. 
[141] A. Berk, L. et al., “MODTRAN cloud and multiple scattering upgrades with 
application to AVIRIS,” Remote Sens. Environ., vol. 65, no. 3, pp. 367–375, 1998. 
[142] S. Arnon, “Power versus stabilization for laser satellite communication.,” Appl. 
Opt., vol. 38, no. 15, pp. 3229–33, 1999. 
[143] D. L. Fried, et al., “Measurements of laser-beam scintillation in the atmosphere,” 
Josa, vol. 57, no. 6, pp. 787–797, 1967. 
[144] D. L. Fried and J. B. Seidman, “Laser-Beam Scintillation in the Atmosphere,” J. 
Opt. Soc. Am., vol. 57, no. 2, pp. 2–6, 1967. 
[145] A. K. Majumdar and J. C. Ricklin, Free-space laser communications: principles and 
advances. 2008. 
[146] G. R. Boyer, et al., “Atmospheric birefringence under wind speed gradient shear,” J. 
Opt. Soc. Am., vol. 68, no. 4, p. 471, 1978. 
[147] “Applications of optical properties of materials.” [Online]. Available: http://what-
when-how.com/electronic-properties-of-materials/applications-optical-properties-of-
materials-part-4/. 
[148] Corning, “Corning SMF-28e Optical Fiber Product Information,” no. January. 
Corning Incorperated, Corning, NY, USA, 2005. 
[149] Corning Incorporated, “Corning ® SMF- 28 ® ULL Optical Fiber,” 2014. 
[150] “ID Quantique.” [Online]. Available: http://www.idquantique.com/. [Accessed: 13-
Jan-2016]. 
[151] Quintessence labs, “Quintessence Labs,” 2015. [Online]. Available: 
40 
http://www.quintessencelabs.com/. [Accessed: 17-Nov-2015]. 
[152] W. Becker, Advanced Time-Correlated Single Photon Counting Techniques, vol. 81. 
Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2005. 
[153] Picoquant, “HydraHarp 400 Single Photon Counting System User’s Manual and 
Technical Data,” vol. 1.2. 
 
41 
 
Chapter 3 
Review of Cryptography and Digital Signatures 
3.1 Introduction 
This Chapter introduces the concept of conventional cryptography with the focus on key 
distribution, and digital signatures. Here, the term “conventional” is chosen to refer to the 
nature in which the cryptographic information is sent.  For example a bright coherent laser 
source, something hand written, or by an electrical signal on a copper wire are all 
inherently classical in nature, because we are using large ensembles rather than single 
quantum particles.  Conventional cryptography is sometimes referred to by those in the 
quantum fields as “classical cryptography”.  However, in the cryptography field that term 
is applied to protocols of antiquity and the term “conventional” is preferred.  Although 
there are several other conventional cryptographic protocols the focus of this Thesis is on 
quantum key distribution and quantum digital signatures, so only the relevant conventional 
protocols are covered.  
During the description of conventional cryptography, code-breaking and hacking is 
introduced and discussed to give the reader an idea as to why quantum communications is 
a vital area of research.  It also highlights another are of research which aims at providing 
greater security for cryptography and digital signatures, conventional post-quantum 
cryptography.   
The quantum communications section introduces quantum key distribution, the most well-
established quantum communications technology, with brief descriptions of protocols that 
exists and the current limitations. Following this, another quantum communications 
protocol, quantum digital signatures, is introduced in advance of forming the primary topic 
of Chapters 4 and 5.  
3.2 Conventional Cryptography 
Conventional cryptography encompasses encryption methods used over thousands of 
years, such as hand written documents from the Egyptian or Roman era, to the electrical 
and optical signals sent today.   
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This section describes cryptographic schemes which can be used for encryption key 
distillation (sharing) and the digital signatures section.  The two common methods of 
symmetric and asymmetric key cryptography are outlined to set the scene for later, more 
complex schemes.  A major topic in the world of cryptography is the realisation of the 
quantum computer and its effect on how we will transmit secure information, so a 
discussion is given of the attacks that could be attempted with a quantum computer.  
Finally, a description is given of some conventional cryptographic schemes which are 
proven to be safe from known quantum computer attacks.   
3.2.1 Symmetric Key Cryptography 
In symmetric key cryptography both the sender and receiver have the same key.  This key, 
which can be generated by either party, can be shared via a courier, a secure electronic 
connection, or any other secure means [1], [2].  The key is referred to as the cipher key, 
which can be applied to a plain text message creating an encrypted message also known as 
a cipher text.  When the cipher key is re-applied to the cipher text, it will recreate the 
original plain text message as long as the cipher text was not altered in transit.  An example 
for a plain text message is given in Figure 3.1, however if the ‘Plain text message’ was 
replaced with a signature it would become a signature scheme [3]. 
The scheme can also be used for generating a digital signature where the message is turned 
into a digital signature by applying the cipher key.  After the key has been shared, the 
digital signature is then sent through the channel along with the message.  The receiver can 
apply the cipher key to the message and if the retrieved digital signature is the same as the 
one sent with the message it can be said that the message is authenticated and not been 
tampered with during transit. 
There are many different protocols which use symmetric key cryptography some basic 
examples are the Caesar shift [1], [2], and a modified version of the Caesar shift, which is 
known as the Vigenère shift[1], [2].   
The one-time pad is another protocol for symmetric cryptography which, when perfectly 
implemented, can provide unconditional secure communications [4].  The one-time pad is 
a randomly generated one-time key, the length of the key is at least the same size as the 
message.  An eavesdropper will have to perform a brute force attack to break the key, and 
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as the key length increases, the length of time taken to perform this attack will increase.  
However the symmetric key must be sent and stored by some secure means, as allowing an 
eavesdropper access to  the entire key will enable them to read the encrypted information 
[1].  Therefore securely transporting the key in a conventional system is an issue that needs 
to be addressed.  
 
Figure 3.1 – A visual of how a symmetric key works.  
3.2.2 Asymmetric key cryptography 
Asymmetric key cryptography does not use the same single key to perform the initial 
transformation as is used for the subsequent decryption, unlike symmetric key 
cryptography.  This is sometimes referred to as public-key cryptography because the key is 
made public, with many parties able to encrypt, or sign, a message for one receiver [5].  
The security of asymmetric key cryptography lies in the present computational difficulty 
for an eavesdropper in figuring out all the parameters for the one-way function (the 
algorithm) from the publicly available information [6]. 
In asymmetric key cryptography, Alice (one party involved in the protocol) generates a 
public-key, to lock the information to be sent down a communication channel, and a 
private key, to read the information sent to her.  These two keys are different but inter-
related.  The public key can be shared through an insecure channel (unlike in symmetric 
cryptography), so anyone with the public-key can encrypt a message (or sign a signature) 
and send it to Alice, but only Alice can decrypt them (or verify a signature) using the 
private key, as the public key does not allow anyone but Alice to decrypt (or verify the 
signature).   
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Public-key cryptography can be used for both key distribution and digital signature 
protocols, making them very useful in for electronic information interchange in today’s 
world especially over the World Wide Web [7].  Diffie-Hellman key exchange [8], elliptic 
curve cryptography [9], digital signature algorithm [10], and the Rivest, Shamir and 
Adleman [11] (RSA) algorithm are all commonly used in internet communications for 
either encryption or digital signatures [7].  Other public key cryptography schemes based 
on other one-way functions can be used, although these are currently much slower [12].   
 
Figure 3.2 - Asymmetric key sharing.  Alice and Bob swapping information 
through an insecure channel.   
3.2.3 Breaking cryptography and a world with the quantum computer 
For as long as cryptography has been around cryptanalysts have been around trying to 
figure out how to break encryption algorithms so that private information can be read or 
digital signatures could be forged [1].  One “basic” method an eavesdropper could use to 
find out the key is to simply guess until they get it right.  The time taken to do this will 
depend on the bit size of the key, expressed as the length in bits N.  The larger N, the more 
guesses a user will need to make in order to reach the right one, in the worse-case scenario 
this will be 2
N
.  This type of eavesdropping attack is known as a brute force attack, and is 
basically an exhaustive search which is very commonly used [13].  The time taken to 
perform the attack is primarily based on how many guesses can be performed per second, 
and is directly linked to the computational power available. 
Problems such as integer factorisation and discrete logarithms, can be solved faster using 
quantum computers [14] running Shor’s [15] or Grover’s algorithm [16] when compared to 
conventional computers.  Although Grover’s algorithm does not offer as great a speed-up 
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as Shor’s algorithm does.  Shor’s algorithm could render many of the cryptographic 
protocols used for encryption and digital signatures unusable.  Public-key cryptography 
schemes widely used today such as Rivest, Shamir and Adleman [11], Diffie-Hellman [8], 
and the digital signature algorithm [10], are all reliant on the integer factorisation and 
discrete logarithms for their security.  This means that a quantum computer will directly 
affect widely implemented cryptographic schemes used today.  The threat of an attack 
being made by a quantum computer is something the cryptographic community needs to 
take into consideration when creating and testing the next generation of cryptographic 
protocols. 
Although practical quantum computers capable of solving complex problems are not 
currently realisable, small-scale realisations using ion traps, neutral atoms, nuclear 
magnetic resonance, optical, and superconducting materials superconducting have been 
shown [17], [18].  The commercially available D-Wave One [19], [20] has generated 
considerable interest in the quantum computing community.  However it is not able to run 
any of the known quantum search algorithms as it is a quantum annealing computer rather 
than a universal quantum computer.  It appears quantum computers are on the horizon, and 
this could make many of today’s cryptographic protocols based on public-key 
cryptography schemes highly vulnerable. 
Quantum-safe protocols are required because of the social, political, and economic issues 
which could arise from the quantum speed-up in breaking some cryptosystems.  So it is in 
the interest of governments and corporations to invest time and money into quantum-safe 
information technology [5], [12].  The term quantum-safe refers to cryptographic 
algorithms believed to be resistant to the reduction in time taken to hack that would be 
achievable with a quantum computer running a quantum search algorithm.   
3.2.4 Conventional quantum-safe protocols 
Although many of today’s widely used cryptographic algorithms (based on public-key 
cryptography) will be made insecure with the creation of a large qubit quantum computer, 
there are still conventional cryptographic schemes which may still survive such as, hash-
based [21], [22], code-based [23], lattice-based [24], and multivariate-quadratic-equations 
[25].  Although experts believe that Shor’s algorithm [15] cannot be applied to these 
cryptosystems another quantum computer algorithm, Grover’s algorithm [16], does have 
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some applications, but does not offer as great a speed-up as Shor’s algorithm [5].  The 
research into the creation of quantum-safe algorithms is known as post-quantum 
cryptography.   
Although conventional quantum-safe algorithms provide security for encryption and digital 
signatures against large classical computation and known quantum computer algorithms, 
currently known quantum-safe algorithms generally require larger key bit sizes compared 
to RSA.  This is a disadvantage as algorithms such as RSA are typically used to secure 
things such as Google searches, which requires fast processing at a low cost in terms of 
both time and money [5].  While an RSA key could, for instance, be four thousand bits, a 
post-quantum key can be 100 times larger, with the corresponding increase in time and 
computational power required to create, store and process this larger key [5].  This is the 
reason why RSA and other cryptography schemes are so popular, because they are 
generally more efficient that other protocols. 
One important thing for cryptography is to provide confidence in the security of the 
protocol or algorithm.  This requires vigorous testing, by cryptanalysts, of different 
methods to break/hack the algorithm [5].  An algorithm that can withstand a number of 
different attacks is more trustworthy than one that cannot.  Breaking cryptography can 
sometimes be about luck, and there may be some as yet unknown method to break an 
algorithm which no one has tried before or discovered.  For instance, recently a new 
algorithm helped reduce the time it took to hack public-key cryptography [26].  If there is 
to be a quick change-over or upgrade to cryptography used today when the quantum 
computer arrives, with enough qubits to apply Shor’s or Grover’s algorithm, there is a need 
to investigate new approaches immediately.  
Post-quantum cryptography’s mathematical complex one-way functions promise to be 
robust against attacks from a quantum computer which would run Shor’s algorithm [15], 
[27]–[29] although some algorithms are still vulnerable to Grover’s algorithm [16], but it is 
not as swift.  In order to push post-quantum cryptography forward, effort into development 
of algorithms and security testing is required to help build confidence and efficiency.  
Software and hardware, which is user friendly and low cost is also required if post-
quantum cryptography is to take over from the public-key cryptography schemes. 
47 
 
3.3 Quantum cryptography 
The previous sub-section described how conventional cryptography using complex one-
way functions can help provide quantum-safe schemes, however there are other methods 
which can be used to provide quantum-safe schemes, with other advantages as well. 
Quantum cryptography uses the well-known and tested laws of quantum mechanics to 
create secure cryptography schemes.  Not only are the schemes quantum-safe, they also 
allow the detection of eavesdroppers before any private information has been shared, 
which is something conventional schemes cannot do [30].   
The main focus of this section will be quantum key distribution and quantum digital 
signatures.  Other quantum schemes exist for different tasks however these are beyond the 
scope of this thesis.   
3.3.1 Quantum key distribution 
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is often referred to as ‘quantum cryptography’, and fits 
into a wider topic of quantum communication along with protocols such as quantum-
money [31], quantum digital signatures [32] (QDS), quantum bit commitment [33] (QBC), 
and quantum fingerprinting [34] (QF).  QKD was first presented by Bennett and Brassard 
in 1984 [35], [36], hence the name of the original QKD protocol, BB84.  
The development of QKD over the past 30 years has involved both theoreticians and 
experimentalists.  Many QKD protocols have been proven to be unconditionally secure in 
terms of their theoretical protocol [37], [38].  The problem in QKD came with device and 
measurement security, where an eavesdropper could gain information from experimental 
imperfections [39] and a description of some common attacks is given in the subsequent 
security section.  Many of the attacks described are also relevant to other quantum 
communications protocols such as QDS.   
QKD provides a secure method of sharing a symmetric encryption key between two 
parties, Alice, and Bob.  The benefit of QKD is its ability to detect an eavesdropper from 
the use of the single-photons to encode the information that will be used to form the key.  
In conventional cryptography, an optical fibre bending attack [40], [41] could be used to 
couple encoded light pulses from an optical fibre without being noticed by either party.  
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This attack essentially allows an eavesdropper to couple photons from a communications 
channel, allowing them to read the signal being sent.  If one photon is being sent at a time, 
the eavesdropper will sometimes receive a photon, when they do they must make an 
optimum measurement on the photon and resend it (or a new photon encoded according to 
the measurement result) to the legitimate receiver.  This optimum measurement is not 
perfect and will lead to mistakes, announcing the eavesdropper’s presence to the legitimate 
parties if they sacrifice a small fraction of their measurement records in a classical post 
processing discussion. 
QKD offers unconditionally secure one-time pad encryption key sharing, with 
eavesdropping exposing potential [42].  A basic diagram showing an outline of a QKD 
scheme is shown in Figure 3.3. 
 
Figure 3.3 – A schematic of the basic layout for quantum key distribution.   
Before going into protocol details it is useful to present some common features present in 
QKD protocols: 
Raw count, sifted key, and secure key rates – The raw count rate is raw photon event count 
rate measured per second by a receiver on their photon detector(s).  These raw photon 
events can then be filtered through classical communication to pick out photon events 
where the receiver made a measurement using the same basis as selected by the sender.  
The raw events counts that pass through this filtering process are the sifted key and give 
the sifted key rate of events per second (ignoring processing time).  After the sifting the 
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sender and receiver generally share (and subsequently discard) some of the sifted key to 
check for errors, and sometimes perform some post processing on the sifted key as well.  
After this process is completed the sender and receiver are left with the secure key. 
Quantum bit error rate (QBER) - The quantum bit error rate is, in its basic form, the 
number of incorrectly determined bits divided by the total number of bits [43].  The QBER 
value is affected by three mechanisms, the effect of the dark count rate on the detector, 
from the photon signal itself, and also from the eavesdropper.  Dark counts are the number 
of inherent false events which a single-photon detector has and these were described in 
Chapter 2.  The errors brought by the photon signal will depend on the effectiveness of the 
measurement which distinguishes the quantum states.   
Error correction codes - Error correction codes are commonly used in QKD experiments 
and commercial systems, allowing the number of mismatches between Alice and Bob’s 
shared secure key to be lowered [43], [44].  There are a number of different codes which 
can be used, which can be carried out over the public channel, and are relatively 
computationally intensive [42]. 
Privacy amplification - The aim of privacy amplification is to reduce the amount of  
information about the secret key that is held by an eavesdropper [44].  This is performed 
by taking the shared key from Alice and Bob, and producing a new shorter shared key 
using some mathematical function, for example a hash function [45].  Although this 
reduces the overall secure shared key rate, it does also mean that there is another security 
barrier in place to limit the effectiveness of eavesdropping. 
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3.3.2 Bennett-Brassard-84 
BB84 was the first quantum key distribution protocol [35], [36], and is explained here to 
give a simple understanding of how QKD works - helping to assist when subsequently 
explaining less intuitive quantum communications protocols.   
The original BB84 protocol is as follows [35]: 
 Quantum distribution 
o Alice has two basis sets for encoding her single-photon, each has two 
orthogonal polarisations, one corresponding to binary digit (bit) value ‘1’ 
and the other to bit value ‘0’, as shown in Figure 3.4. 
o Alice randomly generates two equal length lists of bits via a random number 
generator.  One list will be used to select the “basis set” and the other the 
“bit value” (polarisation) 
o For each individual single-photon Alice sets the polarisation of the photon 
according to the values in her two lists of binary digits. 
o Alice sends the polarisation encoded photon down the quantum channel to 
Bob. 
o Bob randomly chooses a basis set to measure in, and performs a 
measurement, storing the measured polarisation in some form of secure 
storage. 
 Conventional sorting 
o Bob contacts Alice over the conventional communication channel and 
reveals which basis set he made each measurement in.   
o Alice confirms if Bob made the right or wrong choice of basis set for each 
measurement.  If the right choice was made, the qubit information is kept 
and the same bit value for the polarisation is assigned independently by both 
parties without communicating this value.  If the wrong choice of basis was 
made both parties throw away the qubit information. 
o Alice and Bob share a small part of their generated key to check for errors 
(QBER).  If the number of errors is above a certain threshold (defined 
predominantly by natural experimental error and an assessment of the 
eavesdropper’s capabilities), they abandon the shared encryption key, as 
they suspect an eavesdropper has been listening in or tampering. 
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Figure 3.5 shows how the BB84 protocols works without an eavesdropper.  For 
comparison Figure 3.6 shows how the comparison of a subset of the key reveals an 
eavesdropper performing an intercept and resend attack [46]. 
 
Figure 3.4 – Quantum key distribution BB84 basis sets.  There are two 
basis sets which allow for distinguishable measurements within a basis set.   
 
Figure 3.5 – Quantum key distribution using the BB84 polarisation protocol 
scheme for Alice and Bob with no eavesdropper in the quantum channel.   
The effect of introducing an eavesdropper, Eve, who is performing an intercept and resend 
attack (see section 3.3.6 for more details) is shown in Figure 3.6.  Like Bob, Eve only has a 
50% chance of correctly choosing the right basis set to perform a distinguishable 
measurement.  Eve will not know she has guessed the wrong basis set, but has to send on 
whatever she measured to ensure Alice and Bob count the photon she measured in their 
key.  This is because if Bob does not measure a photon, Alice and Bob simply forget that 
qubit.  The post processing discussion of the basis sets will only be made after Bob has 
received a photon, which must occur after Eve has made her measurement and transmitted 
the result.  In the end this means that Eve will sometimes make a wrong measurement, 
which she then forwards onto Bob.  This is only for the very basic of attacks.  In the key 
share check, where Alice and Bob check for errors in a small number of key bits, Eve’s 
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intercept and resend attack will be revealed by a QBER of 25% (for this simple attack) if 
she measures every photon pulse sent.   
 
Figure 3.6 – Quantum key distribution BB84 polarisation protocol when an 
eavesdropper has been introduced performing an intercept and resend 
attack.   
When practically realising QKD, some important assumptions need to be addressed.  In the 
protocol outline Alice is encoding the key on her single-photon qubits, this prevents an 
eavesdropper from stealing information, for if there were two photons (or more), an 
eavesdropper could just measure one (or more) and leave the remainder for Bob.  This is 
crucial to the security of QKD BB84 to prevent many attack strategies by Eve (see the 
subsequent 3.3.6 Security section).   
In reality, single-photon sources which emit only a single photon when triggered were a far 
off prospect for use in QKD back in the early 1980’s, and indeed much work still has to be 
done to create an on-demand, high repetition rate device.  So in practice, many QKD 
protocols use an attenuated laser source.  The laser light is attenuated so that it has a mean 
photon number per pulse (|α|2) which is less than 1, generally 0.1.  Coherent laser light has 
Poissonian photon statistics and therefore there is a spread around |α|2 of photons observed 
per pulse (see Chapter 2), |α|2 must be less than 1 to reduce the probability of two photons 
being present in one pulse. 
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The first experimental demonstration was carried out over 32 cm of free-space using a 
wavelength of 552 nm, and |α|2 = 0.12.  Photomultiplier tubes with 9% detection efficiency 
were used to detect the polarisation encoded weak coherent pulses.  A secure key of 754 
bits was transmitted in 10 minutes with a quantum bit error rate of 3.95 % [47].  Later 
realisations have been shown in optical fibre with entangled states at 1.45 km [48], and 
coherent state phase-encoding (with both optical fibre [49], [50] over >10 km, and 
waveguide embedded [51] interferometers).  Also free-space applications using 
polarisation encoding of a coherent source at 205 m [52], and also entangled sources at 
1.5 km [53].   
Although BB84 was said to be unconditionally secure, the use of a coherent laser source in 
many applications meant that a maximum |α|2 of ≈0.l was allowed [54].  The limit in the 
allowable |α|2 means that the total transmission distance achievable is limited, see section 
2.5 in Chapter 2.   
3.3.3 Other protocols 
Although the original BB84 protocol is now widely known, it is in fact not the most useful 
protocol because of the low |α|2 required during operation, which limits the maximum 
achievable transmission distance and overall secure bit rate.  There are many other QKD 
protocols which several research groups use today instead of the original BB84, either to 
improve security, or to make use of technology which was not available at the time the 
BB84 protocol was proposed.  Although these protocols are not implemented in this 
Thesis, it is worth noting that QKD protocols could also be adopted for quantum digital 
signature (QDS) protocols [55].  Therefore a summary of protocols is given in the 
following paragraphs.  The decoy-state BB84 protocol is described in more depth because 
of the increased |α|2 value which is comparable to those used in QDS protocols in this 
Thesis. 
The Ekert 91 protocol relies on entangled photon pair source(s), with Alice and Bob 
measuring correlations based on Bells inequalities [56]–[58].  While the use of entangled 
sources makes it secure against intercept and resend attacks, these sources are 
experimentally complex to implement successfully.  
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The Bennett-92 protocol is a simplified version of BB84, and directly encodes bit values 
using two non-orthogonal polarisations rather than using two basis sets.  This reduces 
experimental complexity, however the net secure bit rate is reduced by 50% the BB84 rate 
due to the measurement.  [59], [60] 
The six-state protocol is an extension of the BB84 protocol, with an extra basis set in the 
implementation to reduce the effectiveness of an eavesdroppers attack.  This extra basis set 
also reduces the net secure bit rate achievable in comparison to the BB84 by 1/3 [61]–[63], 
however asymmetric basis set choice can increase this. 
The decoy-state BB84 is another protocol which expands on the original BB84 protocol, 
was introduced by Won-Young Hwang [64] in 2003 as a means of detecting a photon 
number splitting attack by an eavesdropper.  The protocol uses three different intensity 
levels are generally called ‘decoy 1’, ‘decoy 2’, and the actual signal.  The signal |α|2 is 
generally set close to 0.5, with the two decoy-states each being less than 0.25 [65].  The 
intensity of the attenuated coherent laser source is randomly modulated such that the 
probability for signal, ‘decoy 1’, and ‘decoy 2’ are X, Y and Z, where the decoy-states have 
lower probabilities than the signal-states to maximise the key generation [66].  The decoys 
are revealed after the quantum bits have been sent and allow Alice and Bob to gauge how 
much information an eavesdropper could have potentially gained. 
The Scarani-Acín-Ribordy-Gisin-04 protocol implements the same experimental set-up as 
the BB84 protocol, with only changes made to classical post-processing to increase 
security against photon number splitting (PNS) attacks.  Instead of a basis set being 
revealed, two encoding values are revealed; this means an eavesdropper performing a PNS 
attack will still not be able to make a perfectly distinguishing measurement.  [67]–[72] 
The coherent one-way protocol, which currently hold the greatest distance covered at 
307 km, transfers the key information by intensity encoded time-bin pairs, allowing a 
simpler measurement set-up.  This involves three time-bin pairs, one for each binary value, 
and also a decoy to check the coherence of the states received by Bob.  This coherence 
check allows Alice to guess the maximum amount of information that an eavesdropper 
could have received.  [73]–[77] 
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The differential-phase-shift protocol uses phase-shifted coherent pulses, where Bob 
interferes sequential pulses by an asymmetric Mach-Zehnder interferometer, with an 
optical path length of one pulse period, the phase difference between each pulse is used to 
transfer the key information [37], [78]–[81].  The round-robin-phase-shift protocol is an 
extension of the differential-phase-shift protocol where sequential pulse interference can be 
extended to more than one period [82].   
Continuous-variable quantum key distribution encodes information over a continuous 
range of mean photon numbers and phase (i.e. two quadratures), and is implemented using 
ordinary photon detectors rather than specific single-photon detectors [83].  This protocol 
can use increased |α|2 values, at the cost of transmission distance, and could be a possible 
implementation for the quantum optical state comparison amplifier introduced in Chapter 7 
and 8. 
Measurement-device independent (MDI) QKD is aimed at reducing the assumptions of the 
measurement devices in Bob [84], [85].  It was shown that single-photon devices can be 
controlled by an eavesdropper leading to information being leaked [39].   
Device-independent QKD is a protocol designed so that its security is not dependent on the 
QKD devices themselves, i.e. protected against malicious manufacturers [86]. 
3.3.4 Longest distance 
As mentioned earlier the coherent one-way (COW) protocol holds the record for the 
longest distance QKD experiment in optical fibre, at 307 km [87].  The previous distance 
record was 260 km for a differential phase-shift (DPS) protocol [88] and several factors 
contributed to the increase in distance.  Firstly, more efficient single-photon detectors were 
implemented in the COW protocol experiment, giving a factor of four increase in detection 
efficiency.  The COW experiment also implemented ultra-low loss optical fibre [89] giving 
approximately 0.03 dB less loss per kilometre than the standard optical fibre [90] used in 
the DPS protocol. 
The longest free-space demonstration of QKD was conducted in 2007 between two Canary 
Islands of La Palma and Tenerife [91].  This experiment was carried out over 144 km using 
the decoy-state BB84 protocol and achieved 12.8 bits/s at a wavelength of 850 nm.  The 
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record has stood for some time and it is likely to remain for a few more years as the next 
stage for free-space QKD is satellite communications where there are many technological 
problems to overcome before an implementation can be carried out.  However there are 
research groups around the world looking into satellite realisations [92]–[95].  Low-Earth 
orbit satellites can be as low as 200 km above sea level, where the attenuation would come 
from the Earth atmosphere [94]. 
3.3.5 Highest bit rates 
When considering the highest secure bit rate, a transmission distance needs to be given in 
order to provide a valid comparison, otherwise the highest bit rate could be given for the 
optimum transmission distance for a particular system.  Every system will have a different 
optimum transmission distance and the difference in performance outside that range may 
be significant.  The distance of 50 km is something of a common data point between many 
QKD experiments and the highest secure bit rate over this distance was shown in [66], by 
Toshiba Research Europe Ltd in Cambridge UK.  The secure bit rate was found to be 
1.002 Mbits/s and was the system was shown to be able to be run continuously over 36 
hours.  This experiment used the T12 protocol.   
At 100 km the COW experimental system which was used for the longest distance 
experiment also has the highest secure bit rate at ≈ 10 kbits/s [87]. 
3.3.6 Security 
This section outlines some general attacks which are available for use by an eavesdropper.  
Some of these attacks, such as the photon number splitting attack, were mentioned in the 
previous section describing QKD protocols.  These attacks are not limited to QKD and 
should also be considered for other quantum communication protocols, such as quantum 
digital signatures, which is reviewed after this section. 
A general assumption in security proofs is that an eavesdropper has all physically probable 
technology available to them.  For instance near unity detectors, long storage time high 
fidelity quantum memory, lossless measurements, and infinite computing power [42]. 
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Beam-splitting attack 
In a beam-splitting attack, Eve replaces the quantum channel with a lossless channel, and 
then uses a beamsplitter to split Alice’s output with the appropriate fraction.  This splitting 
fraction will correspond to the original loss of the quantum channel.  In this way, for 
example, a 3dB loss quantum channel will allow Eve to split 50% of the pulses sent to 
Bob.  This attack will not affect the photon count rate at Bob, because Eve is only taking 
what would be lost anyway.  The aim of this attack is to split the multiphoton pulses, 
allowing Eve to measure information which will be shared between Alice and Bob.  A 
multiphoton pulse will allow both Eve and Bob to measure the encoded information, which 
might be used in the secure key later.  When Eve measures from a single-photon pulse, 
Bob will no longer receive a photon and therefore no information is transferred between 
him and Alice, meaning Eves measurement is voided.  Although it can be seen that Eve 
will never gain much of the overall key, because using a coherent source will have a low 
probability of multi-photon pulses.  This attack allows some mutual information to be 
shared between Alice, Bob and Eve.  A schematic is shown in Figure 3.7 
 
Figure 3.7 –Schematic diagram of a beam splitting attack by Eve on a 
quantum channel used by Alice and Bob.  
Intercept-resend attack 
Another common eavesdropping strategy that Eve can implement is the intercept-resend 
attack.  As in the name, Eve intercepts the photons pulses being sent by Alice and 
measures them herself.  She then resends fake copies of Alice’s photon pulses to Bob [46], 
[96], [97].  A schematic of an attack is shown in Figure 3.8. 
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In Eve’s measurement, she follows a three step process for optimising her measurements.  
First, she performs a non-demolition photon number measurement, which allows her to see 
how many photons she has received and can pick an optimum measurement for the pulses 
depending on how many photons are contained [98].  Secondly, she forwards on pulses 
with a low photon number to Bob, which cannot be distinguished as easily as multi-photon 
pulses. She discards a fraction which is proportional to the loss in the quantum channel.  In 
the final third step, Eve measures the photons with a square-root measurement [99]–[101], 
which gives her the minimum value of error probability when distinguishing the photon 
states [46].   
 
Figure 3.8 – Schematic set-up of an intercept and resend attack that could 
be performed by Eve on a BB84 phase mapped protocol.  
In the basic intercept–resend attack on the BB84 protocol, Eve will simply guess between 
two basis sets and resend the answer she obtains.  This will introduce an error of 25% in 
the secure key if she does this for every photon pulse sent [46].  By making more 
measurements, and eliminating more than one possible encoding of the possible four, Eve 
can reduce this error [42], but this requires multi-photon pulses. 
Man-in-the-middle attack 
In a man-in-the-middle attack, the eavesdropper, Eve, claims to be Bob [42].  Therefore the 
QKD protocol takes place between Alice and Eve, rather than Alice and Bob.  After Eve 
receives the key which was meant for Bob, Eve will now be able to decrypt any documents 
which were only meant for Bob.  A schematic of the attack is shown in Figure 3.9. 
Clearly some form of authentication is needed in order for Alice to be able to tell whether 
Bob is really Bob [102].  Classically this is could be done by using some form of 
previously shared secret that only Alice and Bob will know, for instance a password set-up  
some time in advance of the communication [103].   
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Figure 3.9 – Schematic of a man-in-the-middle attack performed by Eve. 
An interesting idea using relativistic quantum bit commitment, which authenticates a user 
based on an arrival time of the photon, can allow for untrusted secure communication 
between parties [104]. 
Photon number splitting attack 
A photon number splitting attack (PNS), [69], [105], is somewhat similar to the beam 
splitting attack mentioned previously.  Eve breaks into the quantum channel connection 
from Alice to Bob and inserts a routing system.  This routing system allows Eve to 
determine the photon number of each pulse using a non-demolition measurement [98].  If 
the pulse contains more than one photon, Eve sends one photon back into the quantum 
channel to be measured by Bob and keeps the excess photon(s) in a quantum memory for a 
later root-square measurement [99]–[101].   
 
Figure 3.10 – A schematic of a photon number splitting attack that could be 
used by Eve.  
In order for Eve to make the optimum measurement, she keeps her obtained photons stored 
in the quantum memory until Alice and Bob communicate over the classical channel for 
basis reconciliation.  This way Bob will reveal when he made a measurement and which 
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basis set is the correct measurement.  This is important for Eve because if Bob does not 
receive a photon count for a pulse Eve has photons stored for, she will have to discard 
them.  A schematic is shown in Figure 3.10. 
General side-channel attacks 
Side-channel attacks take advantage of the imperfections which are present in a real QKD 
system.  One example is the Trojan-horse attack where Eve probes Alice and Bob’s 
equipment by sending bright pulses through the quantum channel and analysing back 
reflections from components which make up the system [103], [106], [107].  One main 
focus of side-channel attacks has been on the manipulation of detectors [39], [108].  A 
recent attack showed that the detection events on single-photon avalanche diodes could be 
controlled remotely by an eavesdropper [109].  The detectors were brought out of the 
regime in which they had single-photon sensitivity, and a remote eavesdropper could 
subsequently send their own information.   
Physical layer quantum cryptography 
Physical layer quantum cryptography is an recent development in QKD were a boundary 
has been placed in which attacks are currently actually physically possible [110].  For 
instance, in a free space QKD experiment which is used in line-of-sight applications, many 
Eavesdropper attacks would be noticed.  If Eve is performing a PNS or beam-splitting 
attack, with current technology Alice and Bob will notice that Eve has placed some kind of 
routing/beamsplitter physically into the beam line.  In the case of optical fibre 
communication, these attacks will still be relevant, as the optical fibre will generally be out 
of view and therefore the legitimate parties cannot physically see Eve.   
In QKD these attacks were applied to both free-space and optical fibre communication, 
which in a sense is wrong to do, as it can limit the function of a technology for no other 
reason that a theoretical proof says it will be insecure at some point in the future [110].  
Having physical layer quantum cryptography can help improve system performance based 
on a logical standpoint from how realistic an attack really is on system but as technology 
catches up with the theory it risks leaving us with weak or fatally flawed QKD systems 
[110].   
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3.4 Quantum Digital signatures 
Digital signature schemes are as equally important as key sharing schemes in 
communication, as they can provide different forms of security such as message integrity 
(a message cannot be altered in transit), message authentication (a sender’s message can be 
authenticated), and non-repudiation (a sender cannot deny creating the message).  A 
scheme is unforgeable if a dishonest party cannot send a message pretending to be 
someone else.  Non-repudiation in a scheme means that a signer cannot deny sending a 
message provided the scheme is unforgeable.  Message transferability means that a 
message can be verified by an initial receiver, forwarded on and be verified by a secondary 
receiver, and so on [30]. 
Common conventional methods of creating digital signatures were mentioned earlier, such 
as Diffie-Hellman [8], elliptic curve cryptography [9], and Rivest-Shamir-Adleman [11].  
These are based on one-way functions which were said to be insecure against attacks by a 
quantum computer using either Shor’s [27] or Grover’s [16] algorithm, which allow the 
quantum computer speed-up time in hacking attempts.  This speed-up time is due to the 
quantum computer algorithms being more efficient in integer factorisation and discrete 
logarithms [18].  Grover’s algorithm does also have some speed-up time for other one-way 
functions as was mentioned in Section 3.2.3. 
Not all conventional digital signature schemes are based on factorisation or discrete 
logarithm problems, meaning that they are safe or more resistant to the speed-up time of 
known quantum algorithms [16], [27].  These digital signature schemes were hash-based, 
code-based, lattice-based, or multivariate-based schemes [5].  They are still complex one-
way functions, however the speed-up time is not as significant for these problems as it is 
for factorisation and discrete algorithms [5].  Therefore they are said to be quantum-safe...  
at least for now.   
One digital signature scheme which is similar to quantum digital signature schemes is the 
Lamport-Diffie one-time signature, a hash-based scheme [22].  In this scheme Alice wants 
to send a single signed bit, 0 or 1, some time in the future.  Alice takes two randomly 
generated key inputs, k0 (for binary message 0) and k1 (for binary message 1), and puts 
then through a one-way hash function f.  Alice then sends out the corresponding outputs of 
the hash function into the public channel.  At a later time Alice send the single bit, 0 or 1, 
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and the corresponding randomly generated function input, k0 or k1.  A receiver can apply 
the publically known hash-function to the input sent.  If the function output sent earlier, 
and the one generated with the message are equal, then the message is authenticated.  If 
they are not equal then the message cannot be authenticated.  This signature can be used 
only once, and can be inefficient to generate.  Later modifications were made to increase 
the efficiency of the scheme [21][30]. 
Although some one-way function schemes are quantum-safe, they can still be broken given 
enough time for a malicious party to use a brute force attack.  For the ultimate security, 
schemes which are unconditionally secure are required.  Unconditionally secure means that 
a protocol cannot be broken any faster than a brute-force attack [30]. 
Digital signature schemes can be made unconditionally secure if they do not rely on one-
way functions [30].  In 1991 Chaum and Roijakkers proposed a scheme [111] in which the 
sender’s signature elements were made up from elements transmitted by all the other 
participants who sent their elements anonymously, this prevents a sender trying to cheat as 
they cannot try to create a signature which will pass verification at one receiver and not 
another as they do not know which part to forge.  Another conventional unconditionally 
secure scheme [112] allowed longer messages to be signed with more efficiency. 
With unconditionally secure digital signature schemes available, why go to the quantum 
realm, introducing more experimental complexity?  Quantum schemes allow assumptions 
about the communication channel to be reduced, or removed completely [30].  Quantum 
mechanics in QKD was shown to help reveal an eavesdropper in an insecure channel 
because of increased quantum bit error rate, this means that quantum digital signatures can 
also travel down insecure channels as long as sufficient checks are made.  The 
conventional unconditionally secure digital signature schemes rely on broadcast channel, 
and anonymous secret sharing channels which can be difficult to implement and also 
expensive [30]. 
3.4.1 First introduction of quantum digital signatures 
Quantum digital signature (QDS) protocols generally involve three parties, Alice, Bob, and 
Charlie.  This is different from conventional digital signature scheme which involve 
between one and N depending on the protocol itself.  QDS protocols have three main aims, 
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to provide authentication, prevent forgery signatures, and also message transferability.  The 
third party in QDS protocols allows a swap and comparison to take place, allowing the 
receivers to check whether they were sent the same signature allowing them to authenticate 
and forward on messages sent.  Alice is generally the sender, with Bob and Charlie the 
receivers.  QDS protocols could be expanded to include more parties however this would 
change the security proofs of the protocols and make the experiments much more complex. 
Quantum digital signature was first introduced by Gottesman and Chaung in 2001 [32].  
The scheme involved quantum public-keys and conventional private keys.  The quantum 
public-keys are constructed from quantum states, and the conventional private keys are 
classical strings [30].  The scheme is said to be a quantum analogue of the conventional 
Lamport-Diffie signature scheme described previously [22], [30].   
For each possible future signed single bit, 0 or 1, Alice creates two random key classical 
strings (the private keys of length L), k0 and k1, and then creates quantum key strings using 
a classical to quantum one-way function which maps the classical signature into quantum 
states.  This gives the public keys, two copies of which are sent out to each recipient.   
Two recipients, Bob and Charlie, want to perform some swap and comparison mechanism 
to make sure they both have the same public-key sent from Alice.  Bob (in this case) 
forwards on one of his copies of Alice’s public-key to Charlie, who then takes his own 
copy of the “same” public-key and performs a measurement to test for mismatches 
between the two copies.  If too many mismatches are found the protocol is aborted.  If 
there are a small number of mismatches the protocol is continued, and Alice can send her 
binary message and the classical strings which make up the private keys to one of the 
recipients.  If Bob receives the message and private keys, he performs a measurement to 
test for mismatches.  If the mismatches are too numerous, Bob cannot authenticate the 
message and it is rejected.  [32] 
There were several issues with this scheme, one was the linear scaling of the key length L 
with size of message.  Similar to the Lamport-Diffie one-time signature scheme the keys 
can only be used once, meaning that if more than one message is to be sent, the process of 
signing needs to be started from the beginning [22].  Finally, the swap and comparison 
mechanism, which allowed Bob and Charlie to confirm they were sent the “same” public-
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key relied on quantum memory.  The quantum memory was required in order for Bob and 
Charlie to store their states while waiting on the other party forwarding and also for Alice 
to forward the message.  As was shown in the previous Chapter (section 2.4), quantum 
memories are currently not technologically advanced enough for this protocol [113].   
3.4.2 First practically feasible quantum digital signature protocol 
The first practically feasible QDS scheme came in 2006 in a paper by Andersson et al. 
[114].  This outlined a scheme using coherent states which no longer required quantum 
memory (QM) to perform the swap and comparison mechanism, which was a major step 
forward in practicality (however QM was still required for the state measurement).  Instead 
of requiring Bob and Charlie to store quantum states and wait for copies to be forwarded 
by the other receiver, Andersson et al. proposed an optical multiport which performs state 
symmetrisation.  This symmetrisation means that Alice cannot make the receivers disagree 
in the validation (message transferability).  The multiport is shown in Figure 3.11. 
 
Figure 3.11 - A schematic of the all-optical fibre multiport, which is 
constructed of four 50:50 beamsplitters. 
The optical multiport allowed Bob and Charlie to perform the swap and comparison 
mechanism in transit, meaning that they did not require a quantum memory as they did in 
the system proposed in the paper of Gottesman and Chuang [32].  The nature of the 
symmetrisation came from so called non-demolition measurements [115] at the second 
65 
 
beamsplitters which meant that Alice only needed to send one copy of the quantum 
signatures to Bob and Charlie, unlike in the Gottesman and Chuang scheme where two 
copies were sent to both recipients [30].   
Overview of the security analysis 
The security  of QDS is a complex evolving field and the subject of ongoing research, 
therefore a full analysis is beyond the scope of this Thesis (the curious reader is directed to 
[116] for an introduction to the foundations of the field).This section aims to provide an 
accessible explanation of the basics of the security behind QDS so that the reader may 
appreciate what is expected to be seen in the experiments that follow without becoming 
entrenched in the fine detail.  Figure 3.12 shows a basic diagram of how QDS was 
implemented in the systems reported in this Thesis, along with statements regarding the 
assumptions made about both the quantum and classical communication channels.   
 
Figure 3.12- Schematic for general quantum digital signature experiment 
where Alice sends the same signature to Bob and Charlie. 
Assumption 1 (“Protection against minimum error measurements”) is based on Alice 
sending the same signature to both Bob and Charlie. In the protocol a certain measurement 
of the states is chosen which is to be implemented by both Bob and Charlie.  However one 
of the receivers could apply a more optimised measurement (for example, a square root 
measurement [101]) closer to the sender (therefore at a reduced channel loss compared to 
the other receiver) allowing that receiver to know more accurate information about the 
quantum signature and thereby increase the probability that they can create a forged 
signature that will be accepted.  This is taken into account during the security analysis by 
introducing a correction factor for the measurement that introduces the minimum possible 
error in the form of a parameter called Pmin.  
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Figure 3.13- Von-Neumann entropy with mean photon number for different 
possible phase-encoding alphabets N.   
 
Figure 3.14 – Phase encoding overlap.  Each red circle represents a phase-
encoded coherent state with a given mean photon number (|α|2). 
Although Pmin is discussed later in relation to the experimental values, it is important to 
know at this stage that the amount on information a malicious party can gain from 
performing a minimum error measurement is related to the Von-Neumann entropy, the 
upper bound in accessible information available from a number of quantum states [117].  
Figure 3.13 shows the Von-Neumann entropy (solid lines) along with the Shannon entropy 
(dashed lines) [118].  The Shannon entropy gives the classical limit for the amount of 
information that can be accessed, while the Von-Neumann gives the quantum equivalent.  
The Von-Neumann entropy means that at low |α|2 the upper bound on information 
available to malicious party is lower than the classical limit.  By increasing the possible 
number of non-orthogonal states (Figure 3.14) in the protocol, N, the larger the Shannon 
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entropy limit, and therefore a larger |α|2 can be implemented. Therefore Pmin is a correction 
factor based on the possible information a malicious party could gain determined by the 
|α|2 used in the experiment [101]. 
For assumption 2 (“No eavesdropping on quantum channels”), we assume that the 
quantum channels are inaccessible to eavesdropping from the other receiver.  At first this 
may seem like a big assumption, however some of the eavesdropping attacks made by the 
other receiver would create mismatches in the signature measured by the intended receiver.  
A greater number of mismatches would mean that the intended receiver could reject a 
forged signature even though the other receiver knows a more information about the 
quantum signature sent by Alice.  The problem comes when eavesdropping attacks such as 
beamsplitting, or photon number splitting attacks, which do not create any mismatches, are 
used. 
Assumption 3 (“Authenticated classical channels”) can be simplified to an assumption that 
the classical channels between all the parties are authenticated by the Wegman Carter 
universal hash function protocol [45] or a similar “quantum safe” conventional protocol.  It 
seems strange to have a requirement that authenticated channels are used when one goal of 
QDS is to provide authentication, however QDS also provides message transferability, 
another property of digital signatures – and not one that can be provided by the Wegman 
Carter protocol.   
QDS aims to provide security against three problems; accidently rejecting a correct 
signature, and accepting forgeries or repudiated signatures [118].  These probabilities that 
these situations will arise are denoted as P(hon rej), P(for), and P(rep), respectively.  These 
can be understood in relation to the cost matrix, which is a matrix that can be assembled 
from the measurements made for QDS at a receiver.  Equation 3.1 shows an example of a 
perfect cost matrix for a protocol using a 4 phase-encoding alphabet, namely {0, 
π
/2, π, 
3π
/2}.  The rows in the matrix correspond to the phase-encoding selected by Alice i.e. 0, 
π
/2, 
π, or 3π/2 (in that order, left to right) while the column corresponds to the possible outcome 
at the receiver for the interferometric unambiguous state elimination measurement, ‘not 0’, 
‘not π/2’, ‘not π , or ‘not 
3π
/2’ (in that order, top to bottom). 
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(
0 0.25
0.25 0
0.50 0.25
0.25 0.50
0.50 0.25
0.25 0.50
0 25
0.25 0
)     Equation 3.1 
Equation 3.1 shows the perfect case where there is no channel loss, perfect interferometric 
visibility, and perfect detectors.  However, in reality the diagonal elements will typically be 
non-zero and the off diagonal elements will not have the symmetry exhibited in the perfect 
case.  These imperfections have implications in the security analysis.  In order to protect 
against forgeries, honest rejections, and repudiated signatures, authentication and 
verification thresholds must be set.  The parameters of interest from the cost matrix are the 
average value of the diagonal elements (Ph) and the guaranteed advantage (guad).  Ph 
relates to how well a receiver’s measurement is being performed, if the visibility of a 
measurement is not 100% then the diagonal elements will be larger than zero.  The 
guaranteed advantage is the difference between the largest diagonal element, and smallest 
off-diagonal element, essentially the advantage a receiver has in rejecting a forged element.  
The conditions implied by assumption 1 mean that a correction factor needs to be applied 
to the guaranteed advantage in the case that one receiver is performing a minimum error 
measurement, this gives the modified advantage called the gap, g, which is calculated 
using the minimum error parameter Pmin from earlier, Ph and guad.  
The probability of a receiver honest rejection, P(hon rej), is based on the difference 
between the authentication threshold, sa, and the average diagonal element value Ph.  If the 
average diagonal elements approach the authentication threshold value, the probability that 
an honest rejection will occur will increase towards unity and the implementation of the 
protocol ceases to be viable.  A greater number of mismatches will increase the probability 
that a message is accepted so it is important that the values of the diagonal elements of the 
cost matrix are low.  This can be achieved by improving the visibility of the measurement 
apparatus, and using low dark count rate detectors can keep the probability of an honest 
rejection low. 
The probability of a forged signature, P(for), being accepted is based on the difference 
between the advantage a malicious receiver has over the other receiver, Cmin, and the 
verification threshold sv.  Cmin takes into account the advantage that the receiver will have 
by performing the minimum error measurement (Pmin) and their own measurement in 
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getting a forged element accepted by the receiver.  From the cost matrix this is dependent 
on the average diagonal element value plus the gap, Ph + g.   This is the probability that a 
message verifying receiver would reject an element based on their own measurement, and 
if the forwarding receiver performed a minimum error measurement, this value has to be 
higher than the verification threshold, so that the probability of accepting a forged element 
is low.   
Repudiation is when Alice can deny sending a message, i.e. getting one receiver to accept 
the message, then getting the other receiver to reject the message. To protect against this 
the probability of repudiation, P(rep), is based on the difference between the verification 
threshold and authentication threshold, sa - sv.  For the probability to be small, the 
verification threshold must be greater than the authentication threshold such that a message 
which passes the authentication must then be accepted by the other party with a large 
probability. 
In the QDS protocols P(hon rej), P(for), and P(rep) are based on Hoeffding’s inequalities 
and are computed as follows: X1,…,XL are independent random variables, each has a value 
0, or 1. X̅ = 1 L ∑ Xi⁄  the empirical mean of the variables, and let E(X̅) be the expectancy of 
the empirical mean. This gives Equations 3.2 and 3.3. 
P(X̅ - E(X̅) ≥ t)≤ exp (-2t2L)     Equation 3.2 
P(|X̅ - E(X̅)| ≥ t) ≤  2 exp  (-2t2L)    Equation 3.3 
For each QDS experiment the assumptions regarding the channel and measurement are 
slightly different therefore the formulations of probabilities based on Hoeffding’s 
inequalities change slightly.  Parameter t in the equations is the value which the 
probabilities are based on, and for each of the reasons given previously.  In all QDS 
protocols presented in this Thesis the probabilities are made equal, as favouring one has no 
benefit over equally favouring.  The authentication and verification thresholds are set to 
make these probabilities equal.   
70 
 
From these probabilities, the length of quantum signature can be calculated based on the 
probability of these attacks being successful.  An arbitrary value of 0.01% was assigned for 
the first experimental implementation [118] and has remained consistent throughout 
subsequent experimental demonstrations to provide a comparable.  However it should be 
noted that QKD experiments can offer threshold probabilities of 10
-10
 [119] which is a 
much smaller value.  QDS could operate at the same threshold probabilities, at the expense 
of increasing the signature length.  Because the Hoeffding’s inequalities are exponential 
the increase in signature length is actually relatively small.  
3.4.3 First experimental implementation.   
Following the theoretical design of the multiport by Andersson et al. [114], in 2012 the 
first experimental implementation of QDS was shown by Clarke et al.  [118].  The 
experiment system used for the experiment can be seen in Figure 3.15 [118].  Although 
this protocol managed to remove the requirement for QM in the swap and comparison 
mechanism, a long-term QM was required to store the coherent states at Bob and Charlie 
prior to the messaging stage.  Bob and Charlie had to store the optical coherent states until 
Alice sent them the classical description which allowed them to perform a comparison 
between Alice’s classical description and their stored states.  However it did show a 
realisation of a QDS protocol, and also showed how the multiport can detect different 
signatures being sent to Bob and Charlie through symmetrising of the states sent by Alice. 
In this protocol, Alice wishes to send a single bit binary message, m, which is either 0 or 1.  
She creates a separate quantum signature for both of these messages, which are comprised 
of a set of phase-encoded coherent states with L elements, and referred to as “signature 
half-bits”.  The length of the signature, L, is dependent on the experimental parameters, 
and the level of security required - this dependence will be considered in later Chapters. 
The benefit of this experimental design was that it could be performed with a range of 
different non-orthogonal pairs of phase encodings, N = 2, 4, 8, 16, etc., because of the use 
of the phase modulators in all the encoding and decoding interferometers, Figure 3.15.   
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Figure 3.15 – First implementation of quantum digital signatures (QDS) 
[118].   
This experiment also showed the effect of a cheating Alice, where she sends two different 
signatures through the multiport.  This dishonest scenario was performed by sending a 
pattern of known states which were equal apart from 2 in every 16 states that was changed 
using a secondary phase modulator between Alice and one receiver.  Figure 3.16 shows the 
raw and gated (temporally filtered) rates for an honest scenario for the multiport null-port 
detector and the detectors in the receivers interferometers [118].  The effect of the 
multiport swap and comparison mechanism showed a large increase in the count rate on 
the null-port detectors, as shown in Figure 3.17 [118].  This increase in the null-port 
detection would also lead to a decrease in the number of photons detected at the receiver. 
|α|2.  In theory the null port detectors should have zero photon events when the signatures 
are equal, however due to dark counts and imperfect visibility this is not the case, however, 
when the signatures are different, the number of photon events increases due to 
distinguishable states. 
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Figure 3.16 - Raw and gated (temporally filtered) count rates for the 
receiver detectors and the detector on the multiport null-port [118]. 
 
Figure 3.17 - Photon count rate on the multiport null-port for a phase shift 
on 2 in 16 pulses.  [118] 
The next stages in QDS are to completely remove the requirement for quantum memory 
throughout the protocol [120], [121], and also to increase the transmission distance to 
greater than 5 metres [122] and experimental realisations of these are the topics of 
subsequent chapters in this thesis. 
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3.5 Cryptography overview 
Cryptography is split into three main areas, cryptographer, cryptanalyst, and algorithm 
designer/implementer [5].  The cryptographers come up with schemes to encrypt, decrypt, 
sign, verify, etc.  One job of cryptanalysts is to come up with methods to break the 
cryptographers work and if they pass the tests, algorithm designers and implementers 
create software and hardware for wider use.  One of the main concerns with the widespread 
conventional cryptography methods used in electronic communication (the internet, 
emails, bank transactions), is the possibility of a quantum computer which could use 
Shor’s [27] or Grover’s [16] algorithm to quickly break cryptographic protocols.   
Two fields of research are currently involved in developing cryptographic protocols which 
are resistant to attacks by a quantum computer.   
The first field described in this Chapter was quantum-safe, so called post-quantum 
communications, which is favoured by the conventional cryptography community.  This 
uses complex mathematical one-way functions which are robust to the speed-up introduced 
by known quantum computer attacks.  Developments into more efficient protocols and 
testing security through vigorous attacks are currently being performed to try and create 
mechanisms to keep conventional communications safe with similar or better performance 
than we have currently.  These protocols are said to be quantum-safe for now, however 
they can still be broken by such things as the brute-force attack, or if an efficient algorithm 
is found for the problem in the future. 
Quantum communications is one favoured by many physicists, which uses the well-known 
and tested properties of quantum mechanics to provide unconditionally secure 
cryptography.  So far quantum key distribution, which provides secure encryption key 
transfer, is the most developed with commercially available systems already available.  
Quantum digital signatures are slowly gaining attention because they can be used to 
provide authentication, and message transferability, which are seen as very important 
communication applications. 
It is thought that post-quantum cryptography could be carried out on commonly available 
conventional CPU devices, and could generate giga-keybits per second.  Quantum 
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communications would generate kilo-keybits per second and requires costly speciality 
hardware.  [5]  
So this begs the question, why go with quantum communications when it is expensive and 
requires speciality hardware? The answer lies with quantum mechanics potential to detect 
eavesdroppers/malevolent parties during the secure transfer of key/signature.  Even if a 
cryptosystem is breakable with a large computer or quantum computer attack, the time 
taken to do this may still be long enough for the information to be made irrelevant.  If an 
eavesdropper listens into the transfer of the key/signature transferred by conventional 
methods, this means they have the key straight away, and there is no need for the crypto-
attack.  A conventional system can be attacked in such a way, for instance fibre bending 
[40], [41], but quantum communications protocols are designed so that if someone is 
listening in, they can be detected [42].  Hence, governments and organisations spend time 
and money on developing quantum communications [12]. 
Perhaps we shall leave the last word on post-quantum cryptography to Daniel J. Bernstein 
of the University of Illinois at Chicago. 
“Maybe this preparation is unnecessary.  Maybe we will not actually need 
post-quantum [or quantum] cryptography.  Maybe nobody will ever announce 
the successful construction of a large quantum computer.  However, if we do 
not do anything, and if it suddenly turns out years from now that users do need 
post-quantum [or quantum] cryptography, years of critical research time will 
have been lost.” – adapted from “Post-Quantum Cryptography” by Daniel J.  
Bernstein (2009) [5]  
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Chapter 4 
Experimental Realisation of a Quantum Digital Signature Scheme Which 
Does Not Require Quantum Memory 
4.1 Introduction 
Conventional digital signature schemes are used every day in e-commerce to help provide 
protection against forging, and they also grant message transferability.  However, many of 
the widely used signature schemes are not unconditionally secure.  This means that the 
security relies on assumptions about the mathematical complexity of the protocol.  
Quantum digital signature (QDS) schemes on the other hand can be unconditionally 
secure, making use of the probabilistic nature of quantum mechanics.  The only previous 
experimental realisation of a QDS protocol relied on long term, on-demand quantum 
memory (QM), which is not technologically feasible at this time, as described in Chapter 2 
[1], [2].  The experimental realisation of QDS presented in this Chapter uses an improved 
protocol allowing for QDS to be performed without the need for any QMs, which is a 
major step towards practical applications. 
4.1.1 Introduction to protocol for multiport implementation 
Protocols for QDS have two stages, a distribution stage and a messaging stage.  For our 
experimental implementation we are encoding in four possible states, |a⟩, |aei
π
2⁄ ⟩, |aeiπ⟩, 
and |aei3𝜋 2⁄ ⟩, although this is only limited by the experimental set-up, as each non-
orthogonal pair requires one extra asymmetric Mach-Zehnder interferometer at the receiver 
to perform the measurement.  In theory any number of non-orthogonal states could be used 
this requires modifications to the measurement system and theoretical model.   
In the case of the multiport based QDS protocol the two stages are as follows: 
Distribution stage 
1. For each possible future one-bit message k = 0,1, Alice generates two copies of her 
quantum signatures, QuantSigk.  The quantum signature has a length L (which is 
determined by experimental properties, and calculated during the analysis section 
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of this Chapter), with each qubit element (which is a coherent state of amplitude 
|α|2) randomly chosen from her four available phase states 
{𝛼, 𝑎𝑒𝑖
𝜋
2⁄ , 𝛼𝑒𝑖𝜋, 𝑎𝑒𝑖
3𝜋
2⁄ }.  The information which makes up the signature is stored 
classically by Alice and is known as PrivKeyk.   
2. Alice sends one copy of Quantsigk to each recipient, in this case Bob and Charlie. 
3. Bob and Charlie then pass their phase-encoded coherent state elements of Quantsigk 
through the multiport to perform the swap and comparison mechanism.  For each 
signature element they note whether they detect a photon at their multiport null-port 
photon detector.  After the multiport each signature element is passed to the state 
discrimination measurement stage.  This measurement could be unambiguous state 
discrimination or elimination, but the difference is only post-selection analysis.  
The measurement outcomes are stored in secure classical storage.   
After the distribution stage Alice will have PrivKeyk, the complete classically stored 
information about QuantSigk.  Bob and Charlie will have confirmed they were sent the 
same signature by monitoring detection events on the multiport null-ports.  They will also 
have their state discrimination or elimination measurements of separate signature elements 
stored classically.  They are now ready to perform the messaging stage, a process that may 
take place a significant time after the distribution stage has occurred. 
Messaging stage  
1. To send a signed one-bit message, k, Alice sends the private key (PrivKeyk) and the 
message (k) to the desired recipient which we will assume as being Bob for now 
(although Charlie would perform the same processes). 
2. Bob checks for mismatches between the private key sent by Alice (PrivKeyk) and 
his quantum signature.  An authentication threshold, sa, is applied to the matching 
to prevent forging.  If fewer than L∙sa mismatches occur for Alice eliminated 
signature, then the message is accepted.  If otherwise, the message is rejected. 
3. To forward the message to Charlie, Bob forwards the message and the private key 
(k PrivKeyk) sent to him by Alice. 
4. Charlie also checks for matches, similarly to that carried out by Bob, but instead 
applies verification threshold, sv.  If fewer than L∙sv occur, the message is accepted.  
Otherwise it is rejected.  The verification threshold is chosen 0 ≤ sa ≤ sv < 1, so the 
verification threshold is always larger than the authentication threshold, as there 
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will always be some extra experimental error in the swap and comparison 
mechanism leading to mismatches between the signatures measured by Bob and 
Charlie.   
4.2 Unambiguous state discrimination/elimination quantum digital signatures 
To overcome the need for QM in the swap and comparison mechanism, the first 
experimental QDS protocol [3] used an all-optical fibre multiport, which made use of non-
demolition measurements to perform the swap and comparison mechanism [4].  Although 
the protocol did not require QMs in the multiport, it did however require them for Bob 
(Charlie) to perform their state discrimination measurement.  The protocol proposed in [5] 
by Dunjko et al., allows QDS to be carried out without relying on QM for the state 
discrimination measurement.  This is due to an improved method of state discrimination 
which allows a state to be distinguished without prior information other than knowledge of 
the set of possible phase encodings of the coherent states.  Without this reliance on QM, 
QDS becomes considerably more practical, and can be realised with existing optical 
components.   
4.2.1 State discrimination measurement 
In quantum communication, as in all communication, it is important for a receiver to be 
able to correctly interpret the information being sent.  Generally when dealing with secure 
quantum communication protocols the mean photon number is low.  Therefore it is 
important that the receiver has an optimised quantum measurement.   
In this experiment two similar measurements were carried out using the same set-up, which 
were unambiguous state discrimination (USD), and unambiguous state elimination (USE).  
USD is optimised to only accept the right answer, and therefore fully identifies the phase 
encoding of the state sent.  USE on the other hand, aims to eliminate states which were not 
sent.  Keeping in mind that QDS is a communication protocol, USE allows for a far greater 
success rate in measurement than USD.  This is because USD, in our 4-phase encoding 
case, relies on 3 photon correlated events, while USE only relies on 1 photon event.  This 
allows USD to rule out three of the four states, identifying one, and USE to only rule out 
one.  The mean photon number (|α|2) reaching the detectors is generally <1, therefore the 
probability of 3 photons, which have been routed correctly, triggering detection events is 
extremely small when compared to the probability of one detected photon event.  Figure 
2.1 shows the probability of a observing a certain number of photons in a particular pulse 
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for a given |α|2 per pulse.  It can be seen that even at a |α|2 = 1, the probability of 3 photons 
being measured is less than 10%, at Alice, before any communications channel or detector 
loss. 
Unambiguous state discrimination 
Unambiguous state discrimination allows the phase encoding of a state to be fully 
discriminated based on correlated detections and non-detections.  In order to perform the 
measurement a receiver only needs to know what possible non-orthogonal states are 
available for Alice’s phase-encoding.  An experimental representation of how USD works 
with linear optics for four possible phase-encodings is shown in Figure 4.1.  The input 
state, labelled |β⟩, comes from Alice is split into two paths.  One path is interfered with a 
reference on BS2 which is setup to possibly rules out one or both of the 0 or π non-
orthogonal pair, while the other path is interfered with a phase reference difference of 
π
/2 
on BS3 which possibly rules out one or both the 
π
/2 or 
3π
/2 pair.   
 
Figure 4.1 – a) unambiguous state discrimination and unambiguous state 
elimination schematic [6].  b) Unambiguous state discrimination and 
unambiguous state elimination measurement used in the quantum digital 
signatures experimental implementation BS – beamsplitter, PBS – 
polarisation beamsplitter, AG – air-gap, Det – photon detector.  AGs allow 
the reference photons to be set with a known delay to fully distinguish in 
either non-orthogonal pair set in the experiment.   
In an experimental system it is difficult to create reference beams locally at a receiver from 
a local oscillator that maintain phase locking with the sender’s source and therefore allow 
for high visibility and stability over extended durations.  Therefore the use of unbalanced 
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asymmetric interferometers which are polarisation routed allows a reference beam to be 
split from the signal paths and recombined on BS2 and 3 once their phases have been 
adjusted.  For comparison with Figure 4.1 a), the interferometers used in the experiment 
are shown in Figure 4.1 b).  Each BS, as well as the outputs, is labelled using the same 
notation for reference.   
From the raw detection events of each detector, the time-tags are gated to only include 
events from times when photon pulses are expected.  This gating procedure is undertaken 
to reduce the effects of dark counts and spurious photons from coupled background light.  
From the gated events, the number and precise detector groupings of three photon time-
correlations are discriminated.  Table 4.1 shows the three photon time-correlations 
expected for when Alice sends a certain state.  For example, when Alice sends ‘π’, Bob 
expects to measure a photon on his ‘Not 0’, ‘Not π/2’, and ‘Not 
3π
/2’ detectors. This is 
because each interferometer is locked off to fully distinguish two of the four possible 
phase-encodings.  Therefore in one interferometer only one detector should trigger events, 
while in the other both detectors should trigger events for the same input phase.  
 
Table 4.1- Unambiguous state discrimination (USD) measurement based on 
four phase encodings.  In a system containing interferometers with perfect 
visibility and detectors with no dark counts, Bob will never eliminate the 
state sent by Alice, therefore the diagonal elements in the table are denoted 
with crosses to indicate they should not trigger events. 
Although unambiguous state discrimination allows a receiver to determine a state fully, the 
overall success rate of a measurement is low, due to the requirement for three time-
correlated photon events.  Quantum communication experiments generally use |α|2 < 1, so 
the probability of having three photons in a pulse is at the very most 10%, and this is at the 
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output of Alice.  After transmission losses and insertion losses and non-unity detection 
efficiency, the likelihood of detecting 3 photons will typically be extremely low.   
Unambiguous state elimination 
USE in this experiment is a very similar measurement to USD, with the collection of data 
being the same, Figure 4.1 a) and b), but the post-selection analysis different.  USE relies 
on eliminating states from a known set of phase encodings rather than trying to distinguish 
one.  This means it can rely on one photon event in order to at least eliminate one possible 
state.  If more than one photon event is time-correlated, this allows more than one state to 
be eliminated at a time.   
USE works well with QDS because we are only looking for mismatches in the signature 
elements, if Alice sends a phase-encoding of ‘π’, and only eliminates ‘π/2’, this does not 
count as a mismatch because the ‘π’ phase-encoding has not been eliminated.  Table 4.2 
shows what events the four detectors at Bob (one of the receivers) would be expecting 
based on the four states that Alice sends.   
 
Table 4.2- Unambiguous state elimination (USE) detector clicks.  The ‘?’ 
denotes that a detector may or may not fire in the measurement process.  
The ‘X’ marks across the box denotes that a detector firing will count as a 
mismatch in the comparison stage, in other words it shouldn’t fire in a 
perfect system. 
Because USE yields a result with single detection events, unlike USD which requires three 
simultaneous detected events, the overall success rate of USE is a significantly higher than 
USD, leading to improved rates in signature transmission. 
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4.2.2 Definitions of security 
The security of QDS was described in the previous Chapter, this section serves as security 
definitions for this protocol giving the equations for the probabilities an honest rejection, 
accepting a forgery, and repudiation, P(hon rej), P(for), and P(rep) respectively. 
The definitions of security for this scheme are [6]: 
 A QDS protocol is secure against forging if the probability of a recipient 
successfully producing a private key for a message m, which will pass 
verification by the other recipients, decays exponentially as a function of the 
quantum signature length L increasing.   
 A QDS protocol is secure against repudiation if, for any malicious activity 
by Alice, the probability of a message failing the verification stage with a 
recipient once it has already passed the authentication stage with another 
recipient decays exponentially as a function of the quantum signature length 
L increasing. 
The security analysis is based on the Hoeffding’s inequalities, which gives an upper bound 
on random variable probabilistic scenarios [7].  The full analysis can be found in the 
supplementary material of [6], which gives a more in-depth theoretical analysis of how 
these are created.  These were also discussed in the previous Chapter.  The probabilities for 
an honest rejection, accepting a forgery, and repudiation are given in Equation 4.1, 2 and 3 
respectively.   
𝑃(hon rej) ≤  exp (-2(sa-Ph)
2
L)   Equation (4.1) 
𝑃(for) ≤  exp (-2(Cmin-sv)
2
L)   Equation (4.2) 
𝑃(rep) ≤  exp (-
(sv-sa)
2
2
L)    Equation (4.3) 
It is assumed that a legitimate user is equally interested in robustness against forging and 
repudiation.  The authentication threshold and verification threshold were chosen to be 
sa=Ph+
g
4⁄  and sv=Ph+3
g
4⁄  respectively, so that the bound on probability could be made 
equal. This leads to: 
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𝑃(for)=P(rep)=P(hon rej)≤ exp (-
g2
8
L)  Equation (4.4) 
The parameters for the equations can be found in Chapter 3 section 3.4.2. 
4.2.3 Experimental setup and methods 
The experimental set-up for the newly proposed protocol was superficially similar to that 
used for the previous experimentally realised protocol presented [3].  There were two main 
optical differences in the new set-up, one was the use of polarisation beamsplitters (PBS) 
as beam combiners and splitters, shown in Figure 4.2 a).   
 
Figure 4.2 – a) Polarisation routing in two unbalanced Mach-Zehnder 
interferometers.  The blue and red double headed arrows indicate the linear 
polarisations of the photons propagating in the fibre at that point.  Photon 
events are measured on photon detectors (Det).  b) shows a cross section of 
the polarisation-maintaining optical fibre and the supported propagating 
polarisation with fixed refractive indices n1 and n2. 
Figure 4.2 b) shows a cross section of the polarisation maintaining optical fibre 
highlighting the two polarisations which are supported by the structure.  Stress-members 
(generally modified glass) either side of the optical-fibre core, represented by black dots, 
set up two fixed refractive indices, n1, and n2.  This allows the fibre to support two fixed 
polarisations propagations, represented by the blue and red arrows.  In the previous 
experiment the unbalanced asymmetric Mach-Zehnder interferometers were constructed 
using solely 50:50 BSs, this lead to peaks on a histogram caused by light taking non-
interfering paths, later gated out, which meant that half the light intensity was routed to 
“useless” paths and did not contribute to the usable count rate essentially reducing the |α|2 
of the gated count rate.  Polarisation routing [8] was introduced in order to increase the 
gated rate and therefore increase the raw-to-gated count rate ratio.  Figure 4.3 shows a 
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representation of the interfering and non-interfering peaks, in a histogram, with and 
without polarisation routing.  The interferometers were constructed of polarisation-
maintaining optical fibre, which allowed two polarisations to propagate down the optical 
fibre unaltered.  By rotating the axis of a fibre 90° relative to another during the fusions 
splices made during construction the relative polarization of the photons were rotated when 
passing from one optical fibre to another. 
The second difference was the use of two interferometers to perform the USD/USE 
measurement, where before, only one per user was required.  In the new protocol, the 
measurement interferometers do not require phase modulators, unlike the previous 
experiment, so each interferometer was locked off to distinguish between phase-encoded 
coherent states within one of the two pairs of non-orthogonal states.  For every non-
orthogonal pair used, one more interferometer is required to fully distinguish those states.   
 
Figure 4.3 – A drawing of a histogram when Alice and Bob are using 
(right) and not using (left) polarisation routing.  Routing using the 
polarisation routing approach reduces the non-interfering peaks and 
increases the number of photons present in the interfering peak. 
There are several benefits to a receiver that does not require phase modulators (which are 
active components).  Firstly, a receiver no longer requires expensive RF electronics to 
drive them.  Secondly, temperature stabilisation was easier since phase modulators can 
dissipate electrical energy in the form of heat.  Finally the potential for a receiver to be 
integrated on chip is more viable, as loss-less phase modulation at higher frequencies 
remains difficult on chip.  However some groups have recently made steps to improve 
transmitter and receiver integrated devices [9].  Silicon Oxynitride was their chosen 
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material for the receiver as it has chip-to-fibre coupling (≈ 2 dB) and waveguide 
propagation loss (≈ 0.2 dB/cm) than indium-phostphide (InP), the material the transmitter 
was fabricated on.  The detection of single-photons for the receiver in [10] was off chip 
leading to a higher loss, but there is research interest into integrated single-photon 
detection [11].   
 
Figure 4.4 – Schematic of the optical setup for the experimental realisation 
of quantum digital signatures which does not require quantum memory.   
The optical system is shown in Figure 4.4 (which contains dashed lines which link to the 
electronic configuration of the experiment given in Figure 4.6).  The source of photons for 
this experiment was a vertical-cavity surface-emitting laser (VCSEL) diode (Honeywell 
GaAs HFE4093-342 [12]), which was gain-switched by an Agilent 81134A pulse pattern 
generator (PPG) [13], through a Maxim drive board (EV 3996 [14]) at 100 MHz.  The 
VCSEL emission had a central wavelength of 849.817 nm with a spectral full-width at 
half-maximum (FWHM) of 0.045 nm Figure 4.5 a).  The temporal response of the VCSEL 
emission, Figure 4.5 b), shows a FWHM of 0.537 ns, however this is the measured 
response from the thick-junction Si-SPAD [15] and is detector-limited.  The VCSEL was 
in a free-space package and was highly divergent, and therefore it had to be collimated and 
coupled into a single-mode fibre.  The use of polarisation maintaining (PM) fibre in the 
construction of this experiment meant the polarisation of light in the single-mode fibre had 
to be aligned with one of the two axes of propagation of the PM fibre.  This was carried out 
by polarisation adjustments from a “bat ear” type paddle based static polarisation controller 
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[16].  The optical power generated was attenuated down to a low mean photon level via a 
computer controlled optical attenuator (OZ-optics [17]), which allowed the |α|2 to be set for 
an experimental run.   
 
Figure 4.5 – Vertical-cavity-surface-emitting-laser (VCSEL) diode 
spectrum (a) and temporal response at 100 MHz clocking frequency (b). 
Alice split the pulses into two paths at the entrance to her unbalanced asymmetric Mach-
Zehnder (UAMZ) interferometer.  The short path featured a phase modulator [18], driven 
at a clock frequency of 100 MHz by a non-return-to-zero (NRZ) signal from an Agilent 
81110A PPG [19], which was used to phase-encode the attenuated photon pulses (coherent 
states) in one of the four phases, 0, 
π
/2, π, or 
3π
/2.  The long path, which had a 5 ns 
approximate delay with respect to the short path, was used as a reference, and therefore 
was left unaltered.  The long arm featured a collimated air-gap (Oz Optics [20]), which 
also allowed optical attenuation, and small adjustments to the timing of the delay.  These 
features allowed the user sufficient control to perform loss balancing and timing calibration 
during construction, and then remain fixed at a particular optimum value during operation 
of the system.  The two paths were recombined on a PBS which was used as a “lossless” 
beam combiner.  This “lossless” recombination was performed by rotating one of the paths 
PM fibre axis by 90° during construction, allowing both the signal and reference to exit 
through one output port with crossed polarisations.   
After the recombination of the paths by Alice, she sent her pulse train, composed of pairs 
of orthogonally polarised pulses separated by 5 ns (a signal pulse at the 100 MHz clock 
frequency followed by the reference pulse which is delayed by ≈5 ns) to a 50:50 BS which 
equally split the intensity of Alice’s coherent states into two.  This is an optical way of 
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Alice generating her two copies of quantum signatures which can be sent to Bob and 
Charlie.  We define the |α|2 at the outputs of the 50:50 BS and use inline optical attenuation 
(again based on knife edges) to ensure that the |α|2 was identical in both arms. 
Bob and Charlie took their copies of the coherent states from Alice and perform the swap 
and comparison mechanism using the multiport which was described previously.  The 
multiport was constructed of PM fibre, and features collimated adjustable air-gaps (with 
adjustable optical attenuation) in each arm allowing a user to easily loss balance for high 
visibility (approximately 99.7%).  The monitoring of the null-ports was carried out using 
commercially available thick junction PerkinElmer (initially RCA, then EG&G and now 
Excelitas) SPCM-AQ-12 Geiger-mode Si-SPADs [15], with a mean detection efficiency of 
40.5 % (at a wavelength of 850 nm), dark count rate of 320 counts per second, and a 
FWHM timing jitter of 380 ps [21].   
One issue was encountered in the multiport from the implementation of polarisation 
routing: the two polarisations were sometimes not arriving at the final beamsplitters at the 
same time, meaning reduced visibility at the multiport and further measurements.  One 
polarisation gave a 99.7% visibility while the other was found to vary.  PM fibre has two 
axes of propagation set up by induced birefringence from stress members.  This sets up a 
fast and slow axis of propagation which have very slightly different refractive indices.  
Slightly different refractive indices would not be a problem for short distances, but over 
5 m this slight difference in propagation speed allowed for a phase shift between the 
reference and signal polarisations whilst in transit.  In practice, external stresses caused by 
temperature changes and air-conditioning recirculation slightly changed this phase 
difference. 
After Bob confirmed, using the multiport, that he was sent the same quantum signature 
elements, he performed his state discrimination measurement.  Bob had two UAMZ 
interferometers of their own, one which is locked off to fully distinguish in the 0 or π non-
orthogonal pair, and the other for the 
π
/2 or 
3π
/2 pair.  The USE measurements were 
recorded using thick junction PerkinElmer SPCM-AQ-12 Geiger-mode Si-SPADs at the 
output of each interferometer.  Triggered events are then recorded by time-tagging 
hardware (PicoQuant HydraHarp 400 [22]) for USE and USD analysis later. 
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Figure 4.6 – The electrical system that drives the optical system and 
collects the data.   
Figure 4.6 shows the electronic system for the experiment. A 10 MHz rubidium clock 
(NovaTech [23]) set a common reference synchronisation signal for all the electrical 
controllers.  The output from the rubidium clock signal had too low a voltage to trigger all 
of the equipment in the system and required amplification from a frequency synthesiser 
(Hewlett Packard 8648B [24]) which had lower timing jitter than if an amplifier was used.  
The LiNbO3 phase modulator [18] in Alice’s short arm is electrically modulated by the 
Agilent 81110A PPG [19].  Modulating at a clock rate of 100 MHz, the PPG sent a 
repeated 4-level NRZ pattern consisting of the four possible phase encodings in the 
experiment, Figure 4.7.  A repeated pattern was used to help the user generate histograms 
to monitor the visibility of the interferometers.  In a real system a pseudo-random 
generator would be used to select the phase encodings randomly from the N possible 
phases available in the alphabet.  The piezo-bricks in the air-gaps were controlled by 
voltage sources (ThorLabs MDT630B) with a range of 0 to 100 V.  
On Bob’s side, the null-port detector was monitored by a program written using National 
Instruments LabVIEW [25], which recorded time-tag events when the USD/USE 
measurements were being made.  When it was not collecting data, the program maximises 
the visibility of the multiport output by minimising the count rate measured on the null-
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port detectors.  It controls the count rate by adjusting the relative optical path length via the 
voltage applied over a piezo-brick.  A separate LabVIEW program also recorded time-tag 
events on the time-tagging hardware based on instructions from the user. 
4.2.4 Methods 
This sub-section will describe operation of the system and collection of time tagged photon 
arrival data.  Initial set-up involved adjusting the electrical delay of the phase modulator 
signal to maximise the visibility of the two interferometers for measurement.  The four-
level repeater pattern used for the experiment was created using two square pulse trains 
from the Agilent 81110A PPG are shown in Figure 4.7.  The flat top of the square wave 
(corresponding to the voltage required for a particular phase encoding) was ideally 10 ns 
wide, when running at 100 MHz, but in practice the “flat” top was only 8 ns due to 
switching signal rise and fall time.  The “flat” top was also not perfectly level, as it 
exhibited some ringing and overshoot corresponding to ±0.2 % of the flat top value, 
meaning a 1 or 2 degree possible variation in our set phase-encodings.  The 4-level values 
were also co-dependent on each other as even the ‘0’ voltage was a combination of two ‘0’ 
voltage signals.  The voltage levels between each of the four states was not perfectly equal 
(therefore the non-orthogonal states were not 100% non-orthogonal), optically, the 
visibility for one non-orthogonal pair will be better than the other.  The delay of the phase 
modulator driving signal relative to the laser was adjusted so that the optical pulses arrived 
at the phase modulator at times that gave optimum visibility.  The standard set-up 
procedure involved optimising the visibility for both interferometers.   
The LabVIEW program which monitored the multiport via the null-port detector was set-
up first, as USE measurements could not happen before the multiport was optimised.  As 
mentioned in section 4.2.4 the multiport had some long-term visibility stability issues 
because of the fibre length in the interferometer arms and additional path length 
differences caused by the polarisation routing effects.  Initially the path length changes due 
to temperature and induced stresses were operating on timescales too short to allow for 
sufficient control for reliable operation, so patience was required until the system reached a 
level of mechanical and thermal equilibrium where the LabVIEW program was able to 
compensate for any further drift. 
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Figure 4.7 – Oscilloscope output measured from the Agilent 81110A pulse 
pattern generator [19] which is driving the phase modulator.   
Another LabVIEW program monitored Bob’s interferometers and recorded data when the 
complete system was stable.  It generated four histograms, one for each detector which 
gave the user visual feedback on the interference.  The user used this information to adjust 
the voltage of the piezo-bricks in each interferometer, adjusting for small changes in path 
length to improve the visibility.  When the visibility reached a suitable level, time-tags 
were recorded and a new measurement was set up.   
For processing the data, a program written in MATLAB [26] took the raw recorded time-
tags, and placed a 4 ns duration gate was centred on each of the four histogram peaks (a 
peak for each phase-encoding).  Analysis of the raw, gated, and coincidence counting was 
performed using the process presented in the proceeding section. 
4.2.5 Experimental results and analysis 
The presentation of the experimental results here will follow the logical method of 
processing from the raw time-tagged photons, to manipulation of data to generate state 
discrimination matrices, and finally the analysis of those matrices into meaningful values 
such as the signature half-bit length L that allows the digital signature protocol to be 
secure. 
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The experiment was carried out over a range of |α|2 per pulse between 1 and 11.5.  This 
range was originally chosen to increase the overall USD success rate, the USE analysis 
was performed much later on the same results.   
As mentioned previously in the description of the experimental set-up, polarisation routing 
was used in Alice and Bob’s (Charlie’s) interferometers to increase the percentage of 
signal gated count rates.  It was found that the percentage of gated counts recorded per 
second was on average 88% of the raw count rate for the signal count rate, i.e. the photons 
counted at the receiver interferometers, because of the use of polarisation routing.  This is 
significant improvement over the previous experiment where the gated count rate 
percentage was <40%, because of the non-interfering peaks and background noise [3].  
Figure 4.8 shows the total raw and gated count rates for the experiment in black and red 
respectively for Bob.   
The other data shown in Figure 4.8 is the null-port raw and gated count rates, in blue and 
pink respectively.  The general trend for the total count rate (raw and gated) was to 
increase with |α|2, as would be expected.  The total gated count rate for the multiport null-
port detector is 73.6% of the total raw count rate on average, showing that most of the 
triggered events are coming from the gated region.  In theory, if Alice is sending Bob and 
Charlie the same quantum signature elements, and there is perfect loss balancing in the 
multiport, there should be no photons reaching the null-port detector, apart from 
background light and dark counts.  This should lead to a gated percentage of around 20%, 
composed of 4  2 ns gates (= 8 ns) of the entire timing histogram of 40ns duration, 
because the events are spread randomly throughout the histogram. Because the gated count 
rate percentage is found to be higher than 20% this suggests a non-unity visibility. This 
makes sense, because of the polarisation routing issue in the multiport where the two 
orthogonal polarisations propagating down the polarisation-maintaining fibre were found 
to have varying visibilities. 
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Figure 4.8 – Total raw and gated count rates for the signal-ports and null 
port.  The signal-ports refer to the summed measured events from Bob’s 
four detectors in his USD/USE measurement, and the null-port refers to the 
one detector that is attached to the multiport non-demolition measurement.   
This system used USE/USD to remove the requirement for a QM at each receiver.  We can 
generate the USE/USD success rates, for correct and incorrect cases from the gated count 
records.  For USE, success is described as the case when Bob (Charlie) has eliminated 1 or 
more possible phase-encodings, but has not erroneously eliminated the phase-encoding 
actually sent by Alice.  An incorrect success would be when Bob (Charlie) has incorrectly 
eliminated the phase-encoding actually sent by Alice.  For USD, success is when Bob 
(Charlie) manages to fully distinguish the phase-encoding actually sent by Alice from the 
three photon time-correlations (and one correlated non-event).  A failure would be when 
Bob (Charlie) fully distinguishes a phase-encoding which was not that sent by Alice. 
Figure 4.9 shows the USE a) and USD (b) total rates (black), along with correct (red) and 
incorrect (blue) rates.  One major difference between USE and USD is the total rate 
(correct + incorrect).  It can be seen that even at the top of the |α|2 range used, the total 
USD success rate does not even reach the lowest USE success rate. 
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Figure 4.9 – Total success rates for unambiguous state elimination (USE) 
a) and discrimination (USD) measurements b).   
From Figure 4.9 a) it can be seen that the correct rate of USE far outweighs the incorrect 
rate, with the average correct USE rate being 95.3%.  Given that the total USE rate is the 
gated count rate (because every detected photon can eliminate a state), and the signal gated 
rate is 88% of the raw rate, the overall average correct USE rate was 83.8% of the total raw 
signal count rate.  The incorrectly eliminated rate is substantially lower, meaning incorrect 
eliminations are less frequent.  The number could be reduced further if the purity of the 
transmitted phase-encodings and the visibility of the interferometers were improved.   
Figure 4.9 b) shows the total USD success rate, along with the total correct and incorrect 
rates.  There were two big differences between the data seen in Figure 4.9 a) and b).  First 
is the scale of the y-axis, both figures were plotted using the same raw data, but there was a 
massive difference in success count rate for USE and USD.  The probability that three 
photons are in a pulse that made it to the detectors was low due to the high loss of the 
multiport (>8.5 dB) and the interferometers (>4 dB), and being correctly routed, then 
detected (with each detector having 40.5 % detection efficiency).  The second difference 
was the percentage of USD success rate which was found to be, on average, 78.73%.  This 
average was slightly skewed higher, because for the |α|2 1.25, 1.75, 2, and 2.25, there were 
only ever correct states distinguished.  This meant that the portion of incorrectly 
distinguished states was actually around a quarter of what is recorded.  The total USD 
success rate was found to range from 2.14 × 10
-5
 to 3.57 × 10
-3
 % of the raw signal count 
rate as the |α|2 increased, substantially lower than the USE rate. 
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USD was originally considered as a method to perform the state discrimination by 
Bob/Charlie, because it can fully distinguish which phase-encoding has been sent by Alice 
and was thought to have a low probability of eliminating the state actually sent by Alice.  
Initial tests which were performed using a |α|2 = 1 showed that the USD success rate was 
insufficient to be practically useful, and therefore to improve this rate higher |α|2 was 
required.  In QDS we only need to test for mismatches between signature elements and 
therefore USE would have been enough to eliminate phase-encodings and perform a 
mismatch test.   
Knowing the USE success rate is useful for gauging how well a system is performing in 
terms of count rate.  This information is a fundamental element of QDS, but this 
information alone cannot tell us the important system properties, such as the signature half-
bit length L.  The rest of the section follows the analysis process taken from the 
supplementary material of [15]. 
(
2105 15627
9859 1405
21495 6022
8849 22571
33588 6364
14616 20824
1344 11948
15590 1149
)   Equation 4.5 
 
Figure 4.10 - Count matrix visual representation based on the matrix in 
Equation 4.5.   
The USE measurements can be placed into a photon count matrix, as shown numerically in 
Equation 4.5 and graphically in Figure 4.10, where the columns correspond to what Alice 
sent (0, 
π
/2, π, and 
3π
/2), and the rows, Bob’s (Charlie’s) measurement detector (not 0, not 
π
/2, not π, and not 
3π
/2).  Each element represents a number of detector events at that 
particular detector for the specified transmitted phase.  The following example for this 
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analysis used a |α|2 of 2, as represents the count matrix with minimum error due to Poisson 
statistics.   
The count matrix has some features which are worthy of note.  Firstly, there is a minimum 
down the diagonal, where Bob eliminates the state actually sent by Alice; any values 
recorded here are the incorrect USE successes.  Maxima occur in each column where Bob 
(Charlie) are eliminating the state which is π out of phase with the one sent by Alice.  The 
other two values in each column are referred to as “50%” peaks, where Bob (Charlie) are 
eliminating states orthogonal to the one sent by Alice.  This means that they are equally 
likely to reach either detector and will give equal peaks on each histogram that contain 
50% of the counts in the maximum.  If Bob’s (Charlie’s) interferometer has 100% 
visibility and the states being sent by Alice are perfect (exactly the desired phase) and pure 
(non-variant within a particular phase), then these 50% peaks will be equal. In all 
experimental cases, these peaks are not equal, this is because the 50% peaks where not 
taken into account when looking at the overall system visibility of the interferometers, only 
the maximum and minimum were considered.  This coupled with the fact that there were 
slight differences in the set phases due to the uncertainty in the electrical modulation led to 
discrepancies in the phase-encodings actually set. 
The count matrix Equation 4.5 was divided by the clock-rate (100 MHz in this case) of the 
experiment to give Bob’s (Charlie’s) probability of detecting an event based what Alice 
sends, shown in Equation 4.6.  This is called the Cost matrix [3], [5], [6] 
𝐶 = (
2.105 15.627
9.859 1.405
21.495 6.022
8.849 22.571
33.588 6.364
14.616 20.824
1.344 11.948
15.590 1.149
) ×10-5       Equation 4.6 
Equation 4.7 is the Cost matrix for an honest scenario (C
h
), the probability that Bob 
eliminate the phase-encoding that was actually sent by Alice.  Even if Bob is being honest, 
there will still be a mismatch due to experimental error.  The probability of an honest 
mismatch was denoted by Ph, and is the average of the diagonal elements in Equation 4.7, 
giving 1.50 × 10
-5
. 
𝐶ℎ = (
2.105 1.405
2.105 1.405
1.344 1.149
1.344 1.149
2.105 1.405
2.105 1.405
1.344 1.149
1.344 1.149
) ×10-5   Equation 4.7 
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Equation 4.8, C’, is a variation of the original Cost matrix (Equation 4.6), and is the 
difference offset by the honest Cost matrix in Equation 4.7, essentially C’= C - Ch.  This 
generates a matrix which shows the difference in off-diagonal values and the diagonal 
values for each column, these values represent the advantage that Bob had over a forger in 
identifying a forged signature element.  If all the values were ‘0’ a forger could guess any 
value and be likely to get it accepted.  The guaranteed advantage (guad), is the minimum 
advantage Bob had over a forger, i.e. the smallest non-zero element in Equation 4.8, in this 
case the value was 4.87 × 10
-5
.  Since the lowest element was the worst-case scenario, we 
applied this value to all non-diagonal elements, shown as Equation 4.9.   
𝐶′ = (
0 14.2
7.75 0
20.2 4.87
7.5 21.4
31.5 4.96
12.5 19.4
0 10.8
14.2 0
) ×10-5   Equation (4.8) 
𝐶𝑙 = (
0 4.87
4.87 0
4.87 4.87
4.87 4.87
4.87 4.87
4.87 4.87
0 4.87
4.87 0
) ×10-5   Equation (4.9) 
g = Pmin × guad    Equation (4.10)  
The guad tells us Bob’s minimum advantage over a forger, in measuring a state but the 
forger themselves can have some advantage if the |α|2 was high enough for them to split off 
photons and performed their own measurement, essentially improving their chance of 
sending the correct forged state.  If a malevolent party was able to eliminate one of the four 
possible phase-encodings they would have improved their chances of getting a forged 
signature element accepted.  The minimum error measurement that a malevolent party can 
perform is known as Pmin taken from [27] is plotted for our range of |α|
2
 in Figure 4.11 a) 
from Equation 4.11.  Pmin was a correction factor for our guaranteed advantage, the 
returned value is known as the gap g (Equation 4.10) which is used to calculate the 
signature half-bit length L.   
λ1=2 exp(-|α|
2) (cos(|α|2)+cosh ((|α|2)) 
λ2=2 exp(-|α|
2) (sin(|α|2)+sinh ((|α|2)) 
λ3=2 exp(-|α|
2) (cosh(|α|2)-cos ((|α|2)) 
λ4=2 exp(-|α|
2) (sinh(|α|2)-sin ((|α|2)) 
105 
 
Pmin=1-
1
16
| ∑ √λii |
2
   Equation (4.11) 
Figure 4.11 b), c) and d) show the guaranteed advantage (guad), the gap and Ph, 
respectively for the range of |α|2 in the experiment.  Each plot can be seen to follow a 
general trend, with some experimental outliers.  In plots b) and c) |α|2s 6.25 and 7.25 have 
been omitted because of their unphysical value, during analysis it was found out that one of 
the minimum diagonal elements in each was greater than an off-diagonal element, resulting 
in a negative values.  This can be seen manifesting in d), where the 7.25 value is very out 
of the data trend. 
Figure 4.11 b) shows that the general trend of the guad was to increase with |α|2, because 
this is a probability relating the USE detection rate, as the |α|2 increases so does the count 
rate, and therefore the probability increases.  Uncertainties in the guaranteed advantage 
depend on the variation in the overall visibility, so larger uncertainties correspond to 
unstable measurement runs, for instance points 9.5 and 10.25.  As mentioned previously, 
|α|2 of 6.25 and 7.25 have been omitted as they gave unphysical (negative) values, meaning 
that the at least one diagonal element has a larger value than an off-diagonal element. 
Figure 4.11 c) shows a general decrease in gap with increasing |α|2, this is due to the 
correction factor from Pmin which decreases exponentially with |α|
2
.  The errors in the y-
axis are propagated forward in Equation (4.10).  Following on from the guad, |α|2 6.25 and 
7.25 were omitted due to unphysical (negative) values, implying that the diagonal elements 
were actually larger than off-diagonal elements, i.e. the visibility had drifted so much 
between step-up and measurement that the interferometer was no longer optimised for 
distinguishing the correct values. 
In Figure 4.11 d), Ph, the probability of an honest rejection, shows a general increase with 
|α|2 because it a probability related to the USE success rate (really incorrect rate), as the |α|2 
increases so does the count rate.  An outlier in Ph is the |α|
2
 7.25 value and as mentioned 
previously this is because it was found that a diagonal element was larger than an off-
diagonal element, this would results in a bad overall visibility for the QDS system.  
Uncertainties in the y-axis were found to be because of variation in the visibility, as Ph is 
the smallest value in the Cost matrix, changes in visibility will create large variations in the 
values seen. 
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Figure 4.11 – a) the minimum error correction factor (Pmin) calculated 
using Equation 4.11, b) the guaranteed advantage a receiver has over an 
malevolent party (guad), c) the corrected gap between the highest diagonal 
element and lowest off-diagonal element (gap), and d) the probability that a 
receiver will honestly reject the correct phase-encoding (Ph).   
At this point all the parameters needed to calculate the signature half-bit length, L, have 
been calculated and we can proceed to determine a value for that parameter.  In the 
security analysis it was said that the probability for forging, repudiation and an honest 
rejection should be made equal, as expressed in Equation (4.12).  In the supplementary 
material of Collins et al. [15], the probability that a malevolent party is able to forge a half-
bit was given to be 0.01%.  Since this is a somewhat arbitrary value, this thesis presents 
values of 0.01%, 0.1%, 1% and 10% as well to show changes in L with different levels of 
security. 
𝑃(for)=P(rep)=P(hon rej)≤ exp (-
g2
8
L)   Equation (4.12) 
Figure 4.12 shows the resulting plot of half-bit length for each |α|2 at the different 
percentage of forging values.  It can be seen that the lengths are staggeringly large and 
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only increase with |α|2, due to the gap decreasing (Figure 4.11 c)).  The length expression 
depends on 1 g2⁄  and the gap is a decreasing number with increasing |α|
2
 as was seen from 
Figure 4.11 c).  Although the half-bit length does decrease when the probability of forging 
is increased, it does not make a significant difference on the whole, as for every step shown 
in Figure 4.12 (0.01→0.1→…), the half-bit length only decreases by around 50%.  
 
Figure 4.12 – Signature half-bit length L for different security levels.  
Although the length is an important parameter, arguably a more important one is how long 
is it takes someone to send the signature half-bit.  Note that the smallest length was 
calculated for a |α|2 of 1, found to be 5.13 × 1013 for a probability of forging of 0.01%.   
The time taken for Alice to send one signature half-bit length (for each of the different 
security levels) is shown in Figure 4.13.  The values for the time taken are calculated by 
dividing the signature half-bit length by the clock frequency used in the experiment, in this 
case 100 × 10
6
 Hz.  This method is used because in an experiment, Alice, Bob and Charlie 
omit signature elements when they did not receive any photons.  If Bob and Charlie were 
required to receive the whole signature in order it would take a much longer time.  The 
time given is in seconds, and the time taken increases with the greater |α|2, which is 
counter-intuitive, because a higher success rate should mean less time.  However due to the 
security analysis, the more photons available, the more advantage a malevolent party has, 
therefore the signature length must be longer.  To put the values in perspective for the 
shortest half-bit length, 5.13 × 10
13
, for a |α|2 of 1 at a 0.01% probability of forging, the 
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time taken is 5.13 × 10
5
 seconds, which is approximately 6 days.  Quite a long time 
considering Alice needs to send two sequences of this length (one for her future bit 0 
message, and one for her future bit 1 message). 
 
Figure 4.13 – Time taken in seconds for Alice to send one signature half-bit 
length to Bob (Charlie).   
4.3 Discussion and conclusion 
Now that the data from this QDS experiment has been fully analysed following [6], it 
would be a good idea to compare our best measurement with that of the previous QDS 
experiment.  One point to note, that calculation of probability of forging, repudiation and 
honest rejection was different in each paper, therefore the length calculation was different. 
Equation (4.12) shows the expression for this experiment while Equation (4.13) shows the 
expression used for the previous experiment.  The difference in the equations is dependent 
on the security assumptions of the channel. 
𝑃(for)=P(rep)=P(hon rej)≤ 2 exp (-
2
9
g2L)   Equation (4.13) [28] 
In the main paper and the supplementary material of the previous QDS experimental 
realisation [3] the gap used as their example was 8.03 × 10-4, giving a signature half-bit 
length of 6.91 × 10
7
.  The previous experimental system also ran at 100 MHz clock-rate 
and therefore Alice took 0.691 seconds to send one signature half-bit.  While in this 
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experiment it was shown that the shortest length would be 5.13 × 10
13
, which took 
5.13 × 10
5
 seconds for Alice to send. 
Although these are significantly different, there are several points which should be noted.  
Firstly, this new experiment uses a detection method realised without QM technology, 
while the previous implemented a detection method which simulated a QM using optical 
fibre, therefore although this new experiment may seem to take longer, the previous 
experiment could not be realised in a practical manner with current QM technology [1]. 
Secondly, the |α|2 ranges for each experiment was different.  In the previous experiment it 
was 0.04 to 0.27, the experiment presented in this Chapter ranged from 1 to 11.5.  
Intuitively, it may appear that the newly presented system should perform better, as a 
higher mean photon number suggests a higher probability of detecting photons, but this 
neglects the security analysis.  One of the key elements in calculating the signature half-bit 
length L is the gap, which is calculated using Equation 4.10, and incorporates the 
correction factor Pmin.  At a |α|
2
 of 1, Pmin=0.0924 and drops approximately by a power of 
10 every integer of 1 in the |α|2, Figure 4.11 a).  This means that any benefit of increasing 
the USE count rate is lost immediately, and actually reducing the |α|2 to less than one is 
more beneficial. In the |α|2 range used in the previous experiment, Pmin goes from 
0.6357-0.4035, much higher than the range used in the new Chapter presented here.  
Although the results presented in this Chapter are calculated using the USE success rates, 
the experimental originally used USD hence the values of |α|2 are higher in this Chapter to 
increase the success rate of three photon correlations.  USE analysis can simply be 
performed using the same data for USD.  USE was adopted so much later that the 
multiport and other components had already been decommissioned, therefore lower |α|2 
could not be measured.  
In conclusion, this Chapter has shown an experimental realisation of a QDS protocol 
presented in [14].  The protocol was conceived in order to improve the realisable 
applications of QDS by performing a state distinguishing measurement which stores the 
measured phase-encoding information classically, rather than requiring a QM in order to 
store the optical coherent state.  As mentioned earlier and in the literature review, QM 
technology today is currently not in a state where it could be used in this application and 
therefore ways to avoid QM are sought.  Without the requirement for QM, QDS become a 
more realisable quantum technology.  Another basic improvement was the use of 
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polarisation routing, which increased the percentage of gated counts from <40% to 88% of 
the total counts.   
Using the security analysis from the supplementary material in [6], parameters were 
generated from the data cost matrices to calculate the signature half-bit length.  For a 
0.01% probability of forging, the shortest signature half-bit length was found to be 
5.13 × 10
13
 for a |α|2 of 1.  This gave a time for Alice to send of 5.13 × 105 seconds, which 
is approximately 5.94 days.  The signature half-bit length, and time taken for Alice to send 
only increases with |α|2.  This is due to the decrease in error a malevolent party will have in 
creating a forgery.   
4.4 Improvements and future work  
As mentioned in discussion and conclusion the performance of this new experiment when 
compared to the previous one was actually longer in terms of signature half-bit length, and 
hence the time required for Alice to send one half-bit.  One method to improve this would 
be using lower |α|2 range in the experimental testing.  As mentioned the Pmin correction 
factor used to calculate the gap is a decreasing function with increasing |α|2.  Therefore to 
improve the gap, a lower |α|2 would be of more benefit than trying to increase the gap with 
count rates.  This will be discussed further in the following Chapter also on experimental 
QDS. 
A second way to improve upon the QDS experiment would be to find a more efficient way 
to perform a swap and comparison test.  The multiport was the first step in realising the 
original QDS protocol by Gottesman and Chuang in [29], by removing the need for QM 
technology.  But the multiport introduces complexity and instability because it is two 
intertwined interferometers.  The polarisation routing used in this experiment was also 
affected by the multiport because of its construction with PM-fibre.  The two birefringent 
axes have different refractive indices, which can also change slightly depending on stresses 
on the fibre.  This meant that temperature changes in the room cause the two polarisations 
to travel at different velocities.  Over the 5 m distance this mean that phase shifts could be 
induced creating a lower visibility multiport.  If the distance between the multiport BSs 
would be increased, the effect would be made worse, therefore the multiport limits the 
range at which QDS can be carried out.  A new swap and comparison mechanism which is 
performed classically may be a way to increase the distance of QDS and increase the half-
bit rate. 
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A third way to improve the system may be to use a narrow spectral linewidth laser.  Since 
coherence length is inversely related to spectral linewidth [30], a narrower linewidth would 
mean the coherence length would increase.  Distributed feedback (DFB) and distributed 
Bragg reflector (DBR) laser diodes are known to have narrow linewidths of kHz region at 
wavelengths around 1550 nm [31] while the VCSEL diode used in this experiment had a 
linewidth of 18.7 GHz at 850 nm.   
Changing to a longer wavelength (say at the low loss telecommunications window around 
1550 nm) would also increase stability as changes in path length correspond to relatively 
smaller changes in visibility due to the longer wavelength.  A 
π
/2 change in path length at 
850 nm wavelength corresponds to approximately 212.5 nm, while for 1550 nm this 
corresponds to 387.5 nm, almost double the value.  Therefore it can be seen that a system 
would be relatively more stable at 1550 nm.  This could be combined with the transition to 
narrower linewidth lasers outlined above to further enhance the stability. 
Finally, increasing the clock-rate of the system could help shorten the time taken for Alice 
to send a signature half-bit.  This system now is clocked at 100 MHz, where as many new 
QKD systems operate in the GHz regime, if the maximum clock rate for the labs pulse 
pattern generator was to be used 3.3 GHz, an approximation of a power of 10 could be 
taken off the time taken.   
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Chapter 5 
Experimental Demonstration of Kilometre Range Quantum Digital 
Signatures Using Quantum Key Distribution Hardware 
5.1 Introduction 
The previous Chapter of this thesis showed the final steps in protocol improvements which 
allowed QDS to be carried out without the requirement of quantum memory (QM) for the 
swap and comparison mechanism or the state discrimination measurement.  At present, 
QM has not reached the technical maturity to be a practical option for this application [1]–
[3], as discussed in Chapters 2. 
When comparing the experimental performances of the two experimentally realised 
systems, it turned out that the revised system (presented in Chapter 3) which did not 
require QM, [4], was still out-performed by the original which did require QM [5].  Given 
that QM technology at the moment cannot provide on-demand, unity fidelity, long storage 
time, and large capacity, an implementation which requires QM will not be practical at this 
time [2], [3], [6].   
A measure of performance in QDS is the length L of a signature half-bit, and how long it 
would take a user to send one half-bit.  In the first experimental implementation, which 
required QM, the optimised coherent state sequence length L was found to be 6.91 × 10
7
 
elements, meaning that it takes a total of 0.691 seconds to send one signature half-bit at the 
100 MHz clock frequency employed.  The second experimental implementation, which 
does not require any QM, required an optimised half-bit length of 5.13 × 10
13
, taking a 
total of 5.13 × 10
5
 seconds to send at a clock frequency of 100 MHz.   
There are several factors which caused the modified system without QM to have a longer 
signature half-bit length than the first experimental realisation.  One was the use of 
relatively high mean photon numbers of >1, leading to a very small minimum error 
measurement value.  The passive phase modulators used to perform the measurement were 
more susceptible to rejection events if the phase encoded by Alice was not 100% correct.  
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Fluctuating visibility in the multiport due to external stresses on the optical fibre meant an 
overall lower visibility.   
In this Chapter, a new protocol is used in order to overcome some of these issues and allow 
demonstrations of QDS over kilometre ranges in optical fibre.  The new protocol no longer 
required the optical multiport, allowing greater transmission distances to be covered.  
Lower mean photon numbers are investigated to keep the minimum error measurement 
value at a more optimum level.  
 
5.1.1 Range of mean photon number per pulse 
As explained in the previous Chapter the overall performance of a QDS system is not just 
dependent on the photon count rate measured by a receiver.  The coherent state sequence 
length of the signature half-bits are calculated from a parameter known as the gap, g, 
which is generated from the cost matrix and the minimum error measurement of a 
malicious party.  From the cost matrix we also calculate the guaranteed advantage (Guad), 
the advantage a receiver has in rejecting a forged signature element.  From the minimum 
error measurement, a correction factor for this advantage, dependent on the mean photon 
number per pulse (|α|2) is calculated, and called Pmin [7], plotted in Figure 5.1 a). 
 
Figure 5.1 – a) minimum error measurement correction factor dependence 
on the mean photon number. b) An extracted column from the cost matrix 
showing the minimum, maximum and “50% peaks” which are used in 
analysis. 
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The general trend of Pmin is to decrease with increasing |α|
2
.  Although the probability of 
photon detection increases for a legitimate receiver as more photons are propagating 
through the system, so it also increases for a malicious receiver.  An interesting note is that 
as |α|2 → 0, Pmin → 0.75.  This limit in the correction factor is reached because when 
guessing a forged state a malicious party, will still have a 1:4 chance of actually guessing 
the correct case.  Therefore the advantage is reduced to ¾, because guessing incorrectly 
has a probability of being rejected by the receiver.  For reference the trend of Pmin is shown 
in Figure 5.1 a), and is calculated using Equation 4.11 from the previous Chapter. 
In simple terms the guaranteed advantage is the difference between the smallest off-
diagonal element and largest diagonal element in the cost matrix, as shown in Figure 
5.1 b).  Figure 5.1 b) presents a schematic of an example case of the Guad where these two 
values arise from the same column in the cost matrix.  This is not necessarily always the 
case and in practice these two values could come from different columns in the cost matrix.  
If the cost matrix retains the same overall distribution with increasing |α|2 then the Guad 
will increase because the probabilities will increase, this was shown in the previous 
Chapter. 
 
Figure 5.2 – Estimating the optimum mean photon number |α|2 based on a 
linear fit of the Chapter 4’s guaranteed advantage (Guad) and the Pmin 
value for each |α|2. It can be seen that the gap estimation has a peak value 
of around |α|2 = 0.5. 
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The gap, g, is calculated as g = Pmin × Guad.  Given that the values of Pmin decrease with 
increasing |α|2 while the value of the Guad increases with increasing |α|2, there will be an 
optimum |α|2 where the gap will have the largest value.  From the previous Chapter results, 
a function can be fitted to the guaranteed advantage data.  Along with Pmin values an 
optimum gap value for the previous experiment is found to be at |α|2 ≈ 0.5, Figure 5.2.  
Therefore the range of |α|2 values used in this experiment should comprise a range of 
values that includes 0.5 (preferably somewhere near the centre) so that this effect can be 
seen.   
5.1.2 Multiport – swap and comparison mechanism 
Previous experimental implementations of QDS relied on a multiport [4], [5], [8], [9], 
which allowed quantum signature elements (phase-encoded coherent states), sent from 
Alice, to be swapped and compared in transit to two receivers (Bob and Charlie).  This 
multiport swap and comparison mechanism can be seen in Figure 3.12.  As was more fully 
described in Chapter 2 and 3, the multiport symmetrises the states which are sent into it, 
meaning that if Bob and Charlie are given the same signature, the output at ports 3 and 6 is 
equal to the input, however if the inputs are different, the output of the multiport is 
symmetrised and photons will appear at the multiport “null-ports” (ports 4 and 5 in Figure 
3.12).   
While the multiport is capable of carrying out an all-optical, non-demolition swap and 
comparison operation, it has some serious implications and limitations which prevent QDS 
implementations based on it becoming a viable commercial technology. 
The multiport in the previous experimental implementations was constructed from panda-
eye polarisation maintaining (PM) optical fibre [10], [11] coupled linear optical 
components.  To connect all these components together optical fibre splicing is used, but in 
doing so, some optical loss is introduced (≈0.3 dB per splice [12]).  As well as splicing 
losses, component and bending losses are also present in the multiport, resulting in a loss 
from Alice’s input to Bob’s (Charlie’s) output of ≈8.5 dB or approximately 14 % of the 
input optical power exiting at Bob’s (Charlie’s) output ports.  Since the optical fibre 
transmission medium has a loss it is possible to equate -8.5 dB to approximately 38 km and 
3.8 km direct links of telecommunications optical fibre at 1550 nm and 850 nm 
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respectively.  Clearly, the high loss of the multiport severely reduces the long-range 
transmission potential of QDS protocols based around it. 
The multiport is a physically “large” construction because of the components involved, but 
the optical path lengths are only ≈ 5 m.  It is essentially two intertwined Mach-Zehnder 
interferometers, therefore as the optical path lengths increase, it becomes progressively 
more difficult to keep the relative optical path length differences stable [13].  This limits 
the usable length of fibre in the multiport (and therefore the separation between Bob and 
Charlie) to very short distances (i.e. << 1km) and makes operation in deployed fibre 
(where environmental fluctuations are impossible to avoid) prohibitively challenging.  
Additionally, the fibre length of the two crossing paths in the centre of the multiport fibre 
is the maximum range of the QDS protocol, as Bob and Charlie must be in local control of 
each of their halves of the multiport.  Given that the range of these fibres is likely to be of 
the order of metres, and at best a few 10s of metres, this would severely limit the potential 
range of end applications for QDS.  
As mentioned in the previous Chapter, polarisation routing in the sender and receiver 
interferometers was introduced in order to increase the number of photons routed through 
the correct, interfering optical paths, i.e. useful photon events [14].  The two polarisations 
could travel at different velocities in the multiport depending on the mechanically and 
thermally induced stresses on the fibre [10], [15].  This led to a non-optimal visibility in 
the multiport which varied throughout the day, as shown in Figure 5.3.  Although the effect 
of the polarisation routing could have been avoided with non-PM components, this would 
require polarisation controllers to compensate for polarisation drift and these introduce 
additional losses and complexities to this system.  This can be considered as yet another 
argument against the use of the multiport in a practical QDS system. 
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Figure 5.3 –A schematic of the histograms seen from multiport null-port 
detector in the previous quantum digital signature protocol which required 
the multiport, but no quantum memory.  The figure shows four peaks on 
four different histogram traces taken separately in time.  Pulses 1, and 3 are 
10 ns apart, corresponding to the signal sent by Alice, while 2 and 4 and 10 
ns apart and correspond to the reference sent by Alice. 
Many issues with the multiport have been discussed, including its high optical loss, 
restricted distance (realistically of the order of 10s of metres) and the challenging issues 
with the use of a polarisation routing implementation.  These issues suggest that an 
alternative is most likely required for practical applications of QDS.  In practice, it is 
possible to carry out a swap and comparison mechanism conventionally, using post-
selected conventional information.  Since the multiport is the only major optical 
component that previously distinguished a QDS system from a phase basis set QKD 
system – once it is removed [16] optical and electrical components which are similar to a 
QKD system can be used to transmit QDS.  It has been shown already that quantum key 
distribution (QKD) technology is capable of transmitting over distances of up to 307 km in 
optical fibre [17], so this simplification of the physical hardware offers the prospect of 
significantly enhanced QDS transmission distances. 
In the following scenario Bob and Charlie each had a channel between themselves and 
Alice.  There is also a secure channel between Bob and Charlie for post-selection 
communication.  Alice sends Bob and Charlie copies of a quantum signature, the receivers 
then measure and store the information received by conventional means.  For the receivers 
to be assured that they were sent the same signature, they must perform some form of swap 
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and comparison mechanism.  For each signature element Bob (Charlie) flips a coin and 
decides whether to keep the element or send it onto Charlie (Bob) and then forgetting the 
value just sent.  The element is sent through the secure channel shared between them.  This 
can be created by another QKD link.  At the end of the swap mechanism, Bob (Charlie) is 
ideally left with 50% of his own signature elements, and 50% of Charlie’s (Bob’s).  Note, 
sometimes Bob (Charlie) may keep an element and also receive the same element from 
Charlie (Bob).  The comparison part of the mechanism comes when Alice decides to send a 
message and the conventional signature.  Bob (Charlie) checks for mismatches separately 
against signature elements sent by Alice, and Charlie (Bob).  Hence, this approach means 
that a swap and comparison operation can be performed without a multiport and without 
quantum resources in the link between Bob and Charlie. 
Based on the approximation of the |α|2 which allows for an optimised gap g, and that a 
swap and comparison mechanism can be carried out classically rather than quantum 
mechanically, a QDS protocol can be devised to show an improved distance over previous 
systems.  This chapter will present a revised protocol [16] and then demonstrate how it can 
be adapted and experimentally implemented in optical fibre. 
5.2 Kilometre range quantum digital signatures 
5.2.1 Introduction to protocol 
This revised QDS protocol suggested by Dunjko et al. [16] performs the swap and 
comparison mechanism by swapping classical information of the USE measurement 
outcomes over secured channels.  This means there are no high optical loss components 
between a sender and receiver, apart from the optical fibre connections and any losses 
associated with them.  Two protocols were presented in [16], P1, and P2, both can be 
implemented without the multiport.  The protocol implemented in this experimental 
realisation is a variation of P1, where Bob and Charlie are sent the same signature. 
While this protocol uses four non-orthogonal states |a⟩, |aeiπ 2⁄ ⟩, |aeiπ⟩, and |aei3π 2⁄ ⟩, more or 
less non-orthogonal states could be used. Four was thought to be the optimum number of 
non-orthogonal states for balancing the security requirements, and experimental 
complexities. As the number of non-orthogonal states increases, the upper bound of Pmin 
increases because a malevolent party will have less probability of guessing correctly.  
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Therefore it would be more beneficial for security to have a greater number of non-
orthogonal phase-states.  However as was mentioned previously, for every non-orthogonal 
pair added another measurement interferometer needs to be added to the experimental set-
up, which can become practically difficult to operate and manage.   
QDS protocols typically have two stages, one for distribution of the signature, and one for 
the messaging stage.  The two stages of the protocol are outlined below: 
Distribution stage 
1. For each future possible one-bit message, k = 0, 1, Alice generates two (since there 
are two parties in this protocol) copies of the quantum signature QuantSigk = ⨂l=1
L p
l
k 
where p
l
k is randomly chosen from her four available BB84 [18] phase-encodings 
bl
k∈{α, αe
iπ
2 , αeiπ, αe
3iπ
2 } , where L the length of each signature.  The signature length 
is referred to as the signature half-bit length because there are two signature bits.  L 
is an integer value which is dependent on the security required, and experimentally 
generated parameters.  For a message k, the quantum signature is known as 
Quantsigk and the classical sequence of bits is called the PrivKeyk = (b1
k
,….bl
k
) is 
known as the private key.   
2. Alice sends one copy of Quantsigk to each party in the protocol, for each possible 
message k = 0, 1. 
3. Bob (Charlie) measure the signature elements sent by Alice, recording classically 
which phase-encodings are eliminated for a signature.  This then gives a sequence 
of eliminated states (called the eliminated signature) which are used to authenticate 
or verify a message later on. 
4. For each signature element  of Quantsigk, Bob (Charlie) randomly chooses 
whether to keep it, or forward it onto Charlie (Bob).  If Bob (Charlie) decides to 
keep the element, it becomes part of their quantum signature from Alice, if he 
decides to forward it on, the information is forgotten by Bob (Charlie) and becomes 
part of Charlie’s (Bob’s) signature. 
5. In an ideal case, during the swapping of USE classical measurement outcomes, the 
number of elements Bob (Charlie) forwards onto Charlie (Bob) will be L/2.  But 
due to asymmetric losses in transmission this is unlikely to happen, and therefore 
Bob (Charlie) have to set bounds on how many elements they receive before they 
abort a communication.  Bob (Charlie) will abort if fewer than L(1/2 - r) or more 
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than L(1/2 + r)  are elements are received, where L is the signature half-bit length 
and r is a bound defined by the verification threshold sv  given by sv=
1
16
(1 - 2r). 
After stage 5 in the distribution stage, Bob (Charlie) will have a sequence of element 
measurements (eliminated signatures) corresponding to the signature elements sent by 
Alice, and a separate sequence of signature elements forwarded to him by Charlie (Bob). 
Messaging stage  
1. To send a signed one-bit message, m, Alice sends the private key (PrivKeym) and 
the message (m) to the desired recipient, for this stage lets choose Bob, although 
Charlie would apply the same process. 
2. Bob checks this private key sent by Alice (PrivKeyk) for mismatches against his 
stored eliminated signatures separately for both the signature sent to him by Alice 
previously, and the signature elements forwarded to him by Charlie.  An 
authentication threshold, sa, is applied to the matching to prevent forging.  If fewer 
than sa∙L/2 mismatches occur in both Alice and Charlie’s eliminated signature, then 
the message is accepted.  If otherwise, the message is rejected. 
3. To forward the message to Charlie, Bob forwards the message and the private key 
(m PrivKeym) sent to him by Alice. 
4. Charlie also checks for mismatches, similarly to that carried out by Bob, but instead 
applies verification threshold, sv.  If less than sv∙L/2 mismatches occur, the message 
is accepted.  Otherwise it is rejected.  The verification threshold is chosen 
0 ≤ sa ≤ sv < 1, so the verification threshold is always larger than the authentication 
threshold.   
5.2.2 Unambiguous state elimination measurement 
This new QDS protocol, like the previous experimental implementation [4], does not rely 
on any quantum memories (QM) for the state discrimination measurement, making use of a 
unambiguous state elimination (USE) measurement [19].  A description of the USE 
measurement process was presented in the previous Chapter, as it has not changed between 
the two different iterations of the protocol.  However, the removal of the multiport for this 
new protocol means that the only remaining optical components are now similar to those 
used in phase basis set QKD [20]. 
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5.2.3 Definitions of security and calculation process 
The QDS protocol presented here is designed to prevent repudiation and forging malicious 
activities, and assumes the quantum channels between the parties cannot be tampered with 
or eavesdropped by a 3
rd
 party [21].  The protocol also assumes that all classical 
communication channels are authenticated. The formal definitions remain the same as 
previously described in Chapter 3, section 3.4.2 [22], [23]. 
The formulations for the probability of malicious repudiation, forging, and the probability 
of an honest abortion of the protocol by Bob (Charlie) are given in Equation 5.1, 
Equation 5.2, and Equation 5.3 and are defined in the supplementary material of [21]. 
𝑃(repudiation) ≤ 2exp (-
1
4
(sv-sa)
2
L)   Equation 5.1 
𝑃(forging) ≤ exp (-(Cmin-sv)
2
L)   Equation 5.2 
𝑃(honest abort) ≤ 2exp (-(sa-Ph)
2
L)    Equation 5.3 
Previous protocols [4], [5], [9], [16], [24], have always made these probabilities equal as 
there is no advantage in favouring security for one particular type of malicious activity and 
that is an assumption that will be continued here.  Based on the equations above being 
equal, the authentication and verification thresholds are chosen to be Equation 5.4 and 
Equation 5.5 respectively.  Ph, is the probability that a receiver will eliminate the state 
actually sent by Alice, which is calculated using the cost matrix generated by experimental 
measurements.  g, is the gap, which is essentially the difference between the highest 
diagonal element of the cost matrix, and the lowest off-diagonal element, corrected for by 
the minimum error measurement that a malicious party can make, Pmin.  Ph, g, and Pmin will 
be defined in more detail later in the analysis. 
sa=Ph+
g
4⁄      Equation 5.4 
sv=Ph+
3g
4
⁄      Equation 5.5 
Finally, the minimum length of a signature half-bit L, which can be securely sent, based on 
the probabilities for repudiation, forging and an honest abort being equal is given by 
Equation 5.6.  The security level in the equation refers to the probability of repudiation, 
forging, and honest abort.   
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𝐿 = −
ln(
Security level
2
)
(
g
4
)
2     Equation 5.6 
5.2.4 Experimental set-up 
Figure 5.4 and Figure 5.5 show the optical and electrical experimental set ups used to 
implement the QDS protocol.  The optical set-up will be explained first, followed by a 
description of how the electrical system drives the experiment.  Following this, the 
experimental methods will be outlined, covering the experiment operation and data 
analysis.   
The experimental set-up for this protocol is very similar to the one used in Chapter 4 [4], 
because it continues to use the USE measurement and polarisation routing.  As can be seen 
in Figure 5.4, one of the obvious visual differences is that the requirement for the multiport 
has been lifted, allowing for varying lengths of optical fibre to be placed between Alice 
and Bob (Charlie).  The use of non-PM standard telecommunications optical fibre 
(Corning SMF 28e [25]) as the quantum channel (and the continued use of polarisation 
routing [14]) meant Bob (Charlie) required polarisation controllers (in the form of static 
“bat-ear” polarisation controllers [26]) before each interferometer to compensate for 
polarisation drift.  In fact, the optical system looks more akin to a QKD system than one of 
the originally proposed QDS [24], [27] systems.  In reality, as will be seen in this section, 
it is only the classical processing that distinguishes this QDS protocol from a QKD 
protocol.  As well as changes to the optical system there were many improvements made to 
the operation and analysis software. 
Since all the information regarding the experimental system is covered in the previous 
Chapter (Section 4.2.4), only the differences will be highlighted in this Chapter. Although 
it is worth repeating that this system was operated at 100 MHz, with Alice using the same 
four phase-encodings as the Chapter 4.  
The vertical-cavity surface-emitting laser (VCSEL) diode is no longer gain-switched 
through the Maxim drive board.  It was found that electrically gain switching the VCSEL 
through a bias-tee (Picosecond Pulse Labs 5575A) with a stabilised DC source (Newport 
505) could give equal performance (i.e. the spectral and temporal responses shown in 
Figure 4.10) with less experimental complexity and clutter.   
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At the output of Alice’s unbalanced asymmetric Mach-Zehnder (UAMZ) interferometer, 
instead of sending her coherent state through the multiport, she then splits the intensity into 
two using a 50:50 beamsplitter (BS).  This is an optical way of Alice generating her two 
identical copies of a quantum signature which can be sent to Bob and Charlie.  The mean 
photon number (|α|2) for the experiment is defined at the outputs of the 50:50 BS and use 
inline optical attenuation (again based on knife edges) to ensure that the |α|2 is the same in 
both arms.  The |α|2 is measured only for the signal pulses, as a large intensity (|α|2 >>1) is 
used for the reference pulse to preserve phase.  It is possible for the correct pulse to be 
used for state tomography [28] at a receiver to assist in the security analysis but this 
process was not undertaken in these experiments. 
In previous QDS protocols, after Alice, Bob and Charlie would take their coherent states 
and pass them through the multiport to perform the swap and comparison mechanism.  
Instead, as can be seen in Figure 5.4, the multiport is replaced with reels of optical fibre.  
In the experiment, reels of 500m, 1km, and 2km lengths were used.  The reeled fibre was 
(8.2 μm core diameter) standard single-mode fibre designed for the telecommunications 
wavelengths of 1310 and 1550 nm (Corning SMF-28e+ [25]), which was pigtailed with 
short (<1 m) lengths of 4.4 μm core diameter single-mode fibre designed for a wavelength 
of 850 nm [29] to remove higher order modes before coupling to the PM fibre components.  
The different core sizes led to an extra loss of ≈0.8 dB per reel of fibre [12].  The 
experimental results presented in this Thesis refer to the actual reel length rather than an 
effective distance computed from channel losses, as it would be expected that coupling 
losses would be present in any real system. 
After the reel of fibre, Bob (Charlie) performs the USE measurement using his two UAMZ 
interferometers.  This construction of the interferometers and the USE measurement was 
described in the previous Chapter (section 3.2.2) and the optical set-up is shown in Figure 
5.4.  It should be noted that unlike the previous two QDS experiments both Bob and 
Charlie performed measurements of the phase-encoded coherent states sent them, where as 
previously only one receiver was tested. The photon events were also recorded on the 
commercially available thick junction PerkinElmer Si-SPADs [13].  
126 
 
 
Figure 5.4 – The optical set-up for the kilometre range experimental 
realisation of quantum digital signatures.  Alice, Bob and Charlie were 
physically separated to maximise to the distance between them on the 
optical bench.   
The electrical system shown in Figure 5.5, like the optical system, was very similar to the 
electrical system used for previous experimental demonstrations of QDS [4].  The main 
difference was that two PCs are no longer required to run the experiment, one for 
monitoring the multiport, and one for recording the USE measurements.  This reduced the 
complexity of the synchronisation of time-tag hardware, and simplifies the process of 
correctly initialising measurements.   
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Figure 5.5 – The electrical set-up for the experimental realisation of 
kilometre range quantum digital signatures.   
The rubidium clock [30] provided a 10 MHz reference which was then regenerated by the 
frequency synthesiser (Hewlett Packard 8648B) [31].  This was initially done to provide 
enough voltage for the reference to be used by so many devices, when two PCs were 
required.  The 10 MHz reference was connected electrically to the Agilent 81110A and 
81134A PPGs, as well as the time-tag hardware (HydraHarp 400 [32]).   
A dual channel output PPG (Agilent 81110A) was used to drive the 100 MHz modulation 
of the lithium niobate (LiNiO3) phase modulator (Photline NIR MPX800-LN-08 [33]).  
Each channel output provided two levels of modulation, resulting in the two non-
orthogonal pairs.  The outputs were added using an power combiner [34], which allowed a 
four level repeated pattern to be generated, which is shown in Figure 4.7.  Ideally the four 
levels should be evenly spaced with flat tops to the waveform.  As shown in Figure 4.7, 
there was some ringing and other imperfections in the signal which corresponds to ≈3° 
shift either side of the mean value, and the spacing between the mean values of the level is 
not equal, corresponding to ≈10° error in the initial setting of phase states.  This error has 
some bearing on the final results when the measurements are analysed. 
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The Agilent 81134A PPG provided a 0.75 ns wide pulse at a 100 MHz clock rate with a 
±1V signal into the bias-tee which is added to a 0.3 mA current from the dc driver 
(Newport 505).  Each PPG can be electrically delayed internally, or externally to optimise 
the visibility of the measurement.   
The time-tagging hardware collected the electrical signals from the Si-SPADs. 
(PerkinElmer) and using MATLAB [35] code would record time-tags, perform some 
preliminary filtering and save them to a hard disc for later analysis.  Some preliminary 
analysis was performed in real-time during system operation which gave feedback on 
system visibility and provided an indication of the off-diagonal terms of the resulting cost 
matrix. 
Methods 
Initially the optical laser output pulse temporal and spectral profile was optimised for the 
experimental set-up.  The losses of the interferometers were then calibrated so that Alice 
was sending weak coherent pulses for her signal and a large intensity reference pulses. Bob 
and Charlie’s interferometers were loss balanced, and time synchronised for maximum 
visibility. 
To perform measurements, Alice’s outputs were connected to separate reels of fibre, 
depending on the distance chosen for the experimental run.  The other end of the reel was 
connected to the receivers 50:50 BSs for the USE measurement.  Bob (Charlie) could 
adjust their polarisation controllers to minimise the non-interfering peaks and therefore 
maximise the photons being routed correctly, which also affects the maximum visibility of 
the interferometers.  All interferometers and reels of fibre were located in an air-
conditioned laboratory, on the same optical bench. 
The HydraHarp hardware only had 4 inputs, so only one receiver was measured at one 
time, as there were four detectors for each receiver.  However the experiment was set-up 
and performed as if both receivers were being measured at the same time, although it is 
worth noting that the protocol does not formally require simultaneous measurements at 
Bob and Charlie.  Both Bob and Charlie were optically connected to the system during any 
experiment, but the experiments were conducted twice – once with Bob’s detectors 
connected to the HydraHarp and once with Charlie’s detectors connected. 
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A custom MATLAB program (developed in-house by Robert Collins) controlled the time-
tagging hardware, taking time-tag recordings from all four measurement detectors.  The 
time-tags were used to generate histograms so that a user may view the evolution of the 
visibility of the interferometers, as the experimental conditions were altered.  The visual 
feedback from the histograms allowed the user to fine-tune the interferometer path lengths 
using the piezo-electric controller.  The histograms also gave the user visual feedback on 
any polarisation drift that had occurred during transmission as minor variations in 
environmental conditions affected the kilometre length reels of optical fibre.  During 
configuration of the MATLAB program, the user was asked to define the position of the 
gating windows, where each histogram should be maximised or minimised and the location 
of the non-orthogonal peaks (which will be at 50% of the maximum intensity).  Thresholds 
could be set on the acceptable visibility (typically >94%) and how equal the orthogonal, 
non-orthogonal pair’s interference peaks were (i.e. how equal the two 50% peaks are).  
Once the thresholds were met or exceeded, the one second worth of time-tags used to form 
the histogram would be recorded, otherwise the time-tags were discarded and a fresh set 
collected, and the process repeated.  Unlike the previous QDS system’s control software 
which was written in LabVIEW and only allowed for a single-shot measurement, the 
revised MATLAB program refreshed the histogram with a new one-second duration of 
data so that repeated measurements could be rapidly collected after one configuration 
process, this allowed more efficient data collection. 
A range of |α|2s were recorded from 0.1 to 1, in steps of 0.1.  This was chosen to include 
the possible optimised gap position of ≈0.5 which was proposed earlier.  The range also 
covers the |α|2s commonly used by QKD experiments, for example 0.1 to 0.5 [36], [37].  
To sort the data from raw time-tags into gated format for checking correlations, a 1 ns wide 
gating window was placed either side of the defined peak positions, which were set by the 
user in MATLAB during data collection.  One hundred, individual sets of 1 second’s time-
tag data recordings were taken for each |α|2, and each receiver.  The gated detector event 
statistics from these time-tag data recordings (i.e. the USE success rates at each detector) 
were then averaged before being subjected to subsequent analysis to generate cost 
matrices, protocol thresholds, etc. which were then used in the later analysis to calculate 
the parameters needed to the signature half-bit length L. 
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5.3 Experimental results and analysis 
As in the previous QDS Chapter, the presentation of the results and the analysis will start 
from the raw data, move onto the gated data, construct the necessary matrices and finally 
generate from the cost matrices the parameters required to calculate the signature half-bit 
length L.  Unlike the previous QDS experiments, this analysis includes the results from 
Bob and Charlie, where before only one receiver was demonstrated, hence there are extra 
steps in the later stages allowing the security of the protocol to be defined by the worst 
performing user, as each user has slightly different measurement characteristics.   
 
Figure 5.6 - Raw and gated rates for Bob (a, and b), and Charlie (c and d). 
Starting from the raw time-tag data, Figure 5.6 a), and c) show the raw count rates for Bob 
and Charlie respectively.  From a) it can be seen that the 2 km raw count rate was 
sometimes higher than the 1 km rate.  This was due to optically misrouted photons (i.e. the 
non-interfering peaks) contributing to the background count levels. This was primarily due 
to inaccuracy of the static polarisation controller configuration, but also partly dependent 
on imperfections in the extinction ratio of the PBSs in the receivers.  In Bob, the losses of 
the optical fibre for each distance are 2.2, 3.3, and 5.4 dB for 500 m, 1 km, and 2 km 
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respectively.  For Charlie, the same reel of fibre was used for 500 m and 1 km as was 
employed by Bob (because of the high losses of the reels specifically purchased for 
Charlie), and 6.8 dB loss for 2 km.  The losses of the various fibre lengths were found to be 
higher than the manufacturer’s quoted attenuation of 2.2 dB/km.  This was due to 
additional loss from the two splices (maximum of 0.3 dB each) and the differences 
between the fibre core sizes, which contributed loss due to modal mismatch of ≈0.8 dB.  
Standard telecommunication fibre (single-mode at 1310, 1550 nm, 9 μm core diameter) 
was used to connect sender and receivers so that the QDS system demonstrated 
compatibility with the existing telecommunications optical fibre infrastructure.  But the 
PM fibre was single-mode for 850 nm (4.4 μm), so single-mode non-PM fibre at that 
wavelength was needed to strip any higher order modes [38] before returning to PM fibre. 
 
Figure 5.7- The correct and incorrect unambiguous state elimination (USE) 
rates for Bob at 500m, 1km, and 2 km, a), b), and c) respectively.  The 
correct USE rates are > 95% of the total USE rate hence the total is not 
plotted.   
Figure 5.6 parts b) and d), the gated count rates for Bob and Charlie respectively, show that 
even though the raw count rates for different fibre lengths sometimes over-lap, the gated 
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rates are all separated (except for an |α|2 of 0.1 in Bob).  This confirms that it was the non-
interfering peaks which were contributing to the raw count rate overlapping in the 1 and 2 
km case in Bob.  Over all the results for Bob and Charlie, the average gated rate was found 
to be 80 ± 13.4 % of the raw rate.  This variation in values corresponds to the effectiveness 
of the polarisation routing for Bob and Charlie, although the visibility of the overall system 
was not heavily affected.  This was surprising as the visibility is dependent on the 
polarisation of the states reaching the final beamsplitter.  However, the PBS at Bob 
(Charlie) repolarises the coherent states at its output port.  Therefore, if the static 
polarisation controllers are not set with perfect accuracy the resulting slightly incorrectly 
polarised input light will be repolarised to linear at the output of the PBS and, after 
rotation, the same parallel linear states will recombine on the final beamsplitter.  If the 
presence of photon events in the non-interfering peak regions was primarily due to 
imperfections in the PBS, then the light at the final beamsplitter would have an 
orthogonally polarised component that would degrade the visibility.  
 
Figure 5.8 – The unambiguous state elimination (USE) rates for Charlie at 
500m, 1km, and 2 km, a), b), and c) respectively.  The correct USE rates are 
>98% of the total USE rate hence the total is not plotted. 
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The gated count rates all contribute to the USE measurement and cost matrix.  From the 
previous Chapters description of the USE measurement, if Alice sends phase encoding π, 
Bob (Charlie) considers a correct USE measurement if he eliminates any state except for 
the π state, i.e. he does not have a photon event at his ‘Not π’ detector.  For all the results 
for Bob and Charlie, the correct USE rate was on average 98 ± 0.35% of the total USE rate 
or, equivalently, 78.4% of the total raw rate.  The 78.4% success probability is lower than 
the value of 83.84% seen in the previous Chapter [4] due to misrouting of the large 
intensity reference pulse.  Small mismatches in polarisation in this experiment led to 
greater count rates in the non-interfering peaks in comparison to any mismatching in the 
previous experiment which used a reference pulse which was, relatively, more equal in 
intensity to the signal pulse.  However, the correct USE rate of 98% of the total USE rate is 
higher than the previous experiment of 95.27% which is due to the improved visibility of 
the optical system.  Figure 5.7 and Figure 5.8 show the USE total, correct and incorrect 
rates for Bob and Charlie respectively, at distances of 500 m, 1 km, and 2 km, in a), b), and 
c).  All figures show the same general trend of increasing success rate with higher |α|2.The 
generation of the cost matrix, and subsequent analysis for this Chapter follows the follows 
the same process as the previous Chapter, so to save repetition this is not included in this 
Chapter.  However extra analysis on the cost matrix is performed in this Chapter due to 
both receivers being analysed for the worst-case scenario, this is included as it is different. 
 
Figure 5.9 – Guaranteed advantage for Bob (a) and Charlie (b) over a 
range of mean photon number at the three different distances. 
As a reminder, the Guad is the minimum difference between the largest diagonal element, 
and the smallest off-diagonal element, also known as the guaranteed advantage.  Figure 5.9 
a) and b) show the Guad as a function of |α|2 for Bob and Charlie respectively at the 
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different distances. The general trend for this is to increase with |α|2 however for Charlie’s 
500m values dropped at |α|2 = 0.9 and 1 due to a change in visibility.  It can be seen that 
the average Ph value is decreasing from Figure 5.10.  This suggests that the visibility of the 
system (defined in Equation 5.7) is increasing, but an off-diagonal element is decreasing in 
value.  This increase in visibility leads to a smaller Guad value.  This drift in visibility was 
caused by nonlinearities in the detectors at > 1 MHz raw count rates [39], also from the 
polarisation routing not being fully optimised. 
The mean value of the diagonal minimum elements is called the probability for an honest 
elimination, Ph.  It is the average probability in an honest scenario, where a receiver will 
eliminate the state actually sent by Alice, in this example the value is 1.48 × 10
-4
.  Figure 
5.10 a) and b) show the Ph dependence with increasing |α|
2
 for Bob and Charlie 
respectively.  Ph is primarily dependent on the visibility of interferometer and therefore 
some points are off the normal trend, seen in Bob’s 1km data and Charlie’s 500 m and 
1 km data.  In fact the Ph values for Charlie at1 km are better than the 500 m values at |α|
2
 
of 0.9 and 1 - this is the result of increased visibility at those particular photon numbers 
due to better optimisation of the non-interfering peaks.   
Visibility=
(Counts in maximum)-(Counts in minimum)
(Counts in maximum)+(Counts in minimum)
   Equation 5.7 
 
Figure 5.10– Average probability of an honest rejection, Ph, by Bob (a) and 
Charlie (b).  Ph is directly related to the visibility of the interferometers 
which had a threshold visibility threshold setting of 94% on them. 
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As described in the previous Chapter’s security analysis, the Guad is only a superficial 
value for the advantage a receiver has over a malicious attack, as a malicious party can 
perform some state distinguishing measurement(s) on photons sent by Alice.  If there are a 
greater number of photons available for this distinguishing measurement then a malicious 
party can identify the state sent by Alice more accurately [40].  This is called the minimum 
error measurement Pmin and is a correction factor which can be applied to Guad to give a 
more realistic advantage called the gap, g.   
The minimum error measurement was discussed at the start of this Chapter in relation to 
the magnitude of the correction value.  The formulations are the same for this Chapter as 
the previous, so to save repeating, the functions can be found at Equation 4.11.  When 
|α|2→0, Pmin→0.75, when |α|
2→∞, Pmin→0.  This trend can be seen from Figure 5.1.  For 
the experimental range of |α|2 used in this Chapter, an enlarged region of Figure 5.1 is 
shown in Figure 5.11.  The Pmin value for each |α|
2
 is indicated by the stars, and the trend is 
given as the dashed line, which decreases as the |α|2 increases.  For the |α|2 = 0.5 used as 
the example, the Pmin is 0.262.   
 
Figure 5.11 – The minimum error in a measurement for a malevolent party, 
Pmin.  The relation of Pmin to the |α|
2
 used by Alice in the QDS protocol can 
be seen.  
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The gap is created simply by multiplying the correction factor Pmin by the Guad value from 
the experimental data, Equation 5.8.  The values for the gap, for Bob and Charlie, are 
shown in Figure 5.12 a) and b) respectively, for each distance performed.  As hypothesised 
from earlier analysis, the gap does indeed have an optimum value, due to nature of the Pmin 
and Guad with |α|2.  The value of the optimum gap ranges from |α|2 = 0.4 to 0.5.  Therefore 
it is around the same value as the estimated optimised value from the beginning of this 
Chapter which was |α|2 ≈ 0.5.   
g = Pmin × Guad    Equation 5.8 
In the previous two implementations of QDS [4], [5], knowledge of the gap was sufficient 
information for the signature half-bit length to be calculated.  This is because only Bob (or 
Charlie) was ever experimentally tested due to the high loss of one of the multiport 
outputs.  Now that two receivers are being analysed, more processing needs to be 
performed to calculate L, as it must be equal for both parties.  In simple terms, this is 
undertaken by, essentially, comparing the resulting values for each receiver and taking the 
worst-case scenario for the protocol.   
 
Figure 5.12 – The gap, g, for Bob (a) and Charlie (b) over the three 
distances measured.  The optimised gap would be when it is maximal, i.e. 
the largest amount of advantage over a malicious attack. 
The first new parameter is called the robustness of the protocol, which is directly related to 
Ph, as shown Equation 5.9.  The maximum value of Ph for either receiver is taken as the 
robustness of the protocol, i.e. the matrix which has the highest diagonal elements (lowest 
maximum to minimum visibility) on average for a given |α|2.  Ph is the probability that a 
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receiver will honestly eliminate a state actually sent by Alice.  By taking the largest of the 
two values of Ph (Bob’s 𝑃ℎ
𝐵 and Charlie’s 𝑃ℎ
𝐶), the protocol is taking into account the 
worst-case scenario where a malicious forging attack could have more signature elements 
accepted by the legitimate parties. 
The robustness for the protocol is shown in Figure 5.13, and for the example |α|2 = 0.5, the 
value is 1.48 × 10
-4
.  This value is the Ph value from Bob, who had, on average higher 
diagonal elements.  Robustness is the worst-case scenario of a forger getting an incorrect 
element accepted based on the measurement device alone. 
Robustness=Max[Ph
B , Ph
C]    Equation 5.9 
 
Figure 5.13- Protocol robustness. The worse-case scenario for a forger to 
get a guessed element accepted. It increases with |α|2 as the diagonal 
elements of the cost matrix increase in value. 
Another new parameter is forge, the relation with |α|2 can be seen in Figure 5.14; for 
distances of 500 m and 2 km it has a maximum value at |α|2 = 0.5, while at 1 km the 
maximum occurs at |α|2 = 0.4, but the value with increasing |α|2 drops slightly and increases 
again after |α|2 = 0.6.  Forge is the minimum off-diagonal element based on the diagonal 
average and the gap.  The worst-case scenario is for forge is the smaller value of the 
receivers, Equation 5.10.   
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Forge= Min[Ph
B+gB, Ph
C+gC  ]    Equation 5.10 
 
Figure 5.14- Protocol forging. The value is dependent on the diagonal 
minimum elements of the cost matrix and the gap.  The diagonal elements 
increase with |α|2 while the gap has a shape shown in Figure 5.12. 
The final new parameter required to calculate the signature half-bit length is the effective 
gap, geff, given in Equation 5.11.  This gives the gap in a worst-case scenario for the two 
receiver protocol.  The effective gap, similar to the gap, has an optimum value where it is 
largest, i.e. where the protocol will perform the best, and occurs at a |α|2 = 0.4 on average, 
which is a lower |α|2 than for the gap which occurred at |α|2 = 0.5.   
g
eff
=Forge-Robustness   Equation 5.11 
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Figure 5.15 - Effective gap for the quantum digital signatures experiment, 
which takes into account the worst-case scenario for the protocol. 
The signature half-bit length, previously given in Equation 5.6, is modified to replace the 
gap, g, with the effective gap, geff in Equation 5.12.  This is done to give L for the worst 
case scenario across both receivers in this protocol, rather than just an L for a single 
receiver as was the case in both QDS protocols previously demonstrated.  The signature 
half-bit length as well as being dependent on experimentally generated parameters is also 
dependent on the level of security selected for the protocol, which is the probability that a 
malicious activity will be performed successfully.   
𝐿=-
ln(
Security level
2
)
(
geff
4
)
2      Equation 5.12 
Figure 5.16 shows the signature half-bit length for the worst-case scenario of the 
experimentally realised protocol.  As in previous protocols, the L has been calculated for a 
security level of 0.01%, which is shown in a) for the various distances used in this 
realisation.  The change in L with different security levels was also investigated, with b), c) 
and d) being L for 500 m, 1 km, and 2 km respectively.   
Signature half-bit length is dependent on the effective gap, which in Figure 5.15 was seen 
to be of a largely negative parabolic shape, leading to the generally parabolic shape of the 
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length with |α|2.  The optimised gap is said to be the largest value, while in the case of the 
length, the smallest value is optimised case.  Between |α|2 of 0.4-0.5 is where the optimised 
case would be, from the trend in data.  In Figure 5.16 a) at 500m, |α|2 0.1, 0.9, and 1 are 
affected by the non-linear response of the detector due to detector dead-time and count 
rate. 
 
Figure 5.16 – The signature half-bit length L for the quantum digital 
signature protocol.  a) The length comparison for distances for a security 
level of 0.01%.  Length comparison for b) 500m c) 1km and d) 2 km at 
variety of different security levels. 
Arguably the most important property of a secure communications system is an estimate of 
how long it would take for someone to send a secured signal.  In our case that is the time 
taken to generate a signature of the required length L.  As can be expected the time taken is 
strongly dependent on Alice’s clock rate.  The analysis of the results presented Collins et 
al.  [4] suggests a time of >8 years for the signature to be sent, however this was calculated 
for a receiver to measure the number of signature elements, L, based on their USE rate.  
However, in the protocol, a receiver does not need to measure all the signature elements in 
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order for the protocol to work, if they do not make a measurement, they take note and 
ignore the element in the classical signature sent by Alice later.  Therefore the time which 
is important is how long it would take Alice (the sender) to send the number of signature 
elements, which is based on the clock rate of Alice.   
 
Figure 5.17 - The time taken for Alice to send one half-bit for the three 
distances tested at a security level of 0.01%.  b), c) and d) are times taken 
for 500 m, 1 km, and 2 km respectively, for different security levels.   
Figure 5.17 shows the time taken for Alice to send a signature half-bit, which is the 
signature half-bit length divided by Alice’s clock rate of 100 MHz.  Figure 5.17 a) shows a 
comparison of the times to send at different distances for a security level of 0.01%.  Figure 
5.17 b), c), and d) show the change in time with different security levels, at 500 m, 1 km, 
and 2 km respectively.  The optimised values of |α|2 are the same for the time-taken as they 
are for the signature half-bit length, as the only difference is the division by 100 MHz. 
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5.4 Discussion and conclusion 
At this stage it would be good to compare the past QDS experiments to the one presented 
in this Chapter.  Table 5.1 gives some of the main parameters of interest for each 
experimental realisation, such as the range of |α|2, the transmission distance , the gap, 
signature half-bit length and the time taken (in seconds) for Alice to send a half-bit.   
Protocol |α|2 range Distance 
range 
(metres) 
Gap Length 
(Elements) 
Time to send 
half-bit  
(s) 
Multiport and 
quantum 
memory [5] 
0.04-0.28 ≈5  8.03 × 10-4 6.91 × 107 0.691 
Multiport and 
USD/USE [4] 
1-11.5 ≈5  1.20 × 10-6 5.13 × 1013 5.13 × 105 
Kilometre ranges 
with USD/USE 
[21] 
0.1-1 ≈2,000  2.84 × 10-4 
(500 m) 
1.93 × 10
9
 19.3 
Table 5.1 – Comparison of all the experimentally realised quantum digital 
experiments to date.   
It can be seen from Table 5.1 that the first experimental implementation exhibits the 
shortest time taken to transmit the signature, albeit over a short distance of 5 m.  This is 
due to two fundamental reasons.  One is that the |α|2 range is very low, 0.04 to 0.28 in the 
experiment, meaning that the Pmin values (0.64 to 0.4) are larger than the range used in the 
other experiments.  This leads to a larger gap than the other protocols.  Another reason is 
the use of phase modulator to decode the coherent states rather than passive USE 
measurements.  This allows a better cost matrix to be generated, because if Alice is not 
sending phases which are 100% non-orthogonal, a receiver can compensate their 
measurement for greater visibility and consequently achieve better relative minima on the 
diagonal elements, while USE can only use what it is sent by Alice.  However, the first 
experimental protocol required QM for it to work in a real set-up, making this approach 
unrealistic for application using current technology [1]–[3]. 
The second experimentally realised QDS protocol solved the problem of relying on QM, 
however the performance in terms of the time taken to generate the signature, was not 
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equal (or close) to the first experimental protocol which covered the same distance (≈5 m).  
This was due to the range of |α|2 used in the experiment (1 to 11.5), originally chosen to 
increase the unambiguous state discrimination rate, which required three photon 
correlations.  However, this led to very small values of Pmin, meaning any benefits in 
increased detection rate led to a smaller gap.  This also led to a large half-bit signature 
length and therefore time taken for Alice to send.  In hindsight, a smaller range of |α|2 
would have been better for showing the performance of the system.  This would have been 
further improved when USE was adopted in later analysis to improve success rates.  
Although the second experimentally realised protocol did not require QM for operation, it 
did however still rely on the multiport, which limited the distance over which QDS can be 
carried out due to increased loss of the optical systems and the necessary proximity of Bob 
and Charlie in the shared interferometer scheme. 
The experimentally realised protocol presented in this Chapter was designed to increase the 
distance over which QDS can be performed.  This was achieved by performing the swap 
and comparison mechanism classically, rather than requiring the multiport to perform the 
action optically.  This allowed greater distances of 500 m, 1 km, and 2 km to be 
demonstrated.  The experimental hardware is akin to that used in QKD experimental 
systems, therefore potentially opening up QDS to application by existing systems.  The 
experimental operation of the kilometre range QDS system itself benefited from a review 
of the previous system in the choice of |α|2 range.  The range was also chosen as it included 
|α|2s generally used by QKD decoy state experiments [41]. 
QDS has been shown to be possible over kilometre distances, without the requirement for 
any complicated and high loss quantum technologies such as the QMs or the optical 
multiport.  An optimised signature half-bit length at 500 m was found to be 1.93 × 10
9
 for 
|α|2 = 0.4, taking Alice ≈19.3 s to send to a receiver.   
5.5 Future work & improvements 
In terms of future work there are several things to consider in moving forward from the 
QDS protocol presented in this Chapter.  The choice of operating wavelength and the 
implementation of more efficient protocols are the main scope for moving forward with 
QDS, since we can perform the swapping mechanism classically in post processing.   
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As in all quantum informational experiments wavelength is an important property to 
consider when building an experimental quantum digital signature system, as it will 
determine the overall performance of a system.  For instance, at an operational wavelength 
of 850 nm, there are a range of readily available sources, as well as silicon-based single-
photon detection technologies that can be used [39], [42].  The disadvantage of 850 nm 
when used in fibre-optics communication with standard telecommunications fibre is the 
increased loss of 2.2 dB/km, making long distance implementations much more difficult.   
Switching to a wavelength of 1550 nm or 1310 nm would (in principle) allow for an 
increase in distance due to the low loss of 0.2 dB/km using standard telecommunication 
optical fibre.  However, the semiconductor-based single-photon detector technologies 
available at these wavelengths tend to have poorer performance in terms of reduced 
detection efficiencies, higher dead-time, a greater after-pulse probability and increased 
dark count rates, although improvements are always being made in technologies such as 
InGaAs/InP SPADs and superconducting nanowire single photon detectors [42], [43].  
Currently the longest QKD implementations are all featured at 1550 nm [17], and if QDS 
protocols can be carried out using QKD hardware (as has been shown in this Chapter), then 
1550 nm would be the obvious choice of wavelength to develop the next generation of 
QDS. 
Throughout all the QDS protocols, analysis and generation of the signature half-bit length 
has come from the cost matrix.  One of the key features in the cost matrix is the difference 
between the highest diagonal element, and the lowest off-diagonal element, as they are 
what really determine the signature half-bit length.  The reason why they are not 50% can 
be narrowed down to two main factors, imperfect phase preparation by Alice, and the 
detection method used by a receiver.   
It was found through basic simulations of phase preparation and imperfection of BSs that 
the optimised signature half-bit length could be reduced by around 50% by improving the 
phase preparation and visibility of the QDS experimental system.  So any future QDS 
systems will have more consideration given to these properties during the design, assembly 
and calibration stages. 
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As well as general experimental improvements, new QDS protocols which improve the 
efficiency of QDS are currently in development [44].  This Chapter has shown that the use 
of a classical post-selection swap and comparison mechanism is possible, then this 
approach must be used if QDS is to be used at meaningful distances. 
The next step for QDS is towards implementation of more efficient protocols allowing for 
greater distances to be covered.  This protocol was presented by Amiri et al.  in [44], which 
makes use of a decoy state BB84 based protocol with some adjustments to the post-
processing (no need for error correction or privacy amplification) and propagation 
direction of quantum channel.   
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Chapter 6 
Review of Conventional and Quantum Amplification 
6.1 Introduction 
Quantum key distribution (QKD) requires the use of either single photon sources, or highly 
attenuated coherent sources which are typically reduced to a mean photon number per 
pulse (|α|2) of <0.5, in order for the protocols to remain secure against eavesdropper 
attacks.  This requirement inhibits the maximum transmission distance that can be 
achieved by QKD and other quantum communication protocols, such as quantum digital 
signatures (QDS), since a quantum channel will necessarily have a significant transmission 
loss, and any optical loss will greatly affect the performance of quantum communication 
protocols.  
For example, if the quantum channel loss is at least equal to the fraction of states an 
eavesdropper could be expected to perturb then a loss-less beamsplitter attack becomes 
possible (see Chapter 3 for details of this attack).  This problem is not limited to quantum 
communication – the intensity of the transmitted light drops exponentially with 
transmission distance so conventional forms of communication are also affected.  
However, one major difference between the conventional and quantum communication is 
that conventional signals can be amplified to counteract the losses in the communication 
channel to be overcome.  Although such amplifiers operate with a high fidelity (unity 
fidelity means the output properties are equal to the input) on conventional signals, use of 
such amplifiers in the quantum protocols, even if they do amplify the quantum state, would 
swamp the quantum signal with deterministic noise [1] and spontaneous emission from the 
amplifying process [2].   
This Thesis has focused on optical communication through optical fibre cables, and the 
Chapters on quantum amplification will also concentrate on use of optical fibres.  Figure 
2.10 in Chapter 2 showed the percentage of the original signal intensity as a function of 
transmission distance in silica optical fibre.  It can be seen that eventually the intensity 
reaching a receiver would be too low for a receiver to distinguish what is being sent.  To 
overcome this problem conventional amplifiers are used to boost the signal which can 
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increase the maximum transmission distance. These amplifiers are generally placed every 
30-60 km [3]. 
Quantum communication protocols are designed to utilise the fact that an unknown 
quantum state cannot be cloned deterministically without introducing noise or error [4], 
[5].  If we consider a classical laser pulse signal, composed of a large number of photons, it 
seems strange that while quantum mechanics tells us we cannot clone a quantum state 
perfectly, we can amplify classical signals with a high fidelity.  Optical noise is added to 
the conventional signal when it is amplified, however the intensity of noise added is small 
relative to the gain of the signal- whereas the introduced noise would be comparable or 
greater than the quantum signal intensity.   
Telecommunications systems can transmit over vast distances, and intercontinental 
(typically >1 500 km) transmission distances are achievable due to the use of all-optical 
amplifiers [6].  So far the furthest QKD experiment has been shown at 307 km [7], the 
improvements in transmission distance over the past few years have primarily been due to 
improvements in single-photon detector technology [8] rather than protocol improvements.  
However the T12 protocol, introduced by Toshiba is one protocol which is said to show 
improvements by implementing asymmetric basis set choice [9].  The relatively short 
transmission distance, in comparison to conventional telecommunications, is due to the 
quantum channel loss limitation, therefore any hope of intercontinental range will require a 
quantum amplifier/repeater, or radically different QKD/QDS protocols, where the bit rate 
does not fall off exponentially with distance.  One way to combat this is to introduce low 
earth orbit satellites as transmission nodes, which can then interact with different ground-
stations as the satellite orbit permits. However, there are many issues to be solved before 
an implementation is shown [10], [11]. 
6.2 Conventional optical amplifiers 
In the early/mid 20
th
 Century, many long distance (10-1000s of metres) communications 
were transmitted electronically via copper wire [12].  Electrical signals transmitted through 
copper wires have several benefits, such as potentially allowing a device to extract power 
for operation from the signal, and relatively cheap electronic components.  However, the 
continuing growth in demand for bandwidth (bit rate) on these communication services led 
to a search for an alternative that offered a higher bandwidth [12].   
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After the invention of the laser in the 1960’s [13], it was envisioned that these highly 
collimated monochromatic light sources could be used to transmit information using 
modulated light pulses.  Development into low loss optical fibre systems was a major area 
of research which led to telecommunications today being performed at wavelengths around 
1310 nm and 1550 nm because of the low-loss windows in silica glass [14].  A generic 
schematic of optical fibre communication line is shown in Figure 6.1. 
  
Figure 6.1 – Schematic of optical fibre communication line.  Modulated 
light pulses are sent through a communication channel made up of several 
km of fibre to a receiver.  After 30-60 km, due to losses inherent from the 
optical fibre and splices/connections the signal is amplified/repeated either 
by measure and resend, or optical amplifier methods. 
Up until the early 1980’s, repeater systems had been based on a measure and resend 
principle, where the optical signal is converted into an electrical signal (measured), 
electrically amplified, and used to re-modulate the original signal properties onto a new 
higher intensity laser pulse generated by a local laser source [3].  Although considered vital 
at the time, this measure/resend amplifier limits the bandwidth of the transmission because 
of the need for electronic circuitry for conversion/analysis.  All-optical amplifiers, which 
do not require the conversion of the optical signal into an electrical pulse and then back 
again, were seen as a way to improve the bandwidth of a long-haul communications line.   
Classical electromagnetic theory tells us that an electric-field E can be copied into a larger 
intensity signal gE, where g is the gain factor and is > 1[15].  The only limitation on this 
gain factor is the saturation of the gain medium, as the amplifier only has limited energy 
available.   
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Table 6.1 – Summary of classical amplifiers reviewed in this Chapter.   
Optical amplifiers use stimulated emission of an excited gain medium to increase the 
optical power of the signal pulse.  The gain medium for an optical amplifier could be 
doped fibre/crystal or a semiconductor material, excited by a pump source (optically or 
electrically) just before the expected arrival time of a signal pulse.  The incoming pulse 
causes stimulated emission of the excited elements, amplifying the pulse in a similar way 
to a laser.  The process for stimulated emission can, however, also add noise to a signal due 
to spontaneous emission, which can then be amplified at a proceeding amplifier.  In 
conventional optical signals this noise does not impede state distinguishability because the 
intensity of noise added is small in comparison to the signal intensity.  However, in the 
case of quantum signals the introduced noise is comparable (or even greater) in intensity to 
System  Semiconductor 
Optical Amplifier 
[16], [17] 
Erbium-
doped Optical 
Fibre 
Amplifier 
[2], [16], [18] 
Raman Optical amplifier 
[6], [19] 
Feature  
Maximum internal 
gain (dB) 
30 30 - 50 30  
(normally 10-15 to reduce 
Rayleigh scatter gain (amplified 
noise)) 
Insertion loss (dB) 6 - 10 0.1 - 2.0  ≈1  (for circulator) 
Polarisation 
sensitive 
Weak No Yes 
Pump Electrical Optical Optical  
Nonlinear effects Small No Yes 
Intrinsic noise (dB) 7 - 12 3 - 5 <5.5 (depending on gain) 
Noise type Amplified 
Spontaneous  
Noise (ASE) 
ASE ASE, phonon stimulated, 
double Raleigh scatter (leading 
to gain of ASE), short life-time 
of upper-state 
Notes Low cost,  
with signal distortion, 
and mode coupling 
problems for 
multimodal fibre 
optics.. 
Needs special 
fibre for 
integration. 
No special fibre needed, as 
regular fibre shows nonlinear 
properties.  Requires low 
temperature and can be 
expensive. 
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the signal.  The introduction of spontaneous emission into the signal is one of the main 
reasons why conventional amplifiers are not suitable for quantum state amplification [4]. 
The three main contenders for optical amplifiers are semiconductor optical amplifiers [16], 
[20], rare-earth-metal doped fibre amplifiers (such as erbium-doped [2], [18], [21], [22]) 
and Raman amplifiers [19].  As with all technologies, each method has its own merits and 
demerits. 
A semiconductor optical amplifier can be an inexpensive approach, however there can be 
some signal degradation from Fabry-Pérot resonances in the device [16].  The rare-earth-
metal doped fibres may be sought after where amplifiers are required and the optical fibre 
is easily accessible, such as a local exchange [2].  A Raman optical amplifier has the 
greatest benefit in intercontinental and sub-sea applications where the installation is more 
permanent and inaccessible because it can use the standard optical fibre as a gain medium 
rather than requiring specialised components.  A summary of the main features of these 
optical amplifiers is given in Table 6.1. 
Conventional all-optical fibre amplifiers have benefited the telecommunication industry 
greatly, allowing an increase in bandwidth and transmission distance.  Added noise can be 
an issue, but conventional detector systems can usually discriminate the signal over the 
noise, because generally the noise intensity is still much lower in comparison to the signal, 
typically by several 10’s of decibels [6].   
The gain of conventional linear amplifiers can be determined by a gain coefficient γ which 
is dependent on the gain medium and wavelength to be amplified [19].  If the gain medium 
operates as a linear amplifier the total gain G is determined by G = exp(γL), where L is the 
length of the gain medium [23].  
The amount of noise added to a signal is determined by the amplifier noise figure Fn seen 
in Equation 6.1, where SNR is the signal to noise ratio of the input and out signals [23], 
[24].  The ratios of signal to noise can be shown to be 2-(1/G) for coherent states [25].  
Equation 6.1 is the general equation for the noise figure of a linear amplifier in decibels (a 
commonly used unit in telecommunications).  
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Fn= 10log10 (
SNRin
SNRout
)  ≈10log
10
(2-(1 G⁄ ))     Equation 6.1 
Equation 6.1 for large G gives a limit of 3 dB (approximately equal to a factor of 2) this 
means that of the total signal, 3 dB of that will be noise.  This means that the signal to 
noise ratio of the output is small than that of the input.  Optical amplifiers generally 
operate at G ≥30 dB, and from 6.2 it can be seen that even at G = 25 dB the noise figure 
will be very close to the 3 dB limit value. 
 
Figure 6.2 – The noise figure for a linear optical amplifiers approaching 
3 dB as gain value increases. 
Nonlinear optical amplifiers, such as the Raman amplifier, have higher noise figures than 
linear amplifiers because of a term in the noise figure which integrates over the length of 
the fibre.  The more active length the Raman amplifier has, the larger the noise figure 
become which is generally >3 dB [26].Therefore there during the optical amplification 
there is inherent noise added to a signal using a conventional optical amplifier.  The 
amount of noise is dependent on the gain of the amplifier, and whether it is linear or 
nonlinear in operation.   
6.3 Quantum amplification and repeaters 
As with conventional signals, it would be beneficial to be able to amplify quantum states 
for either communication purposes, or even to boost the number of photons before a 
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measurement.  Increasing the amplitude of a state |α⟩ linearly would give |𝛼⟩ → |𝑔𝛼⟩, 
where g is a gain factor >1.  This is unphysical for quantum mechanics as doing this 
deterministically will violate the no-cloning theorem [5].  Following on from that it was 
shown that amplifying a quantum signal in a linear way would give a noise figure g
2
-1 [1].   
While noiseless deterministic cloning is not possible, the quantum-information community 
has instead been working on probabilistic, non-deterministic cloning methods, based on 
post-selection of data.  This idea was first presented in 2008 by T.C. Ralph and A.P. Lund 
to provide quantum amplifiers and repeaters for quantum key distribution [27].  Post-
selected nondeterministic amplifiers and repeaters are probabilistic devices because a party 
cannot know if the quantum state has been amplified until certain conditions have been 
met, normally through the presence or absence of detection events.  Therefore a party 
cannot predict whether the conditions for successful amplification will be met until the 
process has actually happened.  This is different from conventional deterministic amplifiers 
and repeaters which are expected to be able to amplify correctly on demand.  This 
probabilistic condition of the amplifier limits the noise that can be added to the signal 
during the amplification process.   
Figure 6.3 shows the phasor diagram for the possible amplification processes that could 
occur for coherent state.  A conventional optical amplifier will add noise to the amplified 
signal based on the gain of the amplifier creating a noisy state.   
 
Figure 6.3- Phasor diagram for the amplification of a coherent state. 
Ideally a noiseless amplifier would not increase the minimum amount of 
noise a coherent state.  The quantum limited amplifier amplifies the 
minimum noise and introduces additional noise.  A conventional optical 
amplifier adds more noise on top of the quantum limited case.  [28] 
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At this stage it is worth noting the difference between a quantum amplifier and repeater, 
which in this thesis is primarily determined by the configuration of the system, although 
there are no formal definitions outside this Thesis in regards to quantum amplifiers.  If the 
mode of increasing the maximum transmission distance possible is performed by adding 
photons into the signal in some way, meaning the original optical signal from Alice is a 
constituent of what reaches Bob, then this can be classed as an amplifier.  If the original 
signal from Alice is used to make a measurement at some point in the transmission channel 
and the measurement outcome reaches Bob, then the device can be classed as a repeater.  
Repeaters generally operate using entangled pair sources.  A comparison between example 
amplifier and repeater systems is shown in Figure 6.4 a) and b) respectively. 
 
Figure 6.4 – a) A schematic for a quantum optical amplifier.  b) A 
schematic for a quantum optical repeater  
There are several methods which can be used in quantum amplification protocols for non-
deterministic amplification, including: photon addition and subtraction; quantum scissors; 
and entanglement swapping.  The photon addition and subtraction protocols are classed as 
amplifiers because of the addition of photons to the original signal, while the quantum 
scissors and entanglement swapping devices are classed as repeaters because they measure 
the original signal at the node.  Each method is described, giving experimental methods, 
recent publications and a summary of advantages/disadvantages.   
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6.3.1 Photon addition and subtraction 
Photon addition and subtraction devices are relatively simple devices to understand.  As 
the name suggests, the original signal from Alice has photons added to it in some way.  
After the addition process, a subtraction stage uses a low reflectivity beamsplitter (BS) to 
subtract a small portion of the amplified signal for measurement to demonstrate that the 
amplified state does indeed have greater intensity. 
The photon addition stage allows photons to be added to the signal pulse, these photons 
amplify the intensity of the original signal sent by Alice.  The addition can be performed 
by several different methods and recent experimental implementations and simulations 
have shown photon addition using thermal noise sources [29], [30], stimulated spontaneous 
parametric down-conversion (SPDC) [31]–[33], and also doped fibre [34], [35] - examples 
of experimentally realised devices are given in the following sub-sections.  Some of these 
addition stages require a single-photon detector to monitor whether an addition has been 
successful or not, which can be one of the post-selection conditions.  These post-selection 
conditions depend upon the type of photon addition, as these may, or may not, require a 
photon detection.  It should be noted that the photon addition provides gain to the original 
signal, essentially amplifying it. 
After the photon addition stage, a subtraction stage (generally consisting of a low 
reflectivity BS and a single-photon detector) is used to improve the fidelity of the 
amplified quantum state, and also verify that there is greater than 1 photon present after the 
addition stage.  As mentioned only some addition stages feature a detector for monitoring, 
and post-selection, therefore the subtraction stage is the only post-selection condition to 
confirm the amplification.  A low reflectivity BS is used because the overall gain of the 
amplifier is affected by the subtraction stage removing photons from the amplified state 
and reducing the output intensity.  However the low reflectivity also affects the maximum 
success probability of overall device as the general post-selection condition is that the 
detector at the low reflectivity output must register a photon count. The fidelity and gain 
are also affected by the reflectivity of the subtraction BS.  Photon subtraction detection 
statistics are linked to the statistics of the photon stream not reflected, therefore given 
certain post-selection conditions can change the relative intensity of the output. 
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Random noise source 
Amplification based on the addition of random noise to the signal has been investigated 
using simulation [29], where the noise was from a thermal source.  An experimental 
realisation of a device was recently shown with random phase noise generated by 
randomising the phase of pulses generated from a continuous-wave beam [30].  Figure 6.5 
shows a schematic of such schemes.  In both cases, the additional photons are randomised 
in phase, i.e. their phase is from the continuous 0-2π range, and therefore the success 
probability of the devise is low because of the wide range of phase values possible.  While 
Müller et al. [30] showed the randomisation from pulse generation of a continuous-wave 
coherent beam, random phase noise can also be achieved by a thermal source with super-
Poissonian statistics as simulated by Marek and Filip [29]. 
 
Figure 6.5. – Schematic diagram of a random phase noise experimental 
apparatus.  Many photon addition and subtraction devices employ a photon 
number resolving (PNR) detector in the subtraction stage to add further 
post-selection conditions.  [29], [30] 
In the experimental implementation of Müller et al. [30] the phase randomised additional 
photons were generated from an auxiliary beam using electro-optic modulators which 
featured variable electrical delays to set the phase of the pulse generated.  This system was 
designed to test the 1→2 cloning of a quantum state where one state was generated from an 
strong optical beam, phase randomised and then another state was generated later from the 
same strong optical beam.  The test was to see if these two generated states would be the 
same.  In a deterministic experiment, this would lead to low fidelity, but using non-
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deterministic methods with post-selection, the fidelity is higher.  The polarisation of the 
generated photons was orthogonal to the original beam and could be separated by a 
polarisation beam splitter before the subtraction stage.  No detection conditions were 
assigned to the addition stage, the conditioning was only carried out based on events at the 
subtraction detector which tapped off a portion of the amplifier beam using a low reflection 
BS.   
The subtraction stage in the experiments of both [29], [30] consisted of a highly 
transmitting (low reflectivity) BS with a photon number resolving (PNR) detector on the 
reflection side.  The use of such a detector allowed for variable gain and fidelity because 
knowing the transmission and reflectivity coefficients of the BS allows some information 
about the photon number statistics of the transmitted pulse to be inferred from the photon 
number statistics of the reflected pulse.  In the post-selection stage the user can select 
conditions on the subtraction stage, only accepting time instances when the number of 
photons detected at the PNR detector (M) are above a certain threshold, which in the work 
of Müller et al.[30] was M ≥ 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5.  Increasing the number of photons required at 
the PNR detector will lower the success rate of the amplifier, as it will become increasing 
unlikely that more than one photon will be detected given the low reflectivity of the BS 
and the low detection efficiency of PNR detectors, see the review in Chapter 2.  In the 
work of Müller et al.[30], the success rate for M = 1, for a mean photon number per pulse 
(|α|2) of 2 was 0.1 correlations per second, while the success rate for M = 5 was 1 × 10-4 per 
second.  Simulations from Marek and Filip [29] showed the gain could theoretically 
increase from 2  to 4.5 for M = 1 to 6, but in the work of Müller et al.[30] a gain was not 
investigated, as only the 1→2 cloning was of interest, i.e. the nominal gain of 2 for the 
M = 1 case.   
While it is useful to have variable gain, fidelity and success probability, PNR detectors are 
generally large structures, extremely complex to construct and operate, as well as having 
high initial and maintaining costs.  At present, PNR detectors, such as the transition edge 
sensor [36], typically have poor overall detection efficiencies of around 1-3% (Chapter 3) 
therefore the success probability for an amplifier is reduced significantly.  The more 
commonly available single photon detectors, which are generally more efficient, work in a 
Geiger detection mode (although some have been adapted to have a level of PNR 
properties by having an array of single devices [37]) and users may be more confident 
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using these devices for real world applications since they are widely commercially 
available [38]–[42], although this would negate the variable gain of such devices.   
Many quantum optical amplifier applications are aimed at use in quantum communication, 
more specifically phase-encoding QKD protocols implemented in optical fibre, which 
generally use a known phase-encoding alphabet of four non-orthogonal states (0, 
π
/2, π, and 
3π
/2).  The use of a fully randomised phase source (i.e. over all 0-2π phase space) does not 
take advantage of the situation that the phase-alphabet is known.  The success probability 
could be increased if the amplifier was restricted to the phase-alphabet and could pick 
randomly between the elements in the alphabet (if a secure protocol allowed for this) as 
there would be a smaller spread of possible phases and the success probability is inversely 
related to the number of phases.   
Stimulated spontaneous parametric down conversion 
Stimulated spontaneous parametric down conversion (SPDC) is another method of photon 
addition, where the additional photons are generated in a non-linear crystal by the SPDC 
process [43].  If the signal photons from Alice are in the vicinity of the generated pair 
properties of the signal are shared with the generated pair.  The SPDC process generates 
photon pairs, each has a signal and idler photon, the signal is used to amplify the Alice’s 
signal, while the idler is measured by a single photon detector to prove that SPDC has 
occurred.   
Phase-matching in a SPDC crystal, which is the relation of the wavelength of the signal 
and idler to the emission direction, is a key property for creating amplification as a crystal 
not optimally aligned will not generate as many photons pairs with the desired wavelengths 
[23].  The stimulated nature of the emission means that the phase, and polarisation 
properties of the photon-pair are equal to the photon state that was being amplified.  
A single-photon detector is required to measure the idler photon emitted from the pair 
which travels a different optical path to the signal.  A triggered event at the addition stage 
is one of the post-selection conditions.  The generation of SPDC pairs is dependent on the 
pump power used, therefore it is possible to generate more than one pair for greater 
amplification.  For a single photon source used in quantum communication, more than one 
photon pair is a problem, but in amplification a higher pump power can be useful for 
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generating a greater number pairs to increase the gain of the amplifier and success 
probability. 
SPDC optical amplifiers have been experimental realised by at least three groups [31]–
[33].  A schematic diagram of the experiment reported by Zavatta et al. [32] is shown in 
Figure 6.6.  A barium borate (BBO) crystal was used as the gain medium, which was 
pumped by a coherent source (wavelength = 786 nm) at a repetition rate of 82 MHz.  The 
photons propagating from the quantum channel (Alice’s signal) were made collinear with 
the signal propagating from the pair generation, while the idler was detected by a gated 
photon detector coupled to the crystal using a single-mode optical fibre.  After the photon 
addition stage there was a subtraction stage using a 90:10 BS, to indicate if it was likely 
there was >1 photon in the amplified beam.  The detection conditions in post-selection for 
this beam were detection events at the addition stage and the subtraction stage.  A range of 
|α|2 were tested from 0.2 to 1.4, the fidelity was then checked against a mode locked 
reference and found to be ≈1 up to |α|2 of 0.5, dropping to ≈ 0.3 at |α|2 of 1.5.  The effective 
gain of the system was found to be, ≈1.9 up to |α|2 of 0.2, dropping off to ≈1.4 at |α|2 of 1.4.  
A success rate of 20-70 bits s
-1
 was found for |α|2 0.2 to 1.   
 
Figure 6.6 –Schematic of stimulated spontaneous parametric down-
conversion amplification (SPDC) scheme.  [32] 
One of the major advantages of the SPDC device is that the amplifier node does not know 
any information about the original state other than it has been amplified; meaning no 
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information about the state is recorded by the amplifying station.  One drawback for the 
experimental devices shown is that they are all implemented in free-space, requiring 
optical fibre quantum communication protocols to be coupled into free-space for 
amplification and then re-coupled into optical fibre, potentially leading to significant 
additional losses.   
Unfortunately the success probability of the work reported by Zavatta et al. [32] is very 
low (of the order of 1 × 10
-6
) making it unsuitable for most communication applications.  
This low success probability is primarily due to the SPDC process and the use of single 
mode optical fibre for coupling to the detectors.  The SPDC process emits pairs in a cone 
shape [44], [45], therefore the probability that a pair(s) is generated propagating collinear 
with the signal from Alice is small.  A guided device which limits the pair propagation 
direction, in a waveguide for instance, could perhaps improve the success probability and 
such devices were discussed in Chapter 2.   
6.3.2 Heralded scissor devices 
Heralded scissor or entanglement swapping devices are frequently of the schematic 
configuration which is shown in Figure 6.7.  These devices were first introduced by Pegg, 
et al. [46] in 1998 and subsequently shown experimentally by many groups [47]–[53].  The 
‘scissor’ style device uses two BS, one a 50:50 to perform a Bell-state measurement [54], 
with the other a variable BS where the entanglement swapping occurs.  A single photon 
source is coupled to the variable BS which sets up a superposition of states.  This single 
photon is generally generated by type-1 SPDC (the generated pair have the same 
polarisation), although other single photon sources could be used, such as quantum dots 
[55].  The magnitude of the superposition is determined by the splitting ratio of the 
variable BS.  The reflected part of the variable BS is interfered with an input signal. The 
Bell-state measurement is successful (i.e. the input photon and the amplifier photon are 
indistinguishable) if there is a photon detection at D+ and no detection at D-.  If successful, 
the properties of the signal pulse are passed onto the transmitted single photon.  The single-
photon source and Bell-state measurement do not need to be located in the same 
‘amplifying station’ and can be separated by long distances or high loss channels, because 
the entanglement is said to be robust [56]. 
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Figure 6.7 – Schematic for a heralded scissor/entanglement swapping 
device.  [53] 
Recent simulations using an entanglement swapping device were performed by NICT, 
Japan [56].  The team had recently been looking into the limitation of QKD protocols due 
to high loss turbulent mediums because of their interest in satellite QKD communications 
[56].  The gain is altered by changing the transmission of the variable BS.  The simulation 
used a standard scissor set-up as shown in Figure 6.7.  These simulations showed high 
fidelity, between 0.85 and 0.95, over a range of gains 0.5 to 3.   
Heralded-scissor devices have been experimentally realised: Bruno et al. [48] showed that 
a gain between 1 and 100 is possible depending on the transmission of the variable BS, 
although a higher transmission was found to substantially lower the success rate because of 
the low amplitude intensity for the Bell-state measurement.  Variable BS transmissions of 
0.87, and 0.7 showed coincidence rates of 780 and 1400 s
-1
 respectively.  Osorio et al. [53] 
showed a range of gain from 0.4 to 2 with lower success rates.  The post-selection 
conditions for each case was detection of the idler photon, confirming a photon pair was 
generated by the SPDC process, then a detection event at D+. 
These heralded scissor entanglement swapping devices have shown a success probability 
of the order of 1 × 10
-5
, a factor of 10 greater than the photon addition and subtraction 
devices.  The success probability could be improved with a more efficient way of 
generating the single photons at the variable BS.  It was mentioned by Bruno et al. [48] 
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that the probability of generating a pair was 0.01 and this pair then needs to be confirmed 
by detection of the idler photon, which could be very inefficient.   
The design shown in schematic form in Figure 6.7 could be carried out in free-space or 
optical fibre configurations, making it useful for ground and satellite applications.   
Qubit amplifiers 
A very recent modification of the heralded amplifier has come in the form of a qubit 
amplifier [57] which makes use of type-II SPDC process where signal and idler photon are 
different polarisations.  Instead of the post-selection being based on the idler being 
detected and the result of the Bell-state measurement, only the Bell-state measurement is 
used to non-deterministically determine whether there was amplification.  Qubit amplifiers 
were first proposed in 2010 [50], and further discussed in 2011 [58] as a way of extending 
the transmission distance for device independent quantum key distribution (DI-QKD) and 
(at least partially) closing the Bell-test loophole.   
The experimental device, shown in schematic form in Figure 6.8, is similar to the scissor 
device with two main differences.  The first is the use of type II SPDC instead of type I; 
this generates the photon pairs in orthogonal polarisations, where in type I they are 
collinear.  The use of type II means the Bell-state measurement is now carried out with 
four detectors to identify the polarisations, as perpendicular polarisations will no longer 
interfere at the 50:50 BS. 
In the experimental realisation [57], gains of 0.2 to 9 were tested, based on the 
transmission distance, with a higher gain used for longer distances.  The fidelity of the 
states remained high >97% for the Bell-state measurement.  A 4-fold coincidence based on 
the Bell-state measurement, successful herald by Alice, and measurement of the amplified 
state lead to a success rate of in the order of ≈0.2 per second, which for a 4-fold 
coincidence is rather good.  This experiment was mainly used to test the qubit amplifier for 
use as a DI-QKD device, and has shown that transmission distances of 80 km could be 
achieved, in principle.   
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Figure 6.8 – Schematic for a qubit amplifier, which can be seen to be a 
modified version of the heralded scissor device.  A more thorough Bell-State 
measurement is performed, because of the two different polarisation used in 
the protocol.  [57] 
6.3.3 Entanglement repeater and relays 
The entanglement repeater is a quantum optical repeater based on a measurement device 
independent QKD (MDI-QKD) [59]–[61].  The schematic of this system is already shown 
in Figure 6.4 b), where Alice and Bob, who control their own spontaneous parametric 
down-conversion sources, measure their idler photon from the pair to determine the 
properties (which are entangled to the signal photon) while the signal photon is sent down 
the quantum channel to be measured in a Bell-state measurement with the signal photon 
from the other party.  This basic system, shown in Figure 6.4 b), already theoretically 
increases the transmission distance of QKD by a factor of 2, because the Alice and Bob in 
principle only send one signal photon at a time, any measurement by Eve on either of them 
will break the entanglement and cause the Bell-State measurement to fail.   
This idea for MDI-QKD can be expanded upon in order to make this system a repeater as 
shown in Figure 6.9.  The addition of one repeater node requires an extra source of photon 
pairs in which to perform two Bell-state measurements, therefore as well as additional 
repeater nodes, sources nodes are also required to generate the photon pairs.  If both Bell-
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State measurements are successful Alice and Bob will be able, from their measurement of 
their idler photon, to generate an encryption key.  In Figure 6.4 the addition of one repeater 
stage allowed for a theoretical doubling of transmission distance, while in Figure 6.9 the 
maximum distance is quadrupled.  Adding a repeater node, n, the maximum distance of 
entanglement based QKD protocols can be increased by a factor of 2n.   
 
Figure 6.9 – An example schematic of how an entanglement repeater would 
work for a two stage repeater.   
Although entanglement repeaters theoretically look like a promising way to increase the 
maximum distance of quantum communication protocols, there are several issues which 
need to be addressed before they can be regarded as practical.  Quantum communication 
requires the probability of greater than one photon per pulse to be low, in order to do this 
with SPDC sources, the pump power must be reduced, as the emission of SPDC is super-
Poissonian.  This means that the probability of emitting one pair in the first place can be 
<1%.  Given that the probability of a pair being emitted is low, the probability that 
simultaneous pairs are emitted at the same time from Alice, Bob and the source nodes is 
extremely low.  On top of that, the photons which are measured by the repeater station 
need to actually make it there through the high loss transmission medium.  Given all of 
these technological limitations this experiment is a challenging prospect and, to the best of 
my knowledge, only one experimental realisation has been attempted with limited success 
[62].  The experimental realisation followed a double pass generation of photon pairs at the 
repeater node which sent photons to Alice, Bob and the Bell-state measurement.  Only pair 
generation rates were reported in the paper, limiting any real prospect of an in-depth 
analysis being presented here.  The success probabilities of such devices are likely to be 
extremely low, growing smaller with each additional node introduced.  However, with the 
167 
 
increasing efficiency of spontaneous parametric down-conversion sources, now able to 
emit photon pairs in the MHz range, another experimental implementation is overdue.   
6.3.4 Summary of quantum amplifiers 
It has been shown that non-deterministic noiseless quantum amplification has been an area 
of active research over the past decade with many different protocols and experimental 
implementations of varying success.  Three types of devices were reviewed, addition and 
subtraction, heralded scissor and entanglement swapping devices.  Table 6.2 gives a 
general summary of each device described.   
Device type Source of photons Success 
probability 
Nominal 
gain 
Notes 
Addition and 
subtraction 
Spontaneous parametric 
down-conversion 
(SPDC), single photons, 
coherent or thermal 
source 
1 × 10
-6
  
to 
 1 × 10
-9
 
>1  - Photon number resolving 
subtraction stage can increase gain. 
- Low success probability due to 
continuous range of possible phase 
values. 
Heralded 
scissor device 
SPDC 1 × 10
-5
 >1 -Use of heralded source gives low 
success probability. 
- Herald sources make the device 
robust against high loss channels. 
Entanglement 
repeater 
SPDC >>3 × 10
-5
 1 -Multiple entangled heralded sources 
for many Bell-State measurements 
make the success probability low.   
Table 6.2 – General overview of the three quantum optical amplifier 
devices. 
Addition and subtraction devices have low success probabilities because the addition 
photons have random properties, i.e. phase, which spans over 0-2π space.  The gain, 
fidelity and success probability can be adjusted by using a photon number resolving 
detector and post-selection conditions on the number of photons detected at one time.  A 
fixed phase alphabet is generally used in quantum communication protocols , for example 
the BB84 protocol of quantum key distribution uses 0, 
π
/2, π, and 
3π
/2 [63], therefore it 
makes sense to restrict the amplification process to these values rather than trying to 
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amplify using a source which equally covers the entire phase space.  This could be one 
method to increase the success probability above heralded scissor devices. 
Heralded scissor devices were shown to have improved success probability over the 
addition and subtraction devices, also with a larger gain range.  DI-QKD was shown to 
favour these devices to help increase the transmission distance using entangled heralded 
sources [57] so these quantum amplifiers already have an application.  The gain could be 
varied to accommodate large losses by using variable transmission:reflection ratio BS in 
the device.  Although these devices look promising, the use of heralded sources inhibits the 
achievable success probability because of the low probability of a pair being generated in 
the SPDC process. 
Entanglement swapping repeaters using heralded entangled sources are favoured by many 
as the future of long distance QKD.  The repeaters rely on a Bell-state measurement which 
can confirm if the states sent were distinguishable or not.  The gain is set at unity because 
the device is a repeater and does not amplify any signal.  The predicted success probability 
will be related to several factors, including losses between parties and the repeater station, 
and the probability that heralded pairs are emitted at the same time.  SPDC sources can 
now generate pairs more efficiently [64] than the source in the first experimental 
realisation [62], therefore the success probability of any subsequent experimental 
implementation will have risen.  As well as requiring pairs to be generated simultaneously 
and not be lost during transmission to the repeater, there may also be a need for some form 
of quantum memory (or delay) so that the states arrive at the Bell-state measurement at the 
same time.  This will be high loss and will lower the success probability for each repeater 
node. 
Although there have been many successful experimental implementations of quantum 
optical amplifiers, many have disadvantages which are not easily fixed.  The requirement 
for single photon sources generated by SPDC or quantum dots, which are inefficient and 
sometimes experimentally difficult to maintain for long periods, means that success 
probabilities are generally low for quantum optical amplifiers.   
For quantum amplification to become a real solution for quantum communication 
protocols, higher success probabilities, high fidelity, and >1 gain devices are required.  In 
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the next Chapter, a newly proposed device which is based on photon addition and 
subtraction, called the state comparison amplifier (SCAMP) is described, providing a 
higher success probability than previous devices, with high fidelity output. 
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Chapter 7 
Experimental Demonstration of a Quantum Optical State Comparison 
Amplifier 
7.1 Introduction 
This Chapter presents an experimentally realised quantum amplifier which shows an 
improved success probability over all previously realised quantum amplifiers.  This 
amplifier does not rely on complex quantum resources for implementation, making it a 
relatively simple experimental set-up compared to other quantum amplifiers.  This Chapter 
will introduce the quantum amplifier device and its general operation.  Following this 
Chapter, the next will give a further characterisation of the state comparison amplifier 
(SCAMP) device with variations made to the operation and construction. 
The SCAMP was first introduced by Eleftheriadou et al. in 2013 [1].  The experiments 
reported here constitute the first demonstration of the SCAMP approach, and some of these 
results were published in 2015 [2].   
7.1.1 Background and protocol 
SCAMP is an addition and subtraction quantum optical amplifier. Although it works in a 
very similar way to the other photon addition and subtraction devices described in the 
previous Chapter, there are two key differences which allow SCAMP to have a higher 
success probability, as described below.   
The photon addition and subtraction devices’ success probabilities mainly relied on the 
random phase properties of the addition photon, which uniformly span over the entire 0-2π 
of phase.  Quantum cryptography experiments such as quantum key distribution (QKD), or 
quantum digital signatures (QDS) can use a number of phase-encodings (N) in their 
protocol.  The number of phase-encodings selected depends on the protocol used, and 
typically ranges from N = 2 to 8 [3]–[5].  Instead of adding photons which have a random 
phase over 0-2π range, it makes sense to only choose within the small subset of phase-
encodings being implemented in the protocol. 
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The first improvement SCAMP makes over existing devices is that it employs a known 
phase-alphabet, N, consisting of the possible phase-encodings that Alice will implement in 
her quantum communication protocol.  However this does not mean the amplifier will 
know exactly what states will be sent by Alice and is therefore only guessing between one 
of the possible N values.  The probability of the amplifier guessing correctly will be 1/N.  
The use of the known phase-alphabet means that SCAMP is required to be a trusted node, 
meaning that information from the amplifier’s guess states and detection outcomes could 
allow an eavesdropper some advantage during communication if it were not trusted. 
 
Figure 7.1 – State comparison amplifier schematic showing the addition 
and subtraction stages. 
The second improvement over previous amplifiers is that SCAMP does not rely on any 
complex quantum sources, or photon number resolving (PNR) detectors.  Many quantum 
amplifiers have relied on spontaneous parametric down-conversion to generate single-
photon pairs for amplification [6]–[8].  In practical terms, this is a complex process in 
which it can prove difficult to maintain stability.  Also, the required correlations in the 
amplification also meant that the idler was one of the correlated events, this greatly reduces 
the probability of success [6], [8].  PNR detectors can be used as a discriminator in the 
device subtraction stage to allow greater gain or improved fidelity [9]. However these 
detectors are cryogenically cooled to reduce the gain noise, sometimes as low as milli-
kelvin for transition edge sensors [10], [11].  The addition photons in the SCAMP device 
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can be created by an attenuated coherent laser source [12], and the detection can be 
performed by compact commercially available detectors, such as a silicon single-photon 
avalanche diode (Si-SPAD) [13], [14].  
The basic setup for SCAMP is shown in Figure 7.1.  The device works in two parts, first 
the state comparison, which performs an addition of coherent state intensity for the signal 
by a guess coherent state.  This stage provides the optical gain for the SCAMP device.   
The second part is a photon subtraction with a low reflectivity beamsplitter (BS) which is 
used to improve the fidelity of the output.  This improved fidelity comes at the expense of 
lowering the overall success rate of the amplifier.  Coherent states are eigenstates of the 
annihilation operator, so the subtraction does not have an effect on the coherent state 
properties other than reducing the intensity [15].   
For the input and guess states |a⟩ and |b⟩, the coherent amplitude in the nominal vacuum 
output is t1α - r1β, and the other beamsplitter output passes to the subtraction stage.  The 
amplitude in the subtraction arm is therefore -r2(t1β + r1α), and the output amplitude is 
t2(t1β+r1α).  We assume that the input and guess are chosen from probability distributions 
over the coherent states, 
ρ̂
in
= ∫ d
2
α̅P(a̅)|α̅⟩⟨α̅|, 
ρ̂
in
= ∫ d
2
β̅P(β̅)|β̅⟩⟨β̅|, 
and calculate the output state and the fidelity based on these and the properties of the 
device.  The fidelity is, 
F= ∫ d
2
αP(α)⟨gα|ρ̂
out
|gα⟩, 
where ρ̂
out
 is the output state conditioned both on the input state distributions from (ρ̂
in
 and 
ρ̂
out
) and on the successful operation of the device.  This is the probability that the output 
state passes a measurement test comparing it to the amplified version of the input state and 
can be written as 
F=P(T|S)=
P(T|S)
P(S)
, 
=
∫ d
2a̅ ∫ d
2β̅P(T|S, α̅, β̅)P(S|α̅,β̅)P(a̅)Q(β̅)
∫ d
2α̅ ∫ d
2β̅P(S|α̅, β̅)P(a̅)Q(β̅)
, 
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where P(T|S) is the probability that the output state will pass the fidelity test given that the 
device operates successfully.  
Single-photon detectors are used to record events for correlation in post-selection.  The 
input signal, from Alice, is compared against the guess state from the node that selects one 
of the possible N phase-encodings from the known alphabet.  If the signal and node state 
are indistinguishable the state is amplified and passed through to the subtraction stage.  If 
the states are distinguishable then there is a mixed output, leading to photon events being 
sometimes recorded at the D0 detector. 
The post-selection conditions for a successful amplification in SCAMP are detection at the 
subtraction stage (D1) and no detection at the addition stage (D0).  The node claims a 
successful amplification when D0 does not measure an event (the signal and guess are 
thought to be indistinguishable), and a recorded event at D1 (the pulse exiting the amplifier 
likely contains more than one photon).  Figure 7.2 shows the possible amplification 
processes for SCAMP in the case of two guess states.  For two possible non-orthogonal 
guesses which are π out of phase, the state is either amplified or not.  However in the case 
of imperfect visibility some coherent state could still pass through the state comparison 
stage.  This would likely be low amplitude and not likely to trigger the correct post-
selection conditions.   
 
Figure 7.2- Amplification processes for the state comparison amplifier 
(SCAMP).  a) and b) are the input and output states for the state 
comparison for two possible phase state, N for a gain of 2. 
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In the case where more than two guess states are possible the amplification can results in a 
mixed state output, i.e. there is mixed interference at the state comparison stage.  This will 
result in coherent state passing through the amplifier.  The subtraction stage is more likely 
to click for the larger amplitude correct states, rather than the lower amplitude mixed state 
that comes from a greater number of possible guess states, and therefore the conditional 
output of the amplifier is increased in fidelity compared to the non-conditioned output.  
This will become apparent later when the detector post-selection conditions are applied to 
the visibility of the amplifier output. 
The nominal gain (theoretical gain) of SCAMP is given by Equation 7.1, where t2 is the 
transmission coefficient of the subtraction stage and r1 is the reflection coefficient of the 
addition stage.  The subtraction stage will generally always be a low reflectivity BS 
(approximately 5 or 10 %), to improve the fidelity of the amplified state.  The gain of the 
SCAMP device can be varied primarily by changing the reflection coefficient of the 
addition stage. 
g
nom
=
t2
r1⁄      Equation 7.1 
7.2 Experimental implementation 
This Chapter focuses on the experimental implementation of the theoretical SCAMP 
protocol [1].  This experimental implementation shows a device which has a gnom = 1.8, 
t2=0.90, r1=0.50.  In the following sub-Sections, the experimental set-up is first introduced 
along with the method of operation, this gives a general explanation of how SCAMP 
operates, which can also be referred to for Chapter 8’s experiments as well.   
The results are analysed to show the gain, conditional visibilities, and the fidelity of the 
output.  Results are also analysed for the purposely introduced noise to show how robust 
SCAMP is to noise in a communication channel. 
7.2.1 Experimental set-up 
The experimental set-up revolves around the amplification stage shown in Figure 7.1 and 
the expanded system diagram can be seen in Figure 7.3 which shows in more detail how 
the optical system is set out to perform the experiment.  Figure 7.4 is complementary to 
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Figure 7.3, showing the electronic components, and connections to the optical set-up 
(linked by equal colours).   
 
Figure 7.3 – The optical experimental set-up used for the state comparison 
amplifier.  Number 1, and 2 denote where the noise addition was 
introduced.  1 being for the 850 nm LED, while 2 is for the white light 
noise. 
A 10 MHz clock reference (Novatech [16]) was regenerated by a signal synthesiser 
(Hewlett-Packard [17]), this provided a lower jitter, and larger amplitude 10 MHz 
reference signal.  The reference signal provided a common electrical clock for other 
instruments to phase lock to, allowing instruments to operate together in synchronisation.  
The electrical reference signal was split into four and connected to three pulse pattern 
generators (PPGs) and the time-tagging hardware (HydraHarp 400) [18].  Two Agilent 
81110A PPGs [19] were employed as electrical drivers used to drive the phase modulator 
(Photline [20]) with a known repeating phase-encoding pattern of length N (N being the 
number of possible values in the phase-alphabet). 
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Figure 7.4 – Electrical experimental set-up for SCAMP. 
To drive the vertical-cavity surface-emitting laser (VCSEL) (the same device and set-up 
used in the previous Chapters [21]), a DC offset generated by the DC driver (Newport 
[22]) was combined with the Agilent 81134A PPG 1 MHz pulsed output on a bias-tee.  An 
electrical synchronisation was also sent from the Agilent 81134A to the HydraHarp 400 for 
sampling of the Geiger-mode detectors. 
In this test-bed demonstration of the principles of a SCAMP system, the single optical path 
from the laser was split into two paths at the first 50:50 BS.  The transmitted path was used 
in the SCAMP process while the reflected path was left unaltered and used as a reference 
state for fidelity checks on the final 50:50 BS.   
The reference path featured a variable delay air-gap to match the arrival time of the 
unaltered reference with the signals at the final fidelity check BS.  A piezo-electric actuator 
(Thorlabs [23]) was placed in the variable delay air-gap allowing a user to adjust for 
nanometre scale variations in the path length, in real time.   
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The transmitted path was further split into two paths, a “guess” path and “signal” path, 
which were then recombined at the state comparison stage of the amplifier.  Ideally the 
guess state in the amplifier would not have used energy from the same laser as the signal 
but instead have had its own laser source which was indistinguishable from the signal 
(such as a pair of temperature tuned narrow spectral line-width distributed feedback lasers 
[24]).  In this test-bed the same coherent source was used for both signal and guess due to 
the experimental complexity of two indistinguishable sources.   
The signal path featured a variable delay air-gap with screw-adjustable attenuator and 
piezo-electric actuator which provided adjustment of the path length.  Apart from the 
variable air-gap and attenuation, the signal was left unaltered, and was used to simulate a 
phase-encoded signal coming from Alice in a QKD/QDS style experiment.   
The guess state arm only features the phase modulator, which was used to select the 
‘guess’ state.  The phase-alphabet of the possible guess states, N, for experiments here, was 
2, 4 or 8.  The phase modulator was electrically modulated by the Agilent 81110A PPGs, 
each of which had two channel outputs that could modulate one non-orthogonal pair, hence 
two PPGs were required to generate N = 8.  The output of these were combined using high-
speed electrical combiners (Avtech [25]). 
The guess and signal state were then compared on the amplifier stages, where photon 
detectors D0 and D1 recorded events.  All detectors used in the experiment were Excelitas 
Geiger-mode silicon single-photon-avalanche diodes (Si-SPADs) [14].  
The fidelity of the amplified outcome was then tested on the final 50:50 BS, the 
interference was recorded on detectors DA and DB.  The HydraHarp 400 records the 
measurements taken by D0, D1, DA, and DB in time-tag mode, which records the time 
instance in which a detector measured an event.  Although not strictly necessary for the 
correct operation of the amplifier, the electrical output of each SPAD was subject to 
electrical delays from measured lengths of cables timed to ensure that electrical events 
triggered by fractions of the same light pulse reached the HydraHarp simultaneously.  This 
synchronisation was performed to simplify testing of the amplifier system in the 
laboratory. 
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7.2.2 Methods 
The methods used to operate and analyse the results will be described in this section. 
Calibration and set-up 
Initially the optical laser output pulse waveform was optimised to give a good temporal 
and spectral profile.  The SCAMP experiment could be described as an interferometer 
inside another interferometer, so the SCAMP device was referred to as the inner 
interferometer, and the fidelity check the outer interferometer.  Each interferometer was 
calibrated separately so that the losses in the different optical paths were equal when the 
phase modulator was set to zero phase difference from the signal.  A visibility of >96 % 
was achieved on both interferometers during calibration.   
Before making a set of measurements the phase modulator was configured to send a 
repeating pattern for one of the three investigated phase-alphabets (N = 2, 4, or 8).  For 
N = 2, one electrical channel was set to switch on and off, giving the two levels for 0, and 
π, therefore each state occurs half the time (500,000 times per second), the same idea 
follows for N = 4, and 8 with each state occurring 
ν
/N times per second, where ν was the 
clock frequency of 1 MHz.  The output of the driving electronics for the phase modulator 
was not uniformly level for the entire duration of one period and exhibited some distortion, 
including overshoot and damped ringing.  As the duration of the laser pulse was relatively 
short compared to the period of the electrical driving signal for the phase modulator, the 
timing offset of the periodic laser pulse train was adjusted so that the laser pulses occurred 
at times which gave optimum visibility in the inner interferometer (hence optimising the 
outer interferometer as well).   
The four single-photon detectors employed in this test-bed demonstration of SCAMP, D0, 
D1, DA, and DB, sent photon events to the HydraHarp 400 which recorded the events in 
time-tag mode (when an event occurs the associated macro-time, relative to the start of the 
measurement process, of the event is stored).  A computer program written in MATLAB 
[26] then processed this into four histograms which updated once every second, one for 
each detector.  The histograms allowed visual feedback for the user who could adjust the 
voltage over the piezo-electric actuators in the inner and outer interferometer to improve 
the visibility of the system. 
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Threshold visibilities were set for the inner and outer interferometers, once the threshold 
was reached, or exceeded, the MATLAB program would save the one second duration 
measurement of raw time-tagged data which had been used to create the histograms.  There 
were two threshold visibilities taken into account in the experiment which needed to be 
reached on each interferometer, the standard maximum and minimum visibility, and the 
ratio of the counts in each detector for the non-orthogonal phase-encodings (i.e. how equal 
the peaks are in terms of integrated counts in the histogram).  The standard visibility 
threshold was set to take about 90% in both the inner and outer interferometers, while the 
threshold ratio for the non-orthogonal states was set to (1 ± 0.1):1.  The MATLAB code 
saved 100 individual 1 second duration sets of time-tag measurements for each |α|2.   
After data acquisition the saved time-tag data was gated (or temporary filtered) by 
discarding events that occurred outside of a ±2 ns window centred on a periodic occurrence 
determined by the position of the peaks in the histogram.  The gated time-tags were then 
processed for time-correlations and the average of the 100 individual sets computed for 
later analysis. 
7.3 Results 
This section will be used to present processed time-tag data that was acquired from the 
SCAMP experimental system.  The initial configuration of SCAMP featured a 50:50 
comparison BS at the state comparison stage, and a 90:10 BS at the subtraction stage, 
giving a nominal (theoretical) gain of 1.8 (from Equation 7.1).  In the original theoretical 
paper [1] it was proposed that this configuration would provide a modest gain with high 
fidelity output.   
Two sets of results are analysed: first experiments were performed with no additional 
noise, merely investigating the SCAMP.  Secondly to test the noise resistance of SCAMP, 
additional photon noise was inserted into various parts of the experiment by coupling into 
fibre-fibre splices, or extra fibre couplers on a BS.   
All experiments were carried out over a range of |α|2 for possible phase-alphabets N = 2, 4, 
and 8.  The same MATLAB code was used for all experiments, with only minor changes 
made to the visibility saving thresholds due to the impurity in phase-encodings at higher N 
values.   
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7.3.1 State comparison amplifier with 1.8 nominal gain 
Raw count rates for each detector are plotted in Figure 7.5, a) c) e) for N = 2, 4, and 8 
respectively, these are the average total number of measured events recorded over the 
whole 1 second data acquisition period.  The gated count rates for each detector are shown 
in Figure 7.5 b), d), and f) for N = 2, 4, and 8 respectively.  The gated count rate is the 
number of measured events within the 4 ns gating window over the 1 second data 
acquisition period.  On average, the gated count rate was 4.2 ± 0.3 %, 8.7 ± 0.4 %, and 
3.1 ± 0.1% of the raw rate for N = 2, 4, and 8 respectively.  This variation in the gated 
percentage comes from the |α|2 range and phase-alphabet used.  Because of the use of a 
laser pulse repetition frequency of 1 MHz, the raw count rate is dominated (>90%) by 
background noise, this lead to inaccuracies in the |α|2 set for each phase-alphabet, the 
variation is picked up in the gated rate for each N.   
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Figure 7.5 - Raw and gated count rates for experimental SCAMP 
experiment with nominal gain of 1.8 
Calculation of the |α|2 was based on Equation 7.2, which is a back-calculation from the 
gated count rates on the addition detector (D0).  |α|2 was estimated from the using the raw 
count rate output of an ID Quantique Si-SPAD [27], after back calculation the initial 
estimated values were found to be incorrect because small changes in the over-all raw 
count rate on the detector meant large variations in the |α|2 set.  It can be seen in a), c), and 
e), of Figure 7.5 that the total raw count rate approximately the same for the different 
ranges of |α|2, because the |α|2 change was hidden by the small change in overall raw count 
rate. 
|α|2=
Maximum + Minimum
2 × SPDE × 𝑙𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝 × Repeated pattern frequency
   Equation 7.2 
Equation 7.2 takes into account the maximum and minimum peaks of the D0 (addition 
stage) histogram.  This count rate is then compensated for loss between the point of |α|2 and 
the single-photon detector, lcomp, single-photon detection efficiency (SPDE), and the 
intensity equalisation (a factor of 2, because half of the light intensity is coming from the 
signal state, the half the guess state).  The frequency of the maximum pulse is also taken 
into account, for N = 2, 4, and 8, the repeated pattern frequency is 0.5, 0.25, and 0.125 
MHz, respectively.  The formula could be extended to include all other peaks from the 
histogram, but the outcome would be approximately the same. 
It can be seen in the gated count rates that DA has over taken D0 in count rate, which 
initially suggests measureable gain in the system.  However, the larger gated count rate on 
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detector DA is due to the 50:50 reference splitting when there are no amplified states 
present, rather than actual gain from the amplifier.   
The range of |α|2 used for the experiment was thought to have remained constant for N = 2, 
4, and 8, although it can be seen by the x-axes in Figure 7.5 that the |α|2, when back 
calculated from the gated count rates, has dropped for increasing N.  The value of raw 
count rate for detector D0 for N = 2, 4, and 8 does not change wildly as can be seen from 
Figure 7.5 a), c), and e).  However when the gated count rate is analysed, it can be seen 
there is a huge difference between the gated rates (and associated |α|2 range), Figure 7.5 b), 
d), and f).  Unlike the previous experimental Chapters, this experiment was performed at 
1 MHz, the fraction of a second that the gate is open is small, leading to a gated rate of 
only <10% of the measured raw count rate.  Small changes in the raw rate corresponded to 
large changed in the gated rate.  This was put down to drifting laser power during 
experimentation which was not picked up by the monitoring. 
SCAMP is a noiseless non-deterministic amplifier, which works based on probabilistic 
success in post-selection.  The effect of post-selection on the measurement can be shown 
by applying various conditions to the visibility of the final fidelity stage BS, where the 
amplified state is interfered with an unaltered reference state.   
Standard visibility of an interferometer is calculated using Equation 7.3.  ‘correct guess’ 
refers to the integrated counts under the constructive interference peak, and ‘incorrect 
guess’ the integrated counts under the destructive interference peak.  This equation only 
takes into account two states which are π out of phase.  A modified visibility calculation 
taking into account all the of other non-orthogonal phase pairs in the alphabet is shown in 
Equation 7.4.  ‘All possible guesses’ refers to the counts in all peaks corresponding to the 
entire phase-alphabet. 
Visibility= 
(correct guess - incorrect guess)
(correct guess + incorrect guess)
    Equation 7.3 
SCAMP conditional Visibility= 
(correct guess-incorrect guess)
∑ All possible guesses
   Equation 7.4 
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The SCAMP conditional visibility is based on the time gated time-tag correlations, with all 
Si-SPADs time synchronised.  The post-selection SCAMP conditional visibilities are as 
follows and are plotted in Figure 7.6 a), b), and c) for N = 2, 4, and 8 respectively.   
 No comparison or subtraction (black data points): 
o Correct – Detection at detector DA. 
o Incorrect – Detection at detector DB. 
 Comparison only (red data points): 
o Correct –Detection at DA and no detection at D0. 
o Incorrect - Detection at DB and no detection at D0. 
 Subtraction only (blue data points): 
o Correct –Detection at DA and detection at D1. 
o Incorrect - Detection at DB and detection at D1. 
 With comparison and subtraction - the full SCAMP (pink data points): 
o Correct – Detection at DA and D1, with no detection at D0. 
o Incorrect – Detection at DB and D1, with no detection at D0.   
From Figure 7.6 a), b), and c), it can be seen that as more post-selection conditions are 
applied to the Equation 5.4, the visibility improves.  Each sub-figure shows four conditions 
which were investigated during post-selection, ‘No comparison or subtraction’ (black data 
points), ‘Comparison only’ (red data points), ‘Subtraction only’ (blue data points) and 
‘Comparison and subtraction’ (pink data points).  The visibility of the system increases as 
more strict conditions are applied.  However the difference between the ‘subtraction only’ 
and ‘comparison and subtraction’ is very small, with the ‘comparison and subtraction’ 
being only marginally larger.  The question might arise “why even bother conditioning 
with the subtraction and comparison detectors to give a fully conditioned amplified state?”  
The answer is that the information about the state comparison lets an amplifier node know 
whether or not its guess state was correct or incorrect, the information could be used later 
for use in quantum cryptography protocol.  The discussion will continue later when the 
success rate/probability of the amplifier is presented. 
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Figure 7.6 – Conditional visibilities of the outer interferometer for N = 2, 4 
and 8 (a, b and c) set-up based on post-selection and Equation 7.4.  d) the 
Target state fraction (TSF). 
The target state fraction (TSF) is the percentage of the overall successfully amplified states 
which are amplified using the right guess state.  The limit of target state fraction is given 
by 
2
/N.  From use of SCAMP conditions settings, the amplification TSF is on average 0.96, 
0.49, and 0.22 respectively, showing that the limit is almost reached, but due to some 
experimental imperfections, such as imperfect visibility, the TSF is just short of the limit.  
The TSF is calculated using Equation 7.5, and is plotted in Figure 7.6 d).  The 
experimental uncertainty in the TSF for N = 4, and 8 is small in comparison to in case of 
N = 2.  This is due to the threshold settings in the experiment.  N = 2 only has a visibility 
threshold (≳ 96%) whereas the N = 4, and 8 have threshold bounds based on their other 
non-orthogonal pair respective heights, which is a tighter threshold to stay in than simply 
greater than a set visibility.  Therefore the N = 2 values generally have a greater 
uncertainty in the TSF.  
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TSF=
Conditioned correctly guessed amplified states
∑ All conditioned amplified states
   Equation 7.5 
Success rate and probability are two important properties of an optical quantum 
cryptography amplifier.  As seen in the summary from the previous chapter (Table 6.2) 
previously experimentally realised quantum optical amplifiers had success rates which 
were low, <1% of the clocking frequency.  Figure 7.7 a), b), and c) show the total success 
rate for N = 2, 4, and 8 respectively.  The total success rate, Figure 7.7 d), is shown as well 
to indicate that each N’s range of |α|2 follow the same trend.  In a), b), and c), the total 
number of amplified states is given, along with the correctly guessed amplified successes, 
and the other amplified states, which are incorrectly guessed. 
For N = 2 the difference between the correctly and incorrectly amplified states is greatest, 
because the guess is either correct or not, the number of incorrectly amplified states is only 
dependent on the visibility of the state comparison and fidelity stages.  As more non-
orthogonal pairs are added to the phase-alphabet, incomplete interference takes place, so 
some portion of intensity can carry on through the amplifier which is why the number of 
correctly and incorrectly amplified states is approximately equal for N = 4, and there are 
more incorrectly amplified states for N = 8. 
An amplifier, as the name suggests, amplifies a signal. For this initial experimental 
implementation, the nominal (theoretical) gain was said to be 1.8 because of the BS 
configuration.  After back calculation from the state comparison stage, Equation 7.6, and 
the fidelity stage, Equation 7.7, the estimated effective gain is then calculated using 
Equation 7.8, and plotted against the |α|2 in Figure 7.8 a).  lcomp and lfid are estimated losses 
from the single-photon detectors to before each beamsplitter. 
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Figure 7.7 - Success & failure rate of N = 2, 4 and 8.  a), b) and c).  d) 
shows the total success rate.  The success rate depends on correlated events 
of D0 and D1 only, and not on events at Da and Db.  
It can be seen that the estimated effective gain of the amplifier is unfortunately <1.  Given 
that the nominal gain of 1.8 corresponds to 2.55 dB of gain, experimental component loss 
may explain why gain fell below 1.  The loss from the input of the 50:50 state comparison 
stage to the output of the 90:10 subtraction stage is approximately 2.82 dB, due to splice, 
and inherent component loses, therefore our gain comes to 0.27 dB loss.  The gain actually 
estimated in Figure 7.8 a), found a lower value of gain than the 0.27 dB loss.  This can be 
accounted for by further losses in the system at the fidelity stage.  The large uncertainties 
in the N = 2 case compared to the N = 4, and 8, gain values comes from the threshold 
settings on the visibility for both interferometers (≳96%), which allows for large variation 
in some conditioned count rates.  While in the N = 4 and 8 cases, the thresholds include 
other non-orthogonal states which are required in the visibility calculation, the bounds on 
these are tighter.   
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Figure 7.8 – a) estimated effective gain based on Equation 7.8, b) and the 
success probability. 
𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑙 =
𝐷0𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑚+ 𝐷0𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑚
(2 × 𝑆𝑃𝐷𝐸 × 𝑙𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝)
   Equation 7.6 
𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑟 =  
𝐷𝐴𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑚 + 𝐷𝐵𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑚
(2 × 𝑆𝑃𝐷𝐸 × 𝑙𝑓𝑖𝑑)
   Equation 7.7 
𝐺eff =  
𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑟
𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑙
    Equation 7.8 
The amplifier’s probability of success is plotted in Figure 7.8 b) and is the total number of 
successfully amplified states divided by the clock frequency of the system, 1 MHz.  The 
probability is found to increase almost linearly with increasing |α|2 (over the range used in 
the experiment).   
Initial experimental investigations of SCAMP using the nominal gain of 1.8 configuration 
has shown a non-deterministic amplifier which has a success probability (>1% for 
|α|2 > 0.4), which depends linearly with |α|2.  This high success probability leads to 
impressive success rates (> 10 k, for |α|2 > 0.4) which are higher than previously shown 
realisations.  This success rate can be increased easily by increasing the clock rate of the 
system to >1 MHz.  However, the estimated effective gain (geff = 0.858 ± 0.020) of the 
device based on back calculation shows that this device cannot be used for amplifying as 
the loss of the device means that the gain < 1 in this configuration.  However, replacing the 
existing standard off-the-shelf commercial optical components with customised low loss 
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components and ensuring minimum loss splices while assembling the system could lead to 
a gain of >1. 
7.3.2 Added noise 
After the initial investigation of the SCAMP device properties without added noise, the 
same experiments were carried out again, with noise purposely added into the system to 
see its effects on the conditional visibilities and success rates.  SCAMP works in post-
processing, depending on correlations of detections, therefore it was predicted that the 
added noise would not have much effect on the outcome, as the noise added is from non-
coherent sources, so the probability of correlations is low.   
Figure 7.3 has two positions in the experiment, denoted 1 and 2, where the added noise 
was introduced into SCAMP to test the system for noise robustness using the nominal gain 
of 1.8 set-up.   
 
Figure 7.9 – Spectrum of the “850 nm” Thorlabs M850F2 light emitting 
diode source taken in the lab. [28] 
Position 1 was where an 850 nm wavelength optical fibre coupled LED (Thorlabs 
M850F2) was added, the spectrum of which is shown in Figure 7.9.  The emitted light 
from the LED was attenuated using an optical variable attenuator and coupled into the first 
50:50 BS.  This coupled noise light into every channel.  Although the LED had a narrow 
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bandwidth (FWHM of 31.5 nm Figure 7.9), it is a sufficiently broadband and incoherent 
light source that the interferometric visibility of the noise introduced is still effectively 0%. 
Position 2 was a free-space coupled broadband white light source, a projector bulb.  Some 
of emitted light from the quartz-halogen bulb (100 W Philips FocusLine Type 7023 
projection lamp – colour temperature 3400 K, giving emission in the visible and infrared 
[29]) was focused into a large multimode fibre bundle enclosed in a metal gooseneck, the 
output of which was pointed towards a splice in the signal state arm of the inner 
interferometer.  The light had a small probability of being coupled into the core or cladding 
of the fibre, allowing it to propagate through the rest of the system.  The broadband white 
light will have an interferometric visibility of essentially 0% in the interferometers that 
comprise the SCAMP system and consequently will not undergo any intensity variations at 
the detectors due to changes in the optical path lengths.   
The experimental method was the same as before with the same post-selection conditions.  
The only difference to the method was setting the attenuation of the noise, the modified 
method was as follows: 
 A mean photon number (|α|2) was selected. 
 Measurements were taken when no added noise was present. 
 Measurements were taken when noise was purposely added using a noise source.  
The level of noise is measured using the raw count rate on the D0 detector.   
o 0.5, 1, 1.5, and 2 mega-counts total (signal + noise) raw on D0. 
In these experiments the HydraHarp 400 measuring the raw time-tags was connected by a 
USB 2.0 connection to the computer which limited the total combined raw count rate from 
the detectors to approximately 4 MCounts
-1
 [30], a low enough count rate to ensure that a 
FIFO (first in, first, out) overflow could not take place . A FIFO overflow happens when 
the internal FIFO buffer in the HydraHarp has filled faster than events could be transferred 
and events are lost due to lack of buffer space).  The HydraHarp aborts a measurement if a 
FIFO overflow occurs and does not allow access to any data remaining in the buffer.  No 
more than 1 mega-counts per second of noise per detector could be handled, which limits 
the number of measurements performed as the |α|2 is increased.  The main results primarily 
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follow the N = 4 phase-alphabet, as it is most applicable to the quantum communication 
protocols today which generally feature a 4 phase-encoding alphabet (BB84 decoy-states).   
White light noise 
The total raw count rate is plotted in Figure 7.10 a), it can be seen that the total count rate 
for ‘no added noise’ measurements follows a linear trend with increasing |α|2 while the 
measurements with noise purposely added follow a flat trend, because the measurements 
were made for a constant raw count rate on the D0 detector of 0.5, 1, 1.5, or 2 mega-counts 
per second.  The gated count rates in Figure 7.10 b), c), d) and e) show that added noise 
does not affect the overall gated count rates very much, apart from at the subtraction stage 
(D1 c)), which shows that the gated count rate increases significantly at lower |α|2 as the 
noise is added.  This increase in gated counts at the D1 detector has implications for the 
total success rate of the system, which is shown in Figure 7.10 f).  SCAMP success is 
defined as a detection at D1, and no detection at D0, therefore an increased gated count 
rate at D1, and relatively little change in the D0 gated count rate will lead to an increased 
total success rate, which has been shown in f).   
From the gated count rates and total success rate, it can be seen that added noise will have 
the effect of increasing the total success rate of an amplifier.  Conditional visibility of the 
system is a better indication of how noise affects the amplification of the state as this 
directly shows the effects of increased count rate on the D1 detector.  It was shown in the 
previous results section that the visibility of the final fidelity stage could be improved by 
adding more post-selection conditions, given that the noise is uncorrelated the same 
condition should show the same effect.   
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Figure 7.10 – Raw, gated and success rates with added white light noise. 
Figure 7.10 shows the conditional visibilities for N = 4 for ‘no comparison or subtraction’, 
‘comparison only’, ‘subtraction only’, and ‘comparison and subtraction’, a), b), c) and d) 
respectively, plotted against the raw count rate on D0.  It can be seen that as the noise level 
increases (the raw count rate on D0 increases) that the conditional visibility decreases.  
This decrease is more significant in the lower |α|2 cases because the level of noise added is 
considerably greater than the signal intensity.  Therefore, increasing the |α|2 provides a 
more robust means of counteracting a noisy channel.  The large uncertainties in the 
subtraction only c), and comparison and subtraction d) come from the error propagation of 
the large standard deviation with respect to the mean value [31].  Relatively small number 
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of correlations occur which varied largely with separate runs, because it relies on 3 or 4 
detection correlations.   
 
Figure 7.11 – Conditional visibilities of N = 4 with added noise from a 
white light source. The first point for each trend is the measurement without 
any added noise. 
The conditional visibilities are based on Equation 7.4 and are largely determined by the 
number of correctly and incorrectly guessed amplified successes.  Figure 7.12 shows how 
the fraction of correct/total fully conditioned states changes with increased noise in the 
experiment.  In all phase-alphabets it can be seen that at low |α|2, the fraction of 
correct/total drops significantly with increasing noise, showing that incorrect 
amplifications are becoming more dominant at the amplifier output.  However, as the |α|2 
increases, the fraction comes closer to the no added noise case seen in the previous results.   
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Figure 7.12 – Fraction of correct over total amplified states for N = 4.  For 
N = 4, the ideal fraction should be 0.5. 
The state comparison amplifier has been shown to operate moderately successfully even 
with a white light source employed to create added noise.  White noise does affect the 
conditional visibility of SCAMP depending on the excess noise level added.  This is 
because the wavelengths that make up the broadband light will see different reflection 
coefficients, meaning the 50:50, and 90:10 BS may not have the same transmission and 
reflection coefficients at other wavelengths.  The detectors also have different detection 
efficiencies at other wavelength.  For the Si-SPAD, the detection efficiency increases with 
lower wavelength (to a certain point, see Figure 7.13), so broadband spectral noise is more 
efficiently detected, especially at lower wavelengths.  This effect was mostly seen on the 
D1 detector which has a critical role in confirming a successful amplification.  Increasing 
|α|2 allows an amplifier to better compensate the added noise, but it is not ideal to increase 
the |α|2 used in quantum communication protocols because of the increased risk of 
eavesdropping attacks such as the photon number splitting [32].   
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Figure 7.13 – Single-photon detection efficiency versus wavelength for a 
typical thick-junction silicon single-photon avalanche diode used in these 
experiments.  [13] 
850 nm wavelength light emitting diode noise 
Although the experimental investigation of additional channel noise showed that it did 
have an effect on the conditional visibility and fraction of correctly amplified states to all 
amplified states it was thought that a broadband white light source was not the ideal way to 
test a noisy channel because in a real quantum channel, the noise is more likely to be of the 
same wavelength or close the signal wavelength if a filter is placed before entry to the 
device.  The discrepancies between reflection co-efficient of the BSs, and detection 
efficiencies make the effect of the white light noise more evident, as it was found that the 
subtraction detector had the greatest respective increase in gated count rate.   
Another set of measurements replaced the white light source with an 850 nm wavelength 
LED which was incident on the first 50:50 BS, as shown in Figure 7.3 position 1.  The 
level of noise added was controlled by a motorised attenuator, allowing for similar noise 
level measurements to those of the white light source. 
Measurements using the 850 nm wavelength LED noise source were performed for a range 
of |α|2 trying to remain consistent with those used in the white light noise measurements.   
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Figure 7.14 - Raw, gated and success rates with added 850 nm wavelength 
incoherent noise.   
The total raw count rate over all detectors is shown in Figure 7.14 a), as before the case 
with no noise added follows a linear trend with |α|2, whereas the cases with added noise 
remain flat with changing |α|2.  The gated count rates for D0, D1, DA, and DB are shown 
Figure 7.14 b), c), d), and e) respectively.  Unlike the white noise addition, each detector 
sees a similar increase in the gated count rate, therefore it is likely that the effect of the 
850 nm wavelength added noise will be less than that of the white light noise because in 
the white light added noise the D1 detector received a significant increase, while others 
only seen minor increases.  This is shown in the total success rate plotted in Figure 7.14 f) 
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which shows that the additional noise from an 850 nm wavelength LED has a very small 
increase on the overall success rate, whereas the white light noise showed a large increase, 
even at large |α|2 = 0.7.   
 
Figure 7.15 - Conditional visibilities of N = 4 with added noise from an 850 
nm wavelength incoherent source.  Again, the first point in each of the 
trends is the value without added noise 
As was shown in the addition of white light noise experiment, increased count rate on the 
D1 detector can decrease the conditional visibilities of the system due to Equation 7.4’s 
dependence on the fraction of correct over total successfully amplified rates.  The 
conditional visibilities are shown in Figure 7.15, for the four possible post-selection 
conditions, a) no comparison or subtraction, b) comparison only, c) subtraction only, and 
d) comparison and subtraction.  The conditional visibility is on the y-axis, and the raw 
count rate on the D0 state comparison detector is on the x-axis.  For each trend the point at 
the lowest raw count rate on D0 is the measurement conducted with no additional noise.  
The larger uncertainties in c) and d) come from the large standard deviations present in the 
data [31].  The correlations are for 3, and 4 detector correlations respectively and at low 
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MPNs the probabilities of these occurring are low meaning that the standard deviations are 
respectively larger than for a) and b).  
 
Figure 7.16 - Fraction of correct over total amplified states for N = 4.  For 
N = 4, the ideal fraction should be 1, but due to an non-unitary visibility the 
fraction will always be lower than 0.5. 
Similar to the addition of white light noise, the conditional visibility starts to drop, as the 
raw count rate on the D0 detector starts to increase.  Increasing |α|2 of the signal state 
causes a reduction in the magnitude of the drop.  However, unlike in the white light noise 
results, here the drop in conditional visibility is primarily due to the increase in the gated 
DB count rate (decreasing the visibility of the final BS), rather than the increase in D1.  It 
can be seen in Figure 7.16 that the fraction of correct to total successfully amplified states 
recovers quicker with increased |α|2 than the white light noise results shown in Figure 7.12.  
By |α|2 = 0.2 the 850 nm wavelength noise results show the additional noise and no added 
noise are almost comparable while in the white light noise results at |α|2 = 0.2 the no 
additional noise, and noise results are very much distinguishable.   
7.3.3 Discussion  
Initial result for the state comparison amplifier device (SCAMP) with a theoretical nominal 
gain of 1.8 showed that the effective experimental gain (geff) of the device turned out to be 
0.858 ± 0.020 due to losses in the amplifier device caused by splice connections and 
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inherent optical component loss.  The gain remained fairly constant over the range of |α|2 
used in the experiment.  The highest achieved success probability was found to be > 2.5%, 
at a |α|2 = 0.83 for N = 2, and was also found to be linearly dependent on the |α|2 of the 
signal state.  The post-selection conditions also allowed an increase in the overall visibility 
of the final fidelity measurement stage.  The highest success probability corresponds to 
> 25k success rate achieved by the amplifier.  This is significantly higher than other 
quantum amplifiers due to the classical light source used. 
Noise is an inherent part of communications, this can come from the spontaneous emission 
of a laser source, scattering in the channel, and background noise which is coupled into the 
channel.  If SCAMP is to be used as an amplifier in any sort of quantum cryptography 
protocol, then it must be robust to these added sources of noise.   
Initial experiments with a broadband white light source showed that noise does affect the 
success probability, conditional visibility, and the fraction of correct to total successfully 
amplified states, even with post-selection conditions.  This was primarily due to the 
broadband wavelength of the white light source, and the wavelength dependency of the 
detection efficiencies which increases at shorter wavelength in the visible regime.  The 
subtraction BS which is 90:10 at λ = 850 nm would not be uniformly 90:10 over a broader 
wavelength range because of the optical coatings on the BS itself - it is suspected that at 
lower wavelengths the BS is more reflective.  The higher reflectivity at the shorter 
wavelengths, and the higher detection efficiencies of the Si-SPAD at shorter wavelengths 
meant a significant increase in count rate was measured at the D1 subtraction stage.  The 
post-selection conditions for a successful amplification are no photon detection at D0 (the 
state comparison stage) and a detection at D1.  With little increase in the gated count rate at 
D0, but a significant increase in the D1 gated rate, the number of “successful” 
amplifications has increased, and lowered the conditional visibility. 
Although a communications channel may indeed have broadband noise due to exposed 
fibre or other input mechanisms, in practice, to minimise the effects of the noise, a series of 
optical filters would be placed either before the detectors or the SCAMP device, therefore 
only a small bandwidth of wavelengths would be propagating in the device, and incident 
on the detectors.  To test SCAMP with such noise, the 850 nm wavelength LED source 
was used to simulate background noise in a communications channel from spontaneous 
203 
 
emission and scattering.  This noise was present in all channels, the signal channel, guess 
from amplifier, and the fidelity stage, the very worst case with noisy components. 
The SCAMP device showed that it was it was more robust to added noise with a 
wavelength of 850 nm for lower |α|2, as the fraction of correct to total successful 
amplification recovered quicker (i.e. the difference in fraction with added noise became 
smaller with increasing |α|2 faster) than for the white noise case, as can be seen in Figure 
7.12 and Figure 7.16 for the white noise and 850 nm wavelength noise respectively.  
Therefore if a narrow bandwidth spectral filter(s) is (are) placed into the SCAMP device it 
will improve the robustness against out-of-band noise.  Narrow temporal gating can also 
assist. 
Increasing |α|2 for the signal state showed that the amplifier could be more robust against 
noise, however increasing the |α|2 is not ideal for quantum communications experiments, as 
it may allow for successful eavesdropping attacks, such as the photon number splitting 
attack [33].  In any case the |α|2 reaching the amplifier is very likely to be <0.5 as that is the 
largest |α|2 currently used in BB84 decoy state QKD experimental protocols [34].  Of 
course, losses in the communications channel mean the MPN will drop before reaching the 
amplifier so in reality the input |α|2 will be < 0.5.   
7.4 Conclusion & future work 
This Chapter introduced the state comparison amplifier (SCAMP), which fits into the 
category of addition and subtraction quantum optical amplifiers.  The device was 
characterised for different nominal gains, and also tested for robustness against added 
background noise.   
Table 7.1 shows a comparison of some general quantum amplifier properties for 
comparison with SCAMP.  It can be seen that SCAMP has greater success probability, 
primarily due to the use of a restricted phase-alphabet rather than a continuous range of 
phase values.  The success probability was also linearly dependent on the |α|2 used in the 
experiment and was observed to reach values >2% for |α|2 > 0.7.  It can also be seen that 
the source technology required for a SCAMP implementation is far simpler than other 
quantum amplification methods which can require single-photon sources or pair emission 
from spontaneous parametric down-conversion (SPDC).   
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Device type Source of photons Success probability 
(%) 
Nominal 
gain 
Notes 
Addition and 
subtraction 
Spontaneous 
parametric down-
conversion (SPDC), 
single-photons, 
coherent or thermal 
source 
1 × 10
-4
 to 1 ×10
-7
 >1  - Photon number resolving subtraction 
stage can increase gain. 
- Low success probability due to 
continuous range of possible phase 
values. 
Heralded 
scissor device 
SPDC 1 × 10
-3
 >1 - Use of heralded source gives low 
success probability. 
- Herald sources make the device 
robust against high loss channels. 
Entanglement 
swapping 
SPDC >>3 × 10
-3
 1 - Multiple entangled heralded sources 
for many Bell-State measurements 
make the success probability low.   
State 
comparison 
and 
subtraction 
(SCAMP) 
Coherent source Linear dependence 
on mean photon 
number  
(>2% observed) 
>1 - Simple use of off-the-shelf linear 
optics, detectors and sources. 
- Shown to be robust against noise of 
similar wavelength.   
- Required to be a trusted node. 
Table 7.1 – State comparison amplifier comparison table. 
Although the theoretical nominal gain of the SCAMP device was 1.8, the effective gain 
was 0.858 ± 0.020, meaning the device acted as an attenuator that additionally provides 
some information on the transmitted states.  This was due to inherent loss in the optical 
components and splicing.  The losses could be reduced by using purpose built components 
or even a waveguide construction, although certain waveguide materials have shown high 
loss at 850 nm, therefore a change in wavelength may be required to take full advantage of 
this approach. 
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The robustness of SCAMP with added noise was investigated using two different noise 
sources, a broadband white light source and 850 nm LED.  The white light was shown to 
have a noteworthy effect on the device performance in terms of success probability and 
fraction of correct to total successfully amplified states, as the subtraction stage detector 
saw a significant increase in gated count rate.  A photon detection at the subtraction stage 
was one of the conditions for post-selection so a significant increase in post-selected events 
would create incorrect amplification events.  This substantial increase on the subtraction 
stage was primarily due to the wavelength dependence of the reflection coefficient and 
detection efficiency.  It was judged that the use of narrow bandwidth optical filters was a 
requirement, to discard any other wavelengths of noise and therefore further measurements 
were taken with 850 nm noise.  SCAMP was found to be more robust at lower |α|2 for this 
noise, as the increase in gated count rate was noteworthy.   
The first experimental implementation of SCAMP showed a significant improvement in 
performance over existing experimental implementations in terms of success probability, 
and therefore success rate.   
Future work 
One of the main targets of SCAMP, and indeed many other quantum optical 
amplifiers/repeaters, is to increase the overall transmission distance of quantum 
communication protocols.  This would help quantum communication technologies to be 
considered in more real world applications.  Many previously presented quantum optical 
amplifier devices have only focused on the amplification of coherent states at high 
|α|2 > 0.5 with little consideration to the how a device would perform in a realistic 
communications channel.  Therefore future analysis of SCAMP would consider operation 
in an optical channel.  The optimal position for SCAMP in a communication channel, and 
the number of devices to employ are both factors that would have to be considered.  
Consideration should be made to other SCAMP configurations, and feedforward 
mechanisms which could help increase the success probability, conditional visibilities, and 
the gain. 
Indistinguishable sources 
While in the SCAMP experiments presented here the laser source was simulated by 
splitting the signal into two paths, phase modulating one of the paths to provide a “guess 
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state”, and then recombined on the state comparison BS (essentially operating as an 
interferometer) in practice a quantum amplifier node would be a self-contained device with 
its own laser source providing the photons for the “guess state”.   
 
Figure 7.17 – A schematic design of how the state comparison amplifier 
could be tested in the laboratory with two independent indistinguishable 
sources.  Each source would have separate driving electronics and controls, 
to drive the laser source, intensity modulator, and phase modulator.   
In future work a SCAMP system could be tested with two independent indistinguishable 
sources, such a two narrow spectral band-width distributed feedback lasers which are 
known to be wavelength tuneable [24].  A simple schematic of how a test system might 
look is shown in Figure 7.17, which looks similar to the system used in this experiment, 
except the guess state coherent state source is now generated by a separate source.  
Difficulties arising from the use of two independent and indistinguishable sources will 
come from the monitoring and control of the wavelengths and pulse generation from each 
source, as this will greatly affect the visibility of the state comparison and final fidelity 
stages, as high visibility requires the states to be indistinguishable, a slight change in 
wavelength will reduce the visibility dramatically [35]. 
 
Applications of the state comparison amplifier 
Like the laser at first introduction, SCAMP may be a device which is a solution looking for 
a problem.  This section discusses some of the possible applications for SCAMP. 
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Quantum fingerprinting 
Quantum fingerprinting involves three parties Alice, Bob, and a referee [36], [37].  The 
aim of the protocol is to check whether Alice and Bob have the same message, or code 
word, by sending less information for a comparison than needs to be sent by a classical 
equivalent [37].   
Alice and Bob each have a message, apply an error correction code (to increase any 
mismatches) and covert that into a sequence of encoded coherent states.  They send their 
sequences to the referee who performs a state comparison and measures the outcome. 
The quantum fingerprinting protocol does not appear to have dependence on bit rate, more 
the quality of the information reaching the referee.  If this is the case, a SCAMP device 
could be used in the communications channel to help extend the transmission distance of 
the correctly guessed states.  The post-selection events could be correlated with detection 
events at the receiver to show that the amplifier gave amplification, and the states received 
where either equal or not for the N=2 case.   
However, the low success probability of SCAMP at the low mean photon numbers 
typically used in quantum fingerprinting may mean that more information (coherent states) 
is required to be sent by Alice and Bob, meaning SCAMP actually causes the protocol to 
perform worse.  
Continuous-variable quantum key distribution (CV-QKD) 
An ideal application for quantum amplification would be to help increase the transmission 
distance of quantum communication protocols.  CV-QKD, briefly described in Chapter 3, 
uses a continuous range of mean photon numbers and phase quadrature values relying 
heavily on classical reconciliation and privacy amplification.  CV-QKD uses coherent 
states of |α|2 > 1, much greater than discrete variable protocol [38].  These higher |a|2 
values may mean SCAMP could find a use in CV-QKD. 
It was shown that as |α|2 values increased the success probability of SCAMP also 
increased.  However this would still be around 4-5% for this SCAMP configuration, too 
low for a benefit to be seen.   
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The success probability could be increased by using more efficient single photon detectors, 
and also a feedforward mechanism to correct for any known mistakes . 
Other applications 
SCAMP has been shown to operate at high clocking frequencies with a high fidelity 
output, something other quantum amplifiers have not shown as of yet.  However at present 
no immediate applications fit into the niche characteristics that SCAMP provides.   
The device also features the following properties: 
 Works with a known phase-alphabet and guesses between the values. 
 Post-selection of detection events to give noiseless amplification. 
 Success probability is linearly dependent on the |α|2 value incident on the amplifier 
node. 
 Can operate at MHz repetition frequencies. 
 High fidelity output for correctly guessed states. 
A quantum information scenario which requires amplification, but the performance is not 
dependent on an information transfer rate would be an idea application for SCAMP.   
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Chapter 8 
Further Characterisation of the State Comparison Amplifier 
8.1 Introduction 
The state comparison amplifier (SCAMP) was shown to be an interesting device in the 
previous Chapter, with higher success probability that any other experimentally realised 
non-deterministic quantum amplifier, implementing less complex experimental 
components and methods [1], [2].  This Chapter follows on from the previous Chapter’s 
work, providing a further investigation on the SCAMP device including: 
 Increasing the nominal gain from 1.8 to 9 by changing the state comparison 
beamsplitter (BS). 
o Also investigating robustness with added noise at a wavelength of 850 nm. 
 Adding an extra subtraction stage after the nominal gain of 9 SCAMP, to improve 
the conditional visibilities and fidelity. 
The reasons behind the experiments are discussed in following paragraphs, followed by the 
experimental implementation, results and discussion. Given that the experimental 
implementation and methods are very similar to the previous Chapter of SCAMP, only the 
differences will be highlighted in this Chapter, to save repetition. 
As mentioned in the previous Chapter, the original design of SCAMP had a nominal gain 
of 1.8.  When experimentally tested, it was found that the device was not actually working 
as a ‘true’ amplifier due to only having an estimated effective gain, geff, ≈ 0.87 (or, a loss 
of 0.13).  This was due to inherent losses in optical components and construction.   
Two ways of improving geff could be, constructing a device with low loss components, or 
increasing the nominal gain to overcome the losses.  The latter was chosen as the approach 
for the experiments carried out in this Chapter.  A beamsplitter (BS) with a 90:10 BS ratio 
was chosen to replace the 50:50 state comparison BS.  This would give the device a 
nominal gain of 9, following gnom=t2/r1, where r1 is the reflection of the state comparison 
BS, and t2 is the transmission of the subtraction stage. This should show true gain (i.e. 
geff >1) even in the presence of the expected system losses.  
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As before, the robustness of the SCAMP device is tested against different levels of channel 
noise.  Only the 850 nm wavelength LED is implemented in the experiment as it was 
concluded from the previous Chapter that a narrowband width filter could be used to block 
most broadband wavelength noise, as it was seen that white light noise greatly affected the 
SCAMP success rates. 
The introduction of an extra subtraction stage, allows an extra post-selection condition to 
be added.  From Chapter 6, the photon addition and subtraction experiments similar to the 
configuration of SCAMP were known to contain photon number resolving (PNR) detectors 
[3], [4].  This allowed these experiments to alter the gain factor and also fidelity.  By 
introducing an extra subtraction stage it is possible for an improved fidelity SCAMP output 
without the requirement for PNR detectors. 
8.2 Experimental implementation 
All experiments were carried out at a source repetition rate of 1 MHz, using a very similar 
experimental set-up to that used in the previous Chapter.  An experimental diagram of the 
optical system is shown in Figure 8.1 illustrates how similar the set-ups were (Figure 7.2 is 
the previous system).  The electrical system is the same for this Chapter as well, Figure 7.3 
in the previous Chapter.  Only changes to the experimental set-up are mentioned here as all 
other details can be found in the previous Chapter. 
The first change made was the swapping of the 50:50 state comparison BS with a 90:10 
BS.  This meant re-calibration of the optical losses and path lengths.  Leading to the guess 
intensity from the amplifier being ≈10× greater than the signal intensity, this is not seen as 
a problem because the amplifier node would have its own attenuated coherent source 
which could provide enough power. 
For the added noise experiment, the 850 nm wavelength LED (spectral FWHM 30 nm [5]) 
added noise was introduced by free-space coupling into the signal channel only, unlike the 
previous Chapter where it was introduced into all channels.  It was chosen only to be added 
into the signal channel to simulate noise in the signal channel only, since the noise from 
the local source of the comparison stage is likely to be considerably less. 
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Like the previous Chapter’s noise measurements the mean photon number (|α  was 
selected without any noise present.  When noise was to be added, the vertical-cavity 
surface-emitting laser (VCSEL) diode source for the experiment was blocked, the LED 
was turned on, and the level of power adjusted and monitored on the D0 state comparison 
stage detector.  Three different noise levels were set for measurement during the 
experiment, ≈ 0.1, 0.5, and 0.9 MHz noise only raw count rate on the D0 detector.  Once 
the level was set the VCSEL diode was unblocked and the experiment continued as 
normal, for a particular phase-alphabet.  
 
Figure 8.1 – A modified version of experimental diagram from the previous 
Chapter showing where the additional noise for the 90:10 BS experiments 
was added, and also the position of the extra 90:10 beamsplitter which was 
used for photon subtraction denoted 1. 
The extra subtraction stage was introduced after the first stage, denoted as position 1 in 
Figure 8.1.  The extra subtraction stage was a 90:10 BS.  This experiment was carried out 
after the 90:10 BS replacement in the state comparison stage, therefore all three BSs acting 
as the SCAMP node are 90:10.  The extra subtraction stage required another single-photon 
detector, which was the same design of silicon single-photon avalanche diode used for 
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every other experiment in this Thesis, the Excelitas SPAD [6].  This extra BS also required 
the system to be recalibrated for loss and optical path length.  It also required some editing 
of the MATLAB [7] code, to include the extra subtraction stage for data acquisition and 
processing. 
8.3 Nominal gain of 9 results 
Estimation of |α  for this experiment was calculated using Equation 8.1, a modified 
version of Equation 7.2 from the previous Chapter which is scaled to compensate for the 
90:10 ratio of the BS now used for the state comparison:  This also takes into account the 
single-photon detection efficiency (SPDE) and loss from the point of |α  before the 
comparison BS to the single-photon detector (lcomp).   
|α|2=
Maximum + Minimum
2 × SPDE × 𝑙𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝 × Repeated pattern frequency
×
10
9
   Equation 8.1 
Raw and gated count rates for N = 2, 4, and 8 are shown in Figure 8.2, with the left sub-
figures for raw count rates, while the gated count rates are on the right.  As can be seen 
when the gated and raw are compared, between 70-90% of the raw count rate is retained in 
the gating process, showing significant improvement over the previous results with the 
50:50 state comparison BS which was <5%.  The increase in retained raw rate is because 
of improved laser stability and lower background.  It can also be seen that the range of |α  
is more consistent between phase-alphabets, because of the improved laser stability. 
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Figure 8.2- 1 MHz 90:10 state comparison beamsplitter (BS) raw and gated 
count rates for N = 2, 4, and 8.  The left side are the raw count rates, while 
the right are the gated count rates.   
Figure 8.3 a), b) and c), corresponding to N = 2, 4, and 8 respectively, show how the 
conditional visibility described in the previous Chapter (Equation 7.4) changes as different 
conditions are applied - from no comparison or subtraction to a comparison or subtraction 
only, to full comparison and subtraction.   
Interestingly, while in the 50:50 state comparison BS experiment the ‘comparison only’ 
condition was only a marginal improvement over the ‘no comparison or subtraction’ case, 
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and the ‘comparison and subtraction’ only marginally improved upon the ‘subtraction 
only’, whilst for the 90:10 state comparison BS this was not the case across the full range 
of |α .  At |α  <0.2 this is still true, however, at |α ≥0.2 the ‘subtraction only’, and 
‘comparison only’ overlap and cross.  For the 50:50 state comparison BS, the loss 
balancing on the state comparison BS meant that when a guess was π out phase with 
signal, all the photons would be routed to the D0 detector, while in the 90:10 case, photons 
will still be routed through the amplifier.  The increase in detections at D1 will lead to a 
lower conditional visibility, while a good visibility on the state comparison will still mean 
the guess right will not be routed to the D0 detector.  Therefore at higher |α|2 the 
comparison only events are more significant. 
 
Figure 8.3 – 90:10 state comparison beamsplitter (BS) conditional 
visibilities calculated using Equation 6.5 for N = 2, 4, and 8.   
The conditional visibility for N = 2, 4, and 8 increases with |α|2, however the final point in 
N = 2 drops off unexpectedly.  The detectors at these |α|2 are counting at >1 MHz, so there 
may be some nonlinear effect taking place in the detectors [6]. 
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The target state fraction (TSF), plotted in Figure 8.3 d), following Equation 7.5, is the 
fraction of successful amplification events which are guessed correctly.  The TSF remained 
constant for the 50:50 state comparison configuration aside from at very low |α|2 where the 
count rate was approaching the dark count rate, while in this experiment the TSF increases 
as the |α|2 increases.  This is thought to be due to non-linearity effects in the detectors for 
the greater intensity pulses. 
Following on from the TSF, Figure 8.4 shows the total success rates, with correctly and 
incorrectly guessed successes for N = 2, 4, and 8, a), b), and c) respectively.  It can be seen 
that at higher |α|2 (>1), the other guessed success rate tails and drops off.  This is thought to 
be caused by the recovery of the detectors at the high photon counting levels at these high 
|α|2 levels.  This effect is largely seen in the N = 4, and 8 figures, which is why the total 
success rate tails off for those two phase-alphabets as is seen in Figure 8.4 d). 
 
Figure 8.4 – Success rates for N = 2, 4, and 8 in a), b), and c).  The total 
success rates placed together for comparison in d). 
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The estimated effective gain, geff, of the 90:10 SCAMP amplifier is shown in Figure 8.5 a), 
following Equations 7.6, 7.7, and 7.8 and taking into account the state comparison BS 
ratios.  The figure shows that geff is >1, indicating that is does indeed work as an amplifier, 
unlike the previous configuration.  The decreasing trend with increasing |α|2 comes from 
non-linear detector response and dead-time in the detectors at higher |α|2, although even 
then the estimated effective gain is still >1.   
The success probability, as given in Figure 8.5 b), has been shown to reach a value of >5% 
for |α|2 >0.4.  The success probability is defined as the number of successful correlations 
from the SCAMP amplifier (i.e. time correlations when there are no measured events at 
D0, and a measured event at D1) divided by the clock frequency of the system, which in 
this case is 1 MHz.  It can be seen that the success probability can reach as high as 
21.8 ± 0.48% from N = 2, at a |α|2 ≈ 1.4.  This corresponds to a success rate of >200 KHz, a 
factor of 10 greater than seen in the previous experiment.  The trends for success 
probability are equal across the different N values for |α|2 < 0.7, however |α|2 > 0.7 N = 2 
follows a separate trend to the N = 4, and 8 case.  This is thought to be caused by the clock 
frequency of the laser which was so high that the detectors were unable to recover at such 
high photon counting levels, causing the ‘other amplification successes’ to be missed, 
reducing the overall success probability. 
 
Figure 8.5 – Estimated effective gain, a), and the success probability, b). 
If a comparison between the 50:50 BS, 1 MHz results are taken, for |α|2 = 0.238, the 
success probability is 0.491%, where as in the 90:10 BS case for a similar |α|2 = 0.213, the 
success probability is 2.76%, a significant increase in the success probability.   
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One of the primary improvements the 90:10 state comparison BS SCAMP device has 
shown is the increased estimated effective gain of >1.  The geff value is ≈ 4.7, however this 
decreased with increasing |α|2 due to the fidelity stage DA, and DB, where non-linear 
detector responses occurred due to high peak intensities of the amplified beam.  
Significantly higher success probabilities were also shown, having a linear relationship 
with increasing |α|2 until limitation of visibility and non-linear detector response caused 
some deviation at higher |α|2 (i.e. >0.5).   
8.3.1 90:10 state comparison beamsplitter noise analysis 
The results presented in this section are for the N = 4 case like the previous Chapter.   
Figure 8.6 shows the a) total raw count rate, b-e) gated rates for each detector and f) the 
total success rate for N = 4, with no added noise, and the three other levels of added noise.   
In Figure 8.6 a), the total count rate, it can be seen that the no noise measurements follow 
an almost linear trend with |α|2.  With the addition of noise, an offset is added that increases 
with the increasing noise.   
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Figure 8.6 – Added 850 nm wavelength LED noise to the 90:10 state 
comparison beamsplitter (BS) set up a) raw count rates, b-e) gated count 
rates, and the total success rate for N = 4.   
The general trend for the gated count rate with added noise is to decrease with increased 
level.  Because the noise is essentially a constant background, the number of increased 
events outside the gating region is causing the number of events in the gated region to 
drop.  This is because an event outside the gating region will cause the detector to reset.  
The reduced gated rate leads to a reduced total success rate, seen in Figure 8.6 f).  
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Figure 8.7 – N=4 850 nm noise conditional visibilities calculated using 
Equation 6.4, the four different conditional visibilities, ‘no comparison or 
subtraction’ a), ‘comparison only’ b), ‘subtraction only’ c), and 
‘comparison and subtraction’ d). 
Conditional visibility trends with no noise are shown in Figure 8.3 b) for N = 4.  It was 
found that as |α|2 increased, the trends for ‘no comparison or subtraction’ and ‘subtraction 
only’ were to decrease, while the trends for ‘comparison only’ and ‘comparison and 
subtraction’ were to increase with |α|2.  Figure 8.7 shows the results for N = 4 with a sub-
figure for each condition.  The first point in each trend is the no noise measurement for that 
|α|2 and it can be seen that for the no noise measurements the sae trends are seen as in 
Figure 8.3.  As expected from the previous Chapter’s noise results, the increased level of 
noise reduces the conditional visibility.  However increasing |α|2 allows for some 
compensation. 
It was shown from Figure 8.4, the fraction of correct/total successful amplifications for 
N = 2, 4, and 8, increased with greater |α|2, i.e. the fraction of correct over total 
successfully amplified states increased.  This was found to be due to a decrease in 
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incorrectly guessed successes because of nonlinear detector properties and dead-time.  It 
can be seen from Figure 8.8 that the added noise at |α|2 <1 tends to decrease this fraction, 
as the added noise creates false events on the D0 detector making the decreasing the 
number of correctly guess successful states.  At the highest |α|2 it can be seen that the noise 
has a varied effect on the fraction, probably because there are so many events on the D1 
subtraction stage, and the effect of the added noise (i.e. adding counts into the D0 detector) 
is not as significant as at lower |α|2.   
 
Figure 8.8 – Fraction of the correctly guess successful amplifications over 
the total number of successful amplifications for N = 4.   
8.4 Extra subtraction stage 
As mentioned previously an extra subtraction stage, (following the original subtraction 
stage) was introduced to increase the fidelity and conditional visibilities of the 90:10 state 
comparison amplifier output, in a similar way to how photon number resolving (PNR) 
detectors [8] could be conditioned to post-select events with M numbers of photons for 
variable fidelity and gain [4].   
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Figure 8.9 – The raw and gated count rates for N = 2, and 4.   
The raw and gated count rates are shown in Figure 8.9 for N = 2 (a and b), and 4 (c and d).  
Phase-alphabet N = 8 was not considered for these experiments as it has been seen in all 
other SCAMP experiments that it follows that same trends as N=2 and 4, just at different 
values. 
The extra subtraction stage detector is denoted D2 detector and it was found that it had a 
higher gated (and raw) count rate than the first subtraction stage (D1), this could be 
because of extra losses between the first subtraction stage BS and its corresponding 
detector.   
The extra subtraction stage introduces additional loss, from splices and inherent component 
loss, so it can be seen that DA, and DB detectors have a lower raw count rates than seen 
earlier in the Chapter.  The gating process retained on average 87.3 ± 0.7 % of the raw 
count rate, which is on par with the 90:10 results presented earlier in the Chapter, which 
were found to be 70 - 90%. 
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The conditional visibilities are presented in a different manner to those presented 
previously.  This change in presentation is to give the reader a full appreciation of the 
improvement the second subtraction stage conditions give to the fully conditioned 
visibility over just one subtraction stage.   
 
Figure 8.10 – The conditional visibilities for N = 2 and N = 4 calculated 
using Equation 7.4. 
Figure 8.10 shows four sub figures where a), and b) are for N = 2, also c), and d) for N = 4.  
a) and c) represent the four post-selection conditions which require either 1, or 0 
correlations with the DA, and DB events.  Two different ‘subtraction only’ events can 
occur based on either the D1 or D2 subtraction detectors firing.  The correlations follow 
the same trends as the 90:10 BS presented earlier in, with the ‘comparison only’ and 
‘subtraction only’ visibilities intersecting at a |α|2 ≈ 0.4.  Figures b) and d) show the post-
selection conditions for fully amplified correlation (no detection at D0, and a subtraction at 
either D1, or D2), and the fully amplified correlations where both subtraction detectors 
measure and event, with no detection at D0.  It can be seen that the extra subtraction stage 
post-selection condition (i.e. requiring both subtraction stages to trigger events) improves 
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the post-selected visibility by up to 5% at the low |α|2 values over the standard one 
subtraction stage event.  Therefore adding addition subtraction stages with post-selection 
conditions can improve the conditional visibility of the system, and therefore the fidelity.   
It should be noted that large uncertainties that occur for |α|2 <0.3 because the number of 
correlations for both D1 and D2 subtraction stages firing are only a few correlations (which 
can be seen in the success rates Figure 8.11 d), so fluctuations create large standard 
deviations, creating the large uncertainty observed [9].   
 
Figure 8.11 - Success rates for the state comparison amplifier (SCAMP). 
The success rates for N = 2, and 4 are shown in Figure 8.11, where a), and b) correspond to 
N = 2, and c), and d) correspond to N = 4.  a) and c) show the total success rate, correctly 
guessed success and other guessed states successes for the success time-correlations of D0 
not measuring an event, and both subtraction detectors (D1 and D2) measuring an event.  
N = 2 shows a dominance of correctly guessed success states, however N = 4 shows the 
reverse, that there are a lot more “other” guessed states being amplified than the correct.  
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This feature was also seen in the 90:10 results shown in Figure 8.4, however the 
percentage of ‘other’ states is much greater with the extra subtraction stage.   
Sub-figures b) and d) show the total success rates for the amplifier based on the D1 only 
events, D2 only events, and correlations with D1 and D2.  These, of course, take into 
account the required absence of a detection event at D0 as well.  The single detection event 
rates of D1, and D2, alone, are very similar.  However the total success rate of D1 and D2 
correlations show a significant decrease in the success rate, especially at the lower |α|2 of 
the investigated range, i.e. <1.  This is because of the decreasing likelihood of having two 
photons in the pulse even with the amplification, and also detecting two simultaneously on 
separate detectors.   
The extra subtraction stage adds some changes the ultimate transmission of the device, 
meaning the new nominal gain of the SCAMP device is now 8.1 (because of the extra 
90:10 subtraction BS, essentially giving t2 = 0.81).  As well as a lower nominal gain, extra 
loss due to inherent component losses and fusion splicing during construction also lowers 
geff.  Figure 8.12 a), and d), show geff for the SCAMP device with an extra subtraction stage 
for N = 2, and 4.  This was calculated using Equations 7.6, 7.7 and 7.8 from the previous 
Chapter.  Both geff follow the same trend of dropping with increasing |α|
2
, as was also seen 
in the base 90:10 results, Figure 8.5. 
The success probabilities for N = 2, and 4 are shown in Figure 8.12 b) and d).  It can be 
seen that the success probability for a state comparison and subtraction correlation based 
on D1 or D2, are almost equal. Success probability based on D2 is slightly higher due to its 
increased success rate maintaining the idea that there is extra loss in D1 subtraction stage 
leading to the detector itself.  The success probability for correlations based on a detection 
at D1 and D2 are substantially lower for |α|2 <0.8 where they are below 1 %.  The success 
probability does start to increase nonlinearly with |α|2 >0.8, but is still always lower than 
the success probability of the system with one subtraction stage. 
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Figure 8.12 – The estimated effective gain, a) and c), and also the success 
probability, b) and d), for N = 2 and 4 respectively. 
Overall, the extra subtraction stage has shown some interesting properties.  It does show 
reduced estimated effective gain, however it still works very much as an amplifier with a 
value of >1.6.  The extra subtraction stage showed an increase in the state comparison and 
subtraction conditional visibility, by up to 5 %, however the fully conditioned success 
probability was lower.  For N = 4 it was shown that the ‘other’ guess states had an 
increased success rate over the ‘correct’ guess states, relative to the previously shown 
90:10 results. 
8.5 Summary 
Replacing the 50:50 BS at the comparison stage of the previous design iteration with a 
90:10 BS gave a nominal gain of 9 but also showed a reduced conditional visibility, which 
was to be expected, as the amplifier is now always sending an output, even when guessing 
wrong.  It was found that the output of the ‘comparison only’ case followed the same trend 
as ‘comparison and subtraction’ while the ‘subtraction only’ case followed the trend of ‘no 
comparison or subtraction’.  This is the reverse of what was observed in the 50:50 state 
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comparison BS experiment, but it is not unexpected.  The amplifier will always be giving 
an output even when making an incorrect guess, this means the condition based on the D1 
subtraction stage becomes more common for right and wrong guesses, making its effect in 
the conditional visibility less significant, while the D0 detector events become more 
significant because of the high maximum and low minimum for the right and wrong guess.  
The ‘comparison only’ and ‘subtraction only’ were also found to have a crossover at an  
|α|2 ≈ 0.4, showing that increasing the |α|2 changes the significance of the conditions as 
more photons are added to the device as the detection a D1 is becoming more common 
than a detection at D0 leading to less significance in the conditional visibilities. 
Noise was purposely added into the higher nominal gain SCAMP using a 90:10 BS to 
simulate noise in a communication channel.  The way in which the noise was introduced 
was modified to give a better simulation of noise in a communications channel.  The same 
850 nm wavelength LED as used in the previous added noise experiment was shone free-
space onto the signal channel splice, which allowed coupling of 850 nm photons into the 
core and cladding.  The addition of noise in this way allowed it to be added to the signal 
channel only, simulating noise from the communications channel only.  In the previous 
addition of noise experiment the 850 nm noise was added into all channels, but this was 
seen as unrealistic, because the fidelity reference, and coherent source at the amplifier node 
should have low, or no excess noise.  Again the 850 nm wavelength noise was chosen 
because it is presumed a quantum optical amplifier node would have an optical bandwidth 
filter to block broadband wavelength noise.   
As in the previous set of added noise results, SCAMP was shown to be robust to additional 
noise with higher |α|2 (i.e. >0.5).  However, low levels of noise 0.1 MHz (raw noise on the 
D0 detector) were shown to be acceptable even at |α|2 <0.5.  The conditional visibility was 
the most affected property due to lower visibility on the outer interferometer, and slightly 
increased gated rate on the D1 detector.   
The addition of the extra subtraction stage to the 90:10 BS experiment showed that the 
conditional visibilities could be improved by as much as 5% for the post-selection 
condition of no detected events at the state comparison stage, and a detection event at both 
subtraction stages.  This improvement was over the post-selection condition of no detected 
events at the state comparison stage, and a detection event at one subtraction stage.  This 
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improved conditional visibility does come at a cost to the overall system performance 
however, as it was seen the success probability dropped by up to 5% also the estimated 
effective gain dropped by a factor of 2 because of extra losses, and lower nominal gain, 
over the previous 90:10 results.   
8.6 SCAMP device conclusion and future work 
Table 8.1 shows the collated summary of the various experiments performed with SCAMP 
from this Chapter and the previous.  The results in Table 8.1 focus on the N = 4 phase-
alphabet, as it equivalent to the BB84[10] type protocols commonly used in quantum 
communications [1], [11], [12] and therefore is the most relevant for real world 
applications.  Also included for reference are the general properties of the photon addition 
and subtraction devices that have been experimentally demonstrated prior to the SCAMP 
experiment.  The comparison to these devices is made because the SCAMP device fits into 
the category of photon addition and subtraction devices. 
Device type Clock 
frequency 
(MHz) 
|α|2 range Success 
probability 
(%) 
Effective gain Notes 
50:50 state 
comparison 
1  0.013 – 0.551 
 
0.026 – 1.42 
 
0.858 ± 0.020 
 
- Good success probability, 
however <1 gain factor 
90:10 state 
comparison 
1  0.01-1.53 0.10 – 14.98 4.46-1.83 - Success probability seen higher in 
N = 2.  N = 4 values are for reduced 
visibility.   
Extra 
subtraction 
stage 
1 0.043 – 1.49 0.0025 – 7.60 2.67 – 1.63 - Increased conditional visibility 
due to more significant detection 
for post-selection.   
Addition 
and 
subtraction 
(general) 
- 0-2 1 × 10
-4
 - 1 × 10
-7
 >1  - Photon number resolving 
subtraction stage can increase gain. 
- Low success probability due to 
continuous range of possible phase 
values. 
Table 8.1 –Collated results for N = 4 for all SCAMP experiments 
performed in this Thesis. 
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It can be seen that all SCAMP configurations have significantly improved success 
probability over previous photon addition and subtraction devices.  This is primarily due to 
the fixed phase-alphabet incorporated into the photon addition stage, which limits the 
phase space in which the amplifier can randomise its guess photons.  A secondary, but 
arguably equally important factor, is the experimental simplicity of the SCAMP device 
over previously demonstrated devices, because it does not use complex quantum resources 
(such as spontaneous parametric down-conversion) for the photon sources, or complex 
photon number resolving detectors.   
The initial 50:50 state comparison BS device showed an improved success probability over 
previously shown photon addition and subtraction devices, however the estimated effective 
gain was found to be less than 1, making it an attenuator.   
To improve the estimated effective gain, the 50:50 state comparison BS was replaced with 
a 90:10 BS, which showed an improved success probability and gain.  However the 
conditional visibilities dropped as a result because the amplifier always produces an output 
even if the guess is wrong. 
An extra subtraction stage was introduced to compensate for the decrease in conditional 
visibilities with the 90:10 BS, resulting in a drop in the gain and success probability, 
however, these were still higher than the 50:50 state comparison BS based device.   
Overall SCAMP has been further characterised to show a high success probability, >1 
estimated effective gain, and high conditional visibilities.  The device far outperforms 
other photon addition and subtraction devices, and indeed all other previously 
experimentally realised quantum optical amplifiers. 
Future work 
Similar to the previous Chapter’s future work section, this Chapter will mention that a 
SCAMP device which implements two indistinguishable independent sources is a key 
experiment for showing an independent amplifying node.  All SCAMP experiments have 
been shown with the same source, where an interferometer has split the power into two 
paths, and then had them recombined.  This simulates two indistinguishable sources, 
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however showing that it really does work with two separate sources would show that the 
SCAMP device could possibly be used as a remote quantum amplifier.   
Improving the success probability of the quantum amplifier is also an important feature of 
quantum amplifiers.  As quantum communication is a possible application for quantum 
amplifiers, low success probabilities will actually lower the key generation rate and 
maximum transmission distance making their implementation a hindrance.  One novel way 
to improve the success probability could be to incorporate some sort of feedforward 
mechanism, which allows an amplifier node to correct any known mistakes it has made 
during amplification. 
For instance, take the 50:50 state comparison stage for N = 2 (phase-encodings 0 and π).  
In this case, when the amplifier node guesses wrong, all photons are routed to the D0 
detector, and none pass through the amplifier, in a high visibility case.  If the guess is right, 
all photons are routed through the amplifier.  Therefore if an amplifier makes a guess, and 
detects a photon at D0, they know they are wrong and can make another guess which is 
correct.  This relies on information being transferred forward, so that the same pulse can 
still be amplified.  This will rely on fast electronic switching, and also some form of low-
loss photon delay mechanism, such a lengths of silica optical fibre, which can delay a 
photon pulse by 1 ns for every ≈ 0.2 m of optical-fibre, with a loss of 0.2 dB/km. 
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Chapter 9  
Conclusions and Future Work 
9.1 Conclusions 
Chapter 2 introduced technology that can used to experimentally realise theoretical 
quantum communication protocols.  Coherent sources, silicon single-photon avalanche 
diodes are common technologies used throughout the thesis because they are commercially 
available and easy to use.  Other technologies such as single-photon sources and quantum 
memories (QM) are not directly implemented in the experiments, however they were 
described in overviews to illustrate why they were not used.  They are simply not 
experimentally mature enough to be realistically used in quantum communication 
technologies. 
Chapter 3 introduced both conventional and quantum cryptography and digital signatures.  
Commonly used public-key cryptography were said to be at risk from attacks from 
quantum computers running one of the known quantum search algorithms.  Quantum safe 
protocols, both conventional and quantum were described.  Conventional quantum-safe 
protocols still rely on one-way functions which are currently secure against known search 
algorithms, however like public-key cryptography are at risk from possible future 
breakthroughs in search algorithms.  Quantum protocols, on the other hand, are made 
secure by the laws of quantum mechanics, which have been rigorously tested over many 
years, and are therefore more likely to be safe from future breakthroughs.   
Chapter 4 described the first experimental implementation of quantum digital signatures 
which did not require a quantum memory for the swap and comparison mechanism, or the 
discrimination of the phase-encoded quantum states sent by Alice.  While the predecessor 
experiment required QM for the state discrimination measurement, Chapter 4 introduced 
unambiguous state discrimination and elimination, a passive state discrimination 
measurement.  For a 0.01% probability of forging, the shortest signature half-bit length 
was found to be 5.13 × 10
13
 for a |α|2 = 1.  This gave a time for Alice to send of 
5.13 × 10
5
 seconds, which is approximately 5.94 days.  The signature half-bit length, and 
time taken for Alice to send was also found to increase with |α|2.   
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Chapter 5 described the next stage in removing the experimental complexities of quantum 
digital signatures by removing the lossy and bulky multiport which performed the swap 
and comparison mechanism in all previous experimental realisations.  By removing the 
requirement for quantum memory in the state discrimination measurement, the receivers 
could store their sent signature elements classically, this meant they could perform the 
swap and comparison mechanism classically in post-processing, rather than using the 
optical multiport which limits the achievable transmission distance to several metres.  This 
was shown up to a transmission distance of 2 km in optical fibre with two receivers, Bob 
and Charlie.  An optimised signature half-bit length at 500 m was found to be 1.93 × 10
9
 
for |α|2 = 0.4, taking Alice ≈19.3 s to send to a receiver.   
Chapter 6 moved away from QDS and introduced the next topic of the Thesis, quantum 
amplification.  Conventional telecommunication amplification was introduced, and an 
explanation why these amplifiers cannot be directly used in quantum communications was 
given, essentially because of the added noise.  Non-deterministic quantum amplifiers were 
introduced, these allow the added noise to be overcome by post-selection of photon events 
at the expense of success probability.   
Chapter 7 introduced a relatively new quantum amplifier, the state comparison amplifier 
(SCAMP). This device has similarities to other devices in the photon addition and 
subtraction category, however as was seen there are many difference in the technology 
used in practice.  The use of commercial available technology and fixed phase-alphabets 
allowed the state comparison amplifier to perform much better than all previously 
demonstrated quantum amplifiers.  Success probabilities of >2% were observed for mean 
photon numbers (|α|2) >0.7.  SCAMP was also shown to be robust to additional noise if |α|2 
was increased, however it was shown to less robust to broadband wavelength noise due to 
an increased detection rate on the subtraction detector.  Although the nominal gain was 
said to be 1.8, the loss of the device actually attenuated the signal with a gain of 0.858.   
Chapter 8 was a further investigation into the characteristics of the SCAMP device.  The 
first investigation was to increase the nominal gain of the device from 1.8 to 9, in order to 
show a device that actually had gain.  This actual gain was found to be up to 4.46, with a 
success probability of >14% at |α|2 >1.0, corresponding to >140 kHz success rate.  This 
device configuration was also shown to be robust to noise as |α|2 is increased.  An extra 
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subtraction stage was also added onto the SCAMP device to increase the output fidelity, 
this was shown to reduce the gain and success probability, however the conditional 
visibility (directly relatable to fidelity) was shown to increase marginally.   
9.2 Future work 
As was discussed in at the end of Chapters 5, one of the limiting factors in the achievable 
distance is the choice of wavelength.  At 850 nm the loss in standard telecommunication 
optical fibre is 2.2 dB/km.  Add to this coupling losses and mode mismatches will only 
shorten the maximum achievable distance.  The primary reason for this choice of 
wavelength was the silicon detector technology available which has moderate detection 
efficiency, low dark count rates and 10’s of ns dead-time.  However a move to a 
wavelength in the telecommunication region 1550 nm would allow optical loss of 
0.2 dB/km, and minimal coupling and mode matching losses.  The downside of 
switching to 1550 nm is that the detection efficiencies for InGaAs/InP detection 
technology tends to be lower, also with higher dark count rates.  However the detection 
technology for 1550 nm is an active area of research, so detector characteristics are 
improving.  
Whether or not the move from 850 nm to 1550 nm is made, another future step for QDS 
which could improve the achievable distance is to implement more efficient protocol.  This 
could be performed by the protocol presented by Amiri et al. in [1], with some adjustments 
to the post-processing and propagation direction of quantum channel.   
The state comparison amplifier was shown to have significant improvements over all other 
quantum optical amplifiers, to the best of my knowledge.  Although a solid application for 
SCAMP is not currently known one of the desired applications for quantum amplifiers is in 
quantum communication protocols, to either help improve the transmission distance, or 
simply improve the probability of detecting a certain quantum state.  As well as 
investigating applications in quantum communications other applications need to be found. 
Experiments carried out with SCAMP in this Thesis were carried out using the same 
coherent source which was split and then recombined using an interferometer.  For 
SCAMP to be tested as a real device, experiments using two indistinguishable sources, one 
for a sender, and the other as the amplifiers node must be performed.   
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Recent trends in quantum communication has been to move from bulky optical 
components spliced together, to integration on chip [2].  This gives optical systems which 
can be cheaper, have increased stability, and be more compact.  In the right material the 
optical systems can also be less lossy as well.  SCAMP is a relatively simply device, a 
coherent source, two beamsplitters and two detectors, however it is quite bulky.  Moving to 
an integrated device will give a more compact device which is more robust to 
environmental changes and has the potential to have reduced losses and be more cost-
effective.  
Although the success probability of SCAMP is higher than other quantum amplifiers, it can 
be improved further by a feedforward mechanism.  For instance if two phase-encodings 
were implemented in SCAMP, in the nominal gain of 1.8 set-up, the state comparison is 
either right or wrong, with all photons going through the amplifier or to the detector.  In 
the wrong case, a second guess can be made which corrects the initial guess.  Or in the 
right guess, another correct guess can be made to increase the gain.  This feedforward will 
rely on optical delays long enough for the detector electronics to trigger (or not trigger) and 
event, and then also encode the phase of the second guess.  This could be up several 
hundred nanoseconds or even into microsecond delays.   
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